JUNE 1960

Commentary

THE AMERICAN CRISIS
DAVID RIESMAN/MICHAEL MACCOBY

HANS J. MORGENTHAU
OUR THWARTED REPUBLIC

Middle-Class Judaism — A Case Study
Lucy S. Dawidowicz

Totalitarianism Reconsidered
Richard Lowenthal

Entangling Juvenile Delinquency
Kenneth Keniston

Socialism & Democracy
Oscar Gass

Stanley Kramer's "On the Beach"
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A Conference on the Sit-ins
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
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THE ISSUE—JUNE 1960

Like Daniel Bell's article on collective bargaining in our March issue, Hans J. Morgenthau's extraordinary analysis of the executive function points to the signs of obsolescence in an apparently vital American institution and attributes this obsolescence to technological and other changes whose consequences we have been slow to acknowledge. Mr. Morgenthau is currently working on a book called *The Purpose of America,* in which he argues that this country either represents a dedication to "equality in freedom" or it is nothing. In "The American Crisis," however, David Riesman and Michael Maccoby contend very persuasively that in a heavily industrialized and prosperous society like our own, the ideals of equality and freedom cannot possibly serve as the basis for a renewed sense of national purpose. Mr. Morgenthau's own description of "the new feudalism," I think, supplies a good deal of evidence to support their view. How can we speak of freedom if the people have no recourse against the government and when the government itself, though infinitely more powerful vis-à-vis the people than ever before, has been eroded from within by a multiplicity of semi-autonomous departments and from without by huge concentrations of private power? What can equality mean in such a situation? Messrs. Riesman and Maccoby are probably right in their feeling that a renewed sense of national purpose can only come from a large-scale effort by Americans to cope with the revolutionary problems of affluence—those involving the nature of work and the plague of apathy—and that this in turn requires the mobilization of a movement to end the cold war. But is there really a "peace party" in the Soviet Union strong enough to prevail if the West should find a way of overcoming those forces within its own sphere who wish to keep the cold war alive? It is, of course, true that many changes have taken place in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin. Even Richard Lowenthal, who argues elsewhere in this issue that the essential *structure* of Soviet totalitarianism has never been touched, would probably admit that Khrushchev's Russia is a more pleasant place to live in than Stalin's. But there seems to be no very compelling reason to believe that a desire to end the cold war must be included among those changes. And even if we assume that Khrushchev actually does represent a Communist "peace party," what last month's summit fiasco appears to have indicated is that Khrushchev (for all that he is the ruler of a totalitarian state) is almost as subject to pressure from the advocates of a tough line both in Russia and China as Eisenhower is from our own "cold warriors."

Nothing, incidentally, could more strikingly illustrate the hunger for a "new far-reaching idealistic political movement" that Messrs. Riesman and Maccoby feel in the air than Ted Dienstfrey's piece on the sit-ins. With all his concern over the race problem, Mr. Dienstfrey recognizes that it is the product of a kind of cultural lag and that its solution can only bring the Negroes themselves face to face with the more general problems of our society for which there are, as yet, no real solutions.—N.P.

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The American Crisis

Political Idealism and the Cold War

DAVID RIESMAN & MICHAEL MACCOBY

A VERY large number of the ablest minds in the country, if concerned at all with defense and foreign policy, work for the Air Force's Rand Corporation, the Army's Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins, or in the CIA. In some universities, the political science department has close personal and professional ties with such agencies. So, too, within each of the Armed Services and the AEC there are exceptionally intelligent men whose full-time job it is to find holes in any possibility of a test ban or other rapprochement with the Russians. They are in the business of manufacturing objections, much as any military clique in any country can manufacture incidents. Take, for example, the fantastic idea, developed in Edward Teller's Livermore Laboratory, that deep holes might be dug in salt mines and bombs exploded therein without anybody's noticing—a notion that is fantastic, not because the Russians couldn't do it, but because it would take a long time, require immense commotion of men and machines, and would therefore be very hard to keep secret, if not from us, then from the Russian people themselves. Moreover, there are numerous indications that the Soviet Union has little interest in testing small or "clean" nuclear weapons, and that many Soviet citizens have a better sense of the dangers of a spread of nuclear weapons than is often found on the American side.*

Once upon a time, the Navy in its own interest opposed reliance on massive retaliation, and its experts were therefore free to explore the dangers of this doctrine. But then, faced with a declining strategic role, the Navy traded doctrine for budget —reaping a harvest in big carriers and

DAVID RIESMAN, whose books include *The Lonely Crowd* and *Individualism Reconsidered*, is currently Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences at Harvard. MICHAEL MACCOBY has studied at Harvard and Oxford, and has taught social science both at Harvard and Chicago. The present article, the authors write, "was prepared for *The Liberal Papers*—a collection edited by Marcus Raskin for a group of Democratic Congressmen—and was stimulated by our work in helping to found a new organization, the Committees of Correspondence, which hopes to enlist intellectuals in mobilizing a radical and inventive response to the problem of war and its implications for American culture."

* There is also a certain disingenuousness in the arguments of some American experts that emphasize Soviet cheating rather than their own fears that Los Alamos will be disbanded if scientists and technicians cannot continue legitimate testing—these anxieties raise the possibility, never mentioned so far as we know in the press, that the Americans might also cheat.

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atomic submarines—and joined the Air Force in alliance against the remaining Army men (such as Generals Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor) whose recurrent protests have usually led to their leaving the intra-service battlefield altogether. Today, only a few amateurs, some university professors, and a small group of liberal Congressmen are free to explore the risks of current military policy and the foreign policy to which it leads.

The authors of this essay are neither experts on defense nor on foreign policy. At the same time, we have had some experience in seeing the experts make mistakes by virtue of their expertise. This does not mean that amateurs are necessarily better than professionals; but until a serious effort is mobilized for peace, amateurs will probably have to be relied upon for new ideas in the field of defense and foreign policy.

AMONG the most important and interesting problems of education is that of exploring the means by which people can learn to make a proper judgment of expert opinion. One way is to become expert in a particular field oneself. Another approach is to gain some sense of the kind of perspective or style of perception that the experts use, as a basis for seeing what might be the possible limitations of their view in a given instance. Thus one can find experts privy to discussions concerning deterrence who talk about the American ability to "accept," let us say, ten or thirty million casualties—experts who are familiar with the post-World War II disaster studies but who fail to ask what sort of backwoods reactionaries would take over whatever would be left of America if our major urban centers were destroyed in a nuclear (or biological or other mass) war.

So, too, there are other men, intelligent enough to grasp some of the inherent weaknesses in the strategy of deterrence, who have speculated about an automatic deterrent, protected from the possibility of human frailty on our side. One mechanism that has been proposed for achieving this is a cobalt bomb, aimed at all countries having nuclear power themselves and primed to go off without reference to a human chain of command the moment any nuclear weapon is fired at us. The argument for such a scheme is that if a potential enemy thinks that we, as human beings, might decide for some reason or other not to hit back (despite the fact that we are equipped to do so) then our deterrent, though still terrifying, loses its absolute value; therefore we must try to set up a system over which none of us has any control. This reasoning, logical as far as it goes, typically leaves other variables out of account altogether—like the fact that becoming the prisoners of our own mechanisms would intensify the dangerous feelings of helplessness which the policy of deterrence has already succeeded in producing. It would mean surrendering the hope that the human race can get control of the arms race—even though it has been argued that once the automatic cobalt bomb was known to exist, no one would tempt fate.

One further point about experts: they have fended off outsiders, including many intelligent Congressmen, by establishing as a condition of entering the debate on armaments a knowledge of highly technical matters (frequently "classified") and the possession of a polished rationality of the game-theory sort. Many of the traditional pacifist groups can make no headway in this situation—they are regarded, if not as un-American, then as all heart and no head. There are, however, a few fortunate exceptions among the experts: for example, George Kennan, whose life shows that it is possible to combine the knowledge of an expert with the sound sense of the amateur and the broadly educated human being.

The situation in Great Britain is much healthier in these respects. Stimulated in part by George Kennan's BBC lectures of a few years ago, an active discussion

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has been taking place in England of alternatives to nuclear war, with the proposals ranging from unilateral disarmament to diplomatic maneuvers aimed at easing particular points of tension in the cold war, whether in China or in Germany. Last year, and again this year, many thousands of men and women marched from the Aldermaston atomic energy plant to London in a protest against the plans for nuclear war; a large fraction of the Labor party is opposed to the policy of deterrence, and the Conservative party also contains a significant number of political leaders who are capable of rising above nationalism. It is inconceivable, for instance, that the British equivalent of Lyndon Johnson would respond to something like the spy plane incident by backing his blundering government right or wrong.

WHAT accounts for this difference between Britain and America? The problem of dealing with experts is the same in both countries, although in Britain—which is smaller and still partially aristocratic in nature—political leaders are less cut off than ours are from intellectuals, literary men, and scientists. It may be that people feel safer in this country because it is big and powerful and seemingly remote from the traditional areas of danger. This is an irrational feeling in the modern world of deterrence, since our fearful power and our weapons themselves become a lightning rod inviting attack; nevertheless the feeling does seem to exist. A Gallup poll in January roughly mirrored the results of a poll taken by Samuel Stouffer a few years ago: when people in a national cross-section are questioned about their worries a large proportion of them mention health and family troubles, and another fraction money troubles, but only one in fourteen allude to the international situation.* Yet half the Gallup sample also thought that there would be another war before too long—a war that, as the general texture of their answers indicates, has very little reality for them. Mothers, for instance, said that they didn't want their sons to serve overseas—evidently still unaware, despite the headlines, that in effect there is no "overseas" in modern war.

Another, and related difference between this country and Britain, is that on the whole Americans have not suffered much from recent history. Whatever suffering the Second World War involved for a few was more than matched, for millions, by the fact that the war brought the great depression to an end. Besides, the war left a legacy of wild Keynesianism that continues in a new war economy to sustain prosperity: as Gerard Piel points out in the current issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* it is the war economy which during the last fifteen years has brought a full third of the population into relative affluence.

There is still another difference which Edward Shils has noted in his book, *The Torment of Secrecy.* The British, protecting their privacy better, fear spies, secrets, and invaders less than we do, and have never been as hysterical about Communism. Even after the Klaus Fuchs case, they in effect decided that they would rather risk losing a few secrets to a few spies than turn the country upside down in the alleged hope of flushing all enemy agents out. One result is that the ex-Communists in Britain are not nearly so eager to prove their virtue as the ex-Communists in this country—and it is perhaps the ex-Communists in this country who above all justify Silone's remark that the next war would be fought between the Communists and the ex-Communists.

But perhaps a deeper difference between us and the British lies in the fact that American men seem constantly pursued by the fear of unmanliness, and therefore feel the need to present themselves as hard and realistic. This way of being realistic may have nothing to do

* Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (Doubleday, 1955). The Gallup poll is reported in *Look,* January 5, 1960.

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with reality. Often, "realism" becomes no more than the opposite of idealism, reasonableness, or morality. Many men of an older generation, having witnessed the excesses to which sentimentality and self-righteousness can take us, and completely sure of their own morality and dedication, are sometimes unwitting heralds for what is only a seemingly similar realism in others, a pseudo-realism that springs from fear about masculinity. The British seem less obsessed than we are on this score. Nor do they have a proponent of tragic realism so brilliant as Reinhold Niebuhr. What produces the difference? What is the aim which in America has been distorted into a need to feel tough?

One possibilty is that for those to whom being American means being a pioneer—a trail-blazer and producer—the lack of new frontiers creates a fear (felt within and reinforced from outside) that the country is going soft. Perhaps, having escaped the bombing and much of the suffering of the Second World War, many Americans have never established their courage in their own eyes, and this may be another reason why the fears of being "soft on Communism" or just soft, are far stronger here than in Great Britain.* To recognize and admit the enormous dangers that grow every day the cold war continues would feel like weakness to these people; it would seem but another step leading to a retreat from the heroic stand against nature, a stand that makes sense when, in order to survive physically, man must fight, but which now becomes merely a "posture"—a term that is increasingly and symptomatically coming into use in describing American policy (along with the somewhat analogous word, "position"). This "posture" which so many people insist upon becomes self-destructive in a world of fantastically rapid change, where survival depends on flexibility and on willingness to accept some responsibility for what is happening in the world as a whole.

Such people have been brought up to feel that worthwhile national action is to be defined mainly in terms of military or semi-military attacks on obstacles, either physical or human. They view with horror their countrymen who, captured by the ideology of consumption, have none of the spartan virtues, and in fact seem drones heralding the collapse of the state. A number of these men are the American analogues of Tory patricians (or in some cases, would-be patricians) who since Theodore Roosevelt's day have seen war and preparation for war as the condition of national health.† Having no goals for America in its own terms and (like most of us) more attuned to what they despise in their countrymen than to what they hope for, they cannot help being preoccupied with the Communists as a possible barbarian threat (often failing to realize how necessary we in turn are in the Soviet Union as a model for emulation, frequently for our worst Victorian excesses). So much, in fact, do these Americans depend on frightening their own countrymen with the not entirely fanciful bogeymen of a Soviet take-over, and so much do they rely on generating and maintaining a mood of crisis, that we ourselves are

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* Obviously, we are not here proposing that the British lack problems of their own, including those in the area of masculinity and sex! But British society does provide people with a structure against which to rebel and within which to define oneself; correspondingly, even some ex-Communists can feel at home a bit more readily there than in this country, without having to rush into a new dogmatism. However, by the same token, certain utopian possibilities in America, presented by abundance and the absence of class conflict, are less available in Britain.

† Senator Kennedy was quite in the patrician tradition when he concluded a Senate speech, "An Investment for Peace," of February 29, by saying, "I urge that this Congress, before the President departs for the summit, demonstrate conclusively that we are removing those doubts [about the missile gap and like weaponry] and that we are prepared to pay the full cost necessary to insure peace. Let us remember what Gibbon said of the Romans: 'They kept the peace—by a constant preparation for war; and by making clear to their neighbors that they are as little disposed to offer as to endure injury.' "

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troubled lest the title and themes of this paper, too hurriedly read, add to the image of menace, when our own spirit, though no less critical, looks further and more hopefully ahead. It is one of the many ironies of the current situation that people who fear the missile gap (a presently unrealistic fear, as the U-2 flights have helped to show) and those like ourselves who fear the arms race as the gravest danger have virtually cancelled each other out, thus creating a climate of middle complacency and fringe hysteria.

These contradictory images of our hardness and of our softness cannot help but cloud the vision of those military men and political leaders who are charged with the national defense. Because they fear softness, they seek to maintain a climate in which only hardness can thrive—so much so that perhaps a general is best able to move toward peace, since only a general is immune to accusations of softness. Correspondingly, many people who have different goals in mind seek to hitch them to the defense star, with the result that something so magnanimous in conception as the Marshall Plan becomes from the very start a cold war weapon, and finds a good deal of its legacy in propping up or even creating military regimes in places like Pakistan whose officials can persuade us that they are real, made-to-order anti-Communists.

Obviously, it is not so hard to be anti-Communist if that is the way to build up one's military faction in a still emerging nation. But as the cold war continues, it becomes increasingly difficult for decent Americans, humane enough to prefer peace to an egocentric national honor, to be outspokenly and genuinely anti-Communist. For example, we had very mixed feelings about the idealistic and dedicated Americans, some of them our colleagues, who last summer went to Vienna and set up shop to oppose the propaganda of the Communist Youth Festival. We had misgivings because it was impossible to escape the fact that, whatever their personal motives, these students became, in effect, emissaries of our State Department and our national cold war line.

And the problem is equally grave for the radical opposition. As Margaret Mead observed in an address last year, a student in this country a generation ago who had radical ideas had the advantage of being powerless: of being on the side of a future which did not yet exist. Today, however, such a student may find that his particular idea happens at the moment also to be part of the Communist party line, in which case he is not in alliance with a nonexistent and therefore uncontaminated future, but with an extremely menacing, and totally unwelcome power. On the reverse side, someone like Pasternak, or many young Polish writers who are acclaimed in this country, may feel themselves betrayed by their very courage and virtue. Thus, as long as the cold war goes on, we lack an uncorrupted political debate.

Under such conditions, it is not surprising that so many people prefer to withdraw from the field altogether. Although they are willing to countenance arms spending, a large number of Americans cannot bring themselves to contemplate the true horror of war, and so they simply go to sleep when they are asked to "wake up" to the dangers that face them. They have learned that the thing to do with anxiety (whether based on real danger or not) is to rid oneself of it through drink, drugs, or canned fantasies.

There are other Americans, however, whose anxiety and escape take more productive forms. Like many of the Soviet intelligentsia who hate the system but feel powerless to change it, certain American elite groups have chosen the road of "inner emigration," retreating from social responsibilities into, at best, a concern with their immediate surroundings, family, and friends. Though such people are often aroused by issues like education, urban

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renewal, or mental health, they are estranged from the system because it seems to them run for political motives in the narrowest rather than in the best sense. Unlike the escapist security seekers, they are not alienated from themselves as human beings, yet the fact that they remain without political purpose beyond their small civic circles limits their vision and hence their growth. It is for this reason that they may today be ready to give enthusiastic support to a far-reaching idealistic political movement that will provide them with a way of reasserting their faith in democracy.

Still others who are intelligent enough to be concerned with the world have escaped into cynicism, considering the system as corrupt and finding a sense of purpose in expertise, even if this means selling themselves to the highest bidder. Such people, amorally working for personal gain within the system, have in fact supported many of its worst elements. But perhaps "support" is too strong a word, for one often finds in talking to them that they have a streak of buried idealism hidden as much from themselves as from others by this mask of cynicism. Whereas the hypocrisy of the Victorians consisted of concealing mean motives under noble rhetoric, our own hypocrisy often conceals a cankered decency beneath a cloak of *Realpolitik*. Sometimes the decency manifests itself only with family and intimate relations, sometimes in the restlessness that underlies the purposive exterior, sometimes merely in the aggressive defense that is put up by these people against any suggestion that their public and private selves need not always remain so completely at odds.

WHETHER in foreign policy, or in personal life, Americans appear today to suffer from an inadequate formulation of their alternatives. It has become extremely common among the well-educated to denounce "blind conformity" and "mass society," often symbolized by such minor irritants as tail-fins, TV, or gray-flannel suits. But the only alternatives many people see to the organization man is the nostalgic image of the cowboy or the rebellious artist; hard-shelled individualism and a rejection of human solidarity are mistaken as signs of strength and independence. Even the best students in our colleges tend to assume that they must eventually make their peace with "the system"—which they see as even more monolithic than in fact it is—and they will then often become vicarious fellow-travelers of the Beats whose passive and almost entirely non-progressive defiance serves to publicize a private helplessness.

Students in recent years have frequently said that helplessness is realistic: "What can you do about nuclear war?" Searching for a guarantee that life never provides, a guarantee not only that action will be effective but that all its consequences will be good, such young people never get started and therefore never gain the realistic political experience necessary to make them less helpless. Again, there is a tendency to jump to extreme alternatives: either total control of the total weapons, or total inaction.

The sit-in strikes in the South and their support in the North may be the first sign of a change in these attitudes, for they have shown how much can be done even by relatively powerless and unorganized students, and perhaps the same kind of political activity will spread into other areas such as concern about South Africa, about foreign policy in general, and about nuclear war. In fact, the speed with which things can change is an ever repeated lesson of history; and at the very moment when the system appears impregnable to the realist, it oftens turns out to be vulnerable to the quixotic. Of course, we are not saying that "where there's a will, there is always a way," but we are saying that everyone today has been over-sold on cultural and historical determinism—in which, incidentally, there may be self-serving elements, since determinism allows

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us publicly to accept the existing political structure while we privately deplore conformity, perhaps even showing by minor and irrelevant rebellions like sexual promiscuity or wearing a beard that we are rebels at heart.

If we see only two choices in our personal behavior, such as conformity as against individualism, or adjustment as against neurotic loneliness, then it is likely that a similar dichotomizing tendency will capture our political life. Thus, the American is asked to choose between democracy and communism, when in fact neither system is monolithic, and both have many things—literally things—in common, in contrast with the less industrialized and bureaucratized parts of the world. As already implied, our relationship with Russia is similar to that of a big brother who is obsessed with the fear that his little brother will overtake him, and this overconcern keeps us, the older brother, from realizing our unique potentialities. In this case, the sibling rivalry runs both ways, for the Russians gear their system to show that they are as good or better than we in those areas we most prize—technology, sports, and education. The tragedy is not only that because of our obsession we are rejecting utopian possibilities and ignoring more pressing problems (at the lowest level the much greater threat of Red China) but also that we are missing a chance to provide a better goal for Soviet growth. We may hope that the Russians will get rich enough to be preoccupied by the problem of national purpose which currently plagues us; and in the American-like desires of the Soviet elite, we find signs of this development. But perhaps if we were to show that our system can be mobilized to produce a better life, drawing its meaning from activity rather than from consumption *per se* or from national might, we would eventually shift the emphasis of Soviet emulation.

In fairness it should be added that a surrender to apocalyptic alternatives is sometimes found on the more humane side of current American debates concerning deterrence. It would be surprising if this were not the case, for the dominant ways of perceiving in a culture generally turn up, sometimes in a disguised form, in the very models of opposing such ways. Thus, there are some pacifists, among the many different schools of pacifist thought, who see the present situation as demanding either preparation for total destruction or a complete cessation of all military measures through unilateral action. We believe that if the world survives these next critical years and becomes less uncivilized, we shall move away from the anarchy of nationalism, reducing arms to the level of police forces and handling as imaginatively as we can the problem of coping with despotic governments—in part by the remarkable invention of Gandhian non-violent resistance, a manlier and far more difficult political weapon than trading blow for blow. Naturally, it is hard to see how the transition from the fully armed nation-state to the fully disarmed nation-state can be accomplished. It is easier to envisage a diplomatic give-and-take between ourselves and the Soviet Union that (without complete disarmament) would settle outstanding conflicts of interest in Europe and Asia—even though attempts at such a settlement would encounter the opposition of Adenauer and Ulbricht, Chiang and Mao, American Cold Warriors and their Stalinist opposite numbers in Russia. Efforts at disarmament not coupled with diplomatic moves to settle the cold war will make Americans as uneasy as high-flying spy planes must make the Russian people, and hence may boomerang. In our judgment, one must work simultaneously on both fronts, diplomacy and disarmament, keeping in mind the long-run pacifist goal of a world in which conflict is settled without weapons and war.

What we wish to emphasize here, however, is not the details of the various positions, but rather the way in which the

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American style of thinking has suffered from a tendency to oversimplify alternatives and to leap always to absolute positions. It is wrong to insist that one must choose between conformity and individualism, slavery or freedom, absolute toughness or unilateral disarmament. Our need to plan distant as well as short-run goals, to work out the full implications of alternative actions, is confused with simplistic self-definitions, and thus we militate against graduated approaches. Where the arms race is concerned, a graduated approach would start with a definition of the goal as disarmament and would continue with a step-by-step attempt to find ways of overcoming our fears on the one hand and Russia's distrust of inspectors on the other. A good illustration of the kind of imaginative plan that is needed is Leo Szilard's idea of an inspection game.* Recognizing the reality both of our fear of secret Soviet operations (and of the unreliability of any government's promise, including our own) and theirs of foreigners poking around, Szilard would allow inspection in detail any time that either party suspected clandestine atomic activity or decided that a tremor might not merely be an earthquake. However, if we turned out to be wrong we would have to pay the Soviets a huge indemnity and vice versa. The goal of such a game is greater trust through experience rather than an idea of security through armaments which suggests either a statuesque posture or a swaddled, unrealistic existence, perhaps lived underground in concrete shelters.

How does one begin the effort to change this pattern of thinking about security through armament? Because different people in the United States are at different stages of alertness and health or flight and cynicism, the answer will vary depending on which group in the population one addresses.

When a man is being over-manipulated to the point where his very existence has become unreal, he cannot be "made" human by more and better manipulation from the "right" direction, by mere bombardment with pressures and appeals. It is this very habit of ignoring the human qualities of men in order to get them to run smoothly that has caused much of our trouble.

Manipulation "downward," from the elites to the public, inevitably intensifies apathy and saps the strength of an alert public just when it is most needed. Thus—to return to an earlier point—by a propaganda campaign which persuaded people to view the Marshall Plan as a semi-military stroke against Communism rather than as an idealistic and ultimately practical acknowledgment of our new world responsibility, we increased the chances of a quick acceptance of the program at the expense of setting a pattern in which all economic development of underdeveloped countries would carry the imprimatur of our particular sort of idealism. By reinforcing the ideology of cageyness, we have been killing the very quality in ourselves which might save us from a moral disintegration that armaments can never arrest.

However, while manipulation downward or sideways leads to dysfunctional precedents which narrow future alternatives, lobbying "upward" is necessary and in the best traditions of keeping our leaders responsible. Today, as free citizens, we need energetically to influence the military, industrial, political, and educational elites into letting go of their investments in the cold war and into working not only for a safer but for a better world. This might involve setting up programs for the economics of disarmament, as Seymour Melman says in a study in progress. For example, part of Raytheon might be deployed into a government-supported project for the renewal of downtown Boston, thereby insuring the managers that the cessation of arms stockpiling

* *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* April 1960.

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will not leave them and their industries holding the radio-active potato. Or, to take another example, programs might be developed for the retraining of officers of SAC and other agencies whose existence depends on the cold war. Some of these men can certainly be deployed into inspection for disarmament; but in a less bellicose climate, they will not find jobs with defense contractors, nor even perhaps as headmasters of military schools. Still, their organizational ability and their dedication should be useful.

Many people do not take even the small opportunities to lobby for human interests, encouraging elements of idealism in even the most cynical, and thereby supporting the faction of peacemakers in Washington and perhaps indirectly in the Kremlin, too. The paradox is that in an age when many feel so powerless a single irate letter can often have a totally unanticipated impact. With an elite like ours that is both divided and confused, a "grass roots" complaint about a TV show or a Congressional measure can, as often for worse as for better, show the fallacy of those who believe that there are no channels left for effective political action.

YET, if we get out of the immediate crisis, we shall still be faced with the underlying disorder in a society in which —partly as the result of its great past achievements—people feel there is plenty for all, but little joy in using the things we have made. In order to assuage the managerial fears, often less than conscious, that the end of the cold war would bring us face to face with a problem quite unlike that of 1945 (when the demand for consumer goods had not yet been fulfilled), we need a program which would provide alternatives both to spending for defense and spending for spending's sake.

For the Russians, a decrease in defense spending means the beginning of television and toasters for all, and perhaps a slight loosening of despotic controls. For us, much more is involved, and more difficult problems—those of "abundance for what?"* Indeed, no society has ever been in the American position before or anywhere near it, and thus the dream of plenty until our time has remained unsullied. We cannot look to the experience of other times and other countries for models for the American future. Neither can we discover much relevant wisdom in earlier prophets of abundance. Very few of these prophets foresaw the actual cornucopia of even so modestly efficient an industrial plant as ours (a plant which, if we were not so afraid of productivity or of controlling waste, would produce in a manner truly comparable to the myth of American efficiency).† For example, Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward,* which had an enormous impact on the Gilded Age, envisaged an industrial utopia whose amiable and genteel standard of living has long since been attained throughout a large American middle-income belt—though the inner peace and spaciousness that was supposed to go along with this prosperity has scarcely been approached. Even the most devoted apostles of capitalism in previous generations seldom foresaw that it would outrun their grandest hopes (though Schumpeter did grasp this) —while enemies of capitalism like Karl Marx, who acknowledged its power to surpass all earlier levels of production and consumption, never predicted its chastened managerial form nor indeed its bounteous exploitability. We are a generation who, prepared for Paradise Lost, are afraid that if we enter Paradise Regained, we shall deprive ourselves not merely of the incentive to produce but even of the incentive to live. We therefore resist such a predicament as a temptation of the devil, and in the process fail even to take the necessary steps, first toward

* We have drawn in what follows on Riesman, "Abundance for What?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* Vol. XIV, No. 4 (1958), pages 135–139.

† This myth remains unpunctured because most other countries not only have fewer resources, but are even less efficient.

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peace, and then toward improved social conditions, and better education and medical care.

We have been trained for a world of scarcity and we have developed an image of man under the psychology of scarcity. The maturation of America and correspondingly of world civilization requires that we begin a program for abundance with a new view of man and his potentialities: neither the inherently weak and sinful puritan nor the self-indulgent consumer, but instead a being whose nature is fulfilled through work that truly engages him, both because it draws upon his creative power and because it gives him the responsibility for helping to decide the form and use of what he makes. In this way we would be able to consider human destructiveness as the manifestation of a thwarted need to create and to initiate—a need thwarted by inadequate education and opportunity (as Paul Goodman has pointed out so forcefully in the pages of this magazine). In *Man for Himself* and later writings, Erich Fromm argues that man does not live merely for the release of tensions (as Freud's writings often suggest), but that when this is all society asks of him, his passive-receptive orientation to life can fill him with a nagging self-doubt—which may in turn be exploited in the fantasies of omnipotence that virulent nationalism demands.

Such an orientation is not basically altered when our educational system—urged on by such men as Admiral Rickover—begins to exchange a progressivism that has never been given a proper chance for a climate of rigor based not on the intractable tasks set both by knowledge and by life, but by a need to keep up with the Russians. One of the most profound lessons a child learns in school is how he is to feel about his later life-work, and if he is taught to approach the idea of work only with a sense of duty, competitiveness, and fear of failure, he will never develop the capacity to impose meaning on whatever tasks he comes to undertake.*

The problems, political and technical, of reorganizing work along lines we can now only dimly envisage, are so enormous as to be almost inhibiting. If one ponders on these matters, one finds oneself facing into a new frontier that is neither physically nor politically simple, but that requires as much resourcefulness and tenacity as the older frontiers did. For example, one might consider the changes involved if every job in America were reanalyzed, not with an eye only to its efficiency in terms of traditional output, but in terms of its long-run effect on the worker, his family, his friends, and his political life. We now assume that production will go on as usual, and that humane progress demands only ancillary adjustments, fringe benefits, which repair some of the ravages of work, on the one hand by making the work place less physically exhausting and despotic, and on the other by trying to shore up the leisure life of the worker with a variety of welfare meas-

* Of course, many people today will say that while they may not be "mad" about their work, neither do they mind it. In *The Lonely Crowd*, the senior author took a sanguine view of the attenuation of "meaning" in work, arguing that in an affluent society, arduous and demanding work would become increasingly unnecessary, and that the productive impulse would have to be expressed in leisure and play. Further reflection has convinced us that here we are not necessarily the prisoners of our technological fate, of our given forms of mass production and of the organization of work. We now believe that a rich, heavily automatized society is precisely one that can afford to reorganize work so that attention is focused no longer exclusively on the product, but on the worker himself as a product of his work. We have been greatly excited and impressed by a few pioneering examples, like Edwin Land's Polaroid factory. There, deep involvement in work and a concept of the factory that continues the process of education for the workers, have significantly enlivened many workers (without any loss in productivity when measured by the traditional standards of the balance sheet, although this must not be the sole or even the crucial measure of success). To be creative in leisure while mindless and passive in work demands a schizoid attitude which even if psychologically possible would put too great a burden on leisure, just as the family bears too great a burden when it becomes the only reservoir of decency in a disordered civic and national life.

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ures. It is difficult to change this pattern, even if management is willing to initiate the attempt. Edwin Land has found that workers in his Polaroid factory are not eager to leave the assembly line, to whose routines they have become accustomed, for an unspecified job in a laboratory. They doubt their ability to cope with a larger untried situation, just as some students prefer rigid routines, which give them the assurance they are learning something, to less predictable programs of self-directed study. In Dr. Land's experience, workers, like students, need support and encouragement to attempt new tasks.

Another example of inertia is provided by Professor Chris Argyris of the Yale Department of Industrial Administration. The president of a small corporation, Argyris reports, decided that all foremen should determine their own rates of reimbursement. One day he announced that there was a payroll of so many dollars to which he would add an annual increment, and that the workers should divide it among themselves as seemed equitable to them. At first, they jumped at the chance, but not long after they asked to be relieved of the responsibility. The president, however, did not give up. It took him seven years to create a work milieu in which the foremen could develop respect for themselves and one another. In the course of making his innovations, the president discovered how deep were the feelings of alienation, of separateness, and how low was the sense of self-esteem among the foremen. He found also that these feelings could not be changed by propaganda, that such persuasion merely increased self-hate and alienation. The foremen preferred paternalism until they had developed a confidence in themselves based on an altered work situation in which they made decisions about style and methods of production. And the president was secure enough not to feel that he had to hang on to traditional prerogatives; as the workers took over more activities, he was freed for new ones.

When in discussion we have stressed hopeful illustrations like these as models for social change, we have sometimes found them quickly dismissed by people brought up in the shadow of Marxism. Such people believe that the coming of abundance does not change the vested interests, and that political commitments will continue to reflect economic advantage.* They look to what is left of the American disinherited as the potential cadre to displace the power elite, and they see hostility rather than hope as the principal lever of political change; therefore, they do not even try to move men by rational appeals. One might ask whether they are in fact good Marxists. However, one need not be entirely theoretical: recent student rallies for Negro rights and for disarmament suggest that, among the young at least, it is not the underprivileged who are most concerned about justice and about the future. Even the hangovers of scarcity psychology—for example, the prevalent notion that, even if there should be enough of the good *things* of life for all, there would always remain a short supply of status—do not alter the fact that those who worry least about having enough (including enough status) frequently show the clearest sense of responsibility.

As higher education expands and as blue-collar work gives way to white-collar work, the often denigrated bourgeois idealist, the pilot fish of the Marxian theory of revolution, becomes a member of a class quite as large in number as the factory workers. This group is only residually a

* There is no question that there are vested interests in armaments and against radical innovation in nearly all our industries. However, Americans differ from perhaps any other people in that all accept a classless ideology. The weapons makers in America are not evil plotters, who cynically take the risks for the gain. Rather, they often consider themselves "realistic idealists" and are usually men of good will, whose economic advantage makes it easier for them to rationalize by putting full blame on the Russians and by parading the horrors of Communism; in effect, they want the debate to remain polarized and the proponents of pacifism to seem religious oddballs.

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"class" in the traditional sense, for it lacks any sense of identity of interest and any large reservoir of hatred or of solidarity. Unlike the well-to-do of other times, it is not supported by servants—indeed, its lack of the habit of command is one of its present political weaknesses. On the whole, its members, children of the industrial revolution, have thought that any increase in productivity automatically spells progress; but today this has become a tarnished belief, and little as yet exists to take its place. The "answer" for which many radicals look is the highly unlikely prospect of another depression. But another depression would at the very best bring us another New Deal, and the New Deal was not good enough in its day, let alone in our era of potential abundance. In any case, as we have said, the threat of war would seem to be catastrophic enough to arouse radical commitment to a utopian future.

TO SUMMARIZE our argument: many Americans think that the only changes needed in our national life are minor ones, or choices between starkly stated alternatives. In this, they are like patients who come to a psychiatrist and say, "There is nothing basically the matter with me except that I have this ulcer." So it is with the ulcer of the cold war which exposes the failure of a style of life. Though the immediate peril demands the beginning of disarmament as the first step toward ending the cold war, in doing this, we only patch a symptom. Disarmament is not the end of therapy, and true peace is not merely the absence of war but a state in which the quality of existence becomes humane and generous rather than destructive.

The analogy goes further. Just as no therapist can cure anyone but merely provides the support for another's steps toward health, so our leadership cannot manipulate us into utopia. In order for us to live with our abundance there must be greater participation in the political life of the United States and of the world. The traditional American ideology which is concerned only with equality of economic and political opportunity and freedom from control—in other words with the major problems of scarcity alone—must re-adjust to face the problems that have suddenly become visible because of abundance: lack of participation in life and lack of opportunity and education for self-expression. Once these problems can be faced, a people of plenty may be able to use its power for helping other people toward economic prosperity (as an essential step toward further difficult alternatives).

When we can overcome our embarrassment at being frankly idealistic in our actions, we will no longer be slaves to an ideology that demands the continual creation of pseudo-needs as a basis for production and continued "prosperity," an ideology which leads the American people to doubt the possibility of any growth beyond comfortable survival, protecting the nest egg. Our imagination must focus on other frontiers, work at bringing more people into participation by forming many small groups, by decentralizing industry, by creating better means for continued education not merely for children but for adults throughout life. To be sure, none of the problems of scarcity has been dealt with in a wholly satisfactory way: not all Americans are affluent, many are destitute, and many of the traditional issues of welfare and social justice—markedly, of course, the race issue—remain exigent. But a movement of renewal dedicated only to these issues is not conceivable. We shall move faster on these older fronts if they do not usurp all our attention and if we can invent an American future which is exciting, active, and responsible, but neither murderous nor imperialistic. It is for this that political programs are needed which transcend the details of the present.

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HANS J. MORGENTHAU

Our Thwarted Republic

Public Power vs. the New Feudalism

It is the supreme dual paradox of contemporary democracy that the expansion of democratic methods goes hand in hand with the recession of actual popular control over the government and that this decline in the power of the people is not compensated for by a corresponding increase in the power of the government. As the power of the people has declined, so has the power of the government. It is not so much that the power of the government has been dislocated, as certain observers have suggested, by being shifted from the executive to the legislative branch. Rather the power of the government is in the process of dissipation through being usurped by a multiplicity of semi-autonomous public and private agencies, business enterprises, and labor unions. In other words, we are in the presence of a new feudalism, resembling the old one in two important respects. On the one hand, the substance of governmental power slips piecemeal into places where it does not belong. On the other hand, the public authorities—the President, the Supreme Court, Congress, the people at large—continue to perform their constitutional functions, emptied to a degree of the substance of power. Four factors are responsible for these two paradoxes: a new distribution of power between the government and the people; the nature of the issues facing society; the rise of autonomous concentrations of power; and the abdication of government before the specter of public opinion.

The ultimate safeguard of popular rights in modern democracy—as in all other systems of government—has been the ability of the people to overthrow the government by force, that is, to make a revolution. This ability provided a double safeguard. First, the fear of revolution imposed effective restraints upon the government, causing it to stop short of what it estimated to be the breaking point in the people's endurance. Thus the popular rights in defense of which the people were willing to take up arms were safe as long as the government calculated the mood of the people correctly. Secondly, the actual threat or fact of revolution was capable of protecting or restoring the rights of the people if the government should calculate wrongly.

The protection with which the possibility of revolution surrounded the rights of the people was predicated upon an approximately equal distribution of the means of physical violence between the government and the people. Before the beginning of the century, roughly speaking, the government met the people (barring superior organization and training) on a footing of approximate equality. Both

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sides had virtually the same weapons with which to cut, to thrust, and to shoot. Numbers, morale, and leadership, then, decided the issue.

This approximately equal distribution of military power between government and people has in our time been transformed into the government's unchallengeable superiority. The government today has a monopoly of the most destructive weapons, against which the people can neither defend nor protect themselves. Moreover, the government can instantly acquire a monopoly of the most effective means of transportation and communications, since these are now centralized. For the people to revolt against such a monopolistic concentration of superior military power is utterly impossible, and the very thought of revolution, still lingering on, transforms itself, as the case may be, either into a utopian dream or a neurotic nightmare.

It is no accident that for technologically advanced nations this is the age not of popular revolution but of the coup d'état. That is, what a modern government must guard against is not primarily the disaffection of the people but the disloyalty of the armed forces. A modern government can rule over a thoroughly disaffected people so long as it has the support of the armed forces; but it cannot rule, even supported by a loyal people, against its disaffected armed forces. A modern government may be overthrown by the armed forces acting alone, but it can no longer be overthrown by the people acting alone. The ultimate contest, therefore, is no longer between the government and the people, but between the government and the armed forces.

THE extent to which the fate of modern democracy is in the hands of the armed forces is clearly shown by the history of the democracies of Germany, Italy, and France. In the Nazi rise to power in 1933, the support of the armed forces was decisive; and Nazism survived the military revolt of 1944 only because the armed forces were split and because that segment which supported the revolt was halfhearted and vacillating—it was the distribution of power within the armed forces that proved crucial. Both in the assumption of power by Italian Fascism in 1922 and in its dislodgement in 1943, the Italian army played the determining role.

Nowhere, however, has the ascendancy of the armed forces at the expense of the people been more clearly revealed than in the history of France since 1958. Once the army had resolved to make an end to the Fourth Republic, the doom of the regime was sealed. Regardless of the support it enjoyed in parliament and in the population at large, the last government of the Fourth Republic could only choose between surrendering power voluntarily and being forced by the army to surrender it. Government with the consent of the governed had become government with the consent of the army. And once the Fifth Republic had assumed power with the consent of the army, government with the consent of the army became government by the will of the army.

The army has taken the place of the people and its elected representatives. The refusal of the army to obey certain orders necessary for the execution of a certain policy performs the function which was before performed by the refusal of parliament to pass a law. Such a refusal compels the government either to refrain wholly from pursuing that policy, or from pursuing it in the way it deems necessary. The refusal of the army to obey the government in any way whatsoever has the same effect as, previously, a parliamentary vote of lack of confidence had—that is, it compels the government to resign. The government, in order to be able to govern, must negotiate its policies with the army as it had in the past to negotiate them with the parties in parliament. What the people and their elected representatives wish and are willing to support, does not matter. The composition and

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the policies of the government are determined by what the army wishes and is willing to support.

In no other of the Western democracies has the shift of power from the people to the armed forces been outlined with such stark simplicity as in the Fifth Republic of France; nor have the political consequences of this shift been drawn anywhere else with such radical consistency. Yet the shift has occurred everywhere by dint of the irresistible superiority of the instruments of violence placed by modern technology in the hands of the armed forces. The political consequences of that shift have differed from country to country in accordance with the particular political and social conditions. In the United States, it is not so much the armed forces, as the executive branch as a whole which has benefited from that shift. Three factors have prevented the armed forces from becoming the main beneficiary.

The issues which most closely concern the armed forces are those of military strategy, assignment of missions, and appropriations; and with respect to these, the armed forces have appeared on the political stage not as a unit, but split into competing branches. Thus the mechanics of checks and balances, a prevailing characteristic of the American government, manifest themselves within the military establishment to exert their limiting and restraining influence.

Furthermore, the principle of civilian control of the armed forces is firmly established not only in the Constitution but also and more particularly in the political mores and practices of America. Heeding the wisdom of the *Federalist,* America has been consistently mindful of the potential threat which a standing army constitutes for the democratic order. While unifying the armed forces with one hand for the sake of efficiency, America has never brought itself to accepting a *truly* unified command for fear of the man-on-horseback and it has compounded the military inefficiency of the committee system—the Pentagon houses more than seven hundred committees—by superimposing upon this system a plethora of civilian secretaries, undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries—twenty-five all told—intended to harness the armed forces to the civilian will.

Finally, the armed forces have consistently and eagerly accepted their subordinate role. Even when the civilian direction of the military establishment temporarily lapsed, leaving a vacuum waiting to be filled (as in Europe in the last months of the Second World War), the military leaders refused to fill it. When in April 1945—during the "deadly hiatus" in American political leadership that followed the death of Roosevelt—the British government suggested unsuccessfully to the American government that the American army go as far east as possible in Czechoslovakia and in particular occupy Prague, Generals Marshall and Eisenhower refused to take an action which was both militarily feasible and politically advantageous "unless," in the words of Eisenhower, "I receive specific orders from the combined Chiefs of Staff." The different course of action General MacArthur took under somewhat similar circumstances during the Korean war was an exception to the rule consistently honored by all concerned.

THIS subordination of the armed forces to civilian control—and their own commitment to that subordination—makes the executive branch as a whole rather than the armed forces in particular the beneficiary of the shift of power away from the people. The results of that shift are intangible in normal times, becoming obvious and acute only when the country approaches a revolutionary crisis—for example, in the resistance of Southern states to the federal government's attempts at enforcing the application of constitutional guarantees for Negroes. Yet while a century ago such a conflict would have raised

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the specter of revolution and civil war, as it actually did with regard to a different but related issue, the unchallengeable military superiority of the federal government precludes the possibility of armed conflict. It is the absence of this possibility, of which both the government and the people are vaguely aware, that removes a restraint from the power of the government and a weapon from the armory of the people.

Modern technology, however, which has thus given the government a decisive potential advantage over the people in the over-all distribution of power, has also actually strengthened the hand of the government in its day-to-day operations. The great issues of state in the fields of foreign policy, military organization and strategy, economics, finance, no longer yield in the same degree as they once did to the common-sense judgments that may be rendered by any knowledgeable man of average intelligence. The understanding of such issues requires in good measure that expert knowledge which is naturally available to the government to a much higher degree than to any individual citizen, and partly, because of its classified nature, available only to the government. Thus the government can speak in these matters with an authority unmatched by that of any individual or group on the outside.

Not only can the government speak with superior authority, it can also act with finality. The natural advantage of the executive branch in being able to confront the people and their representatives with an accomplished fact is increased by its control over the technological initiation and implementation of policy. Once the executive branch has started building, say, one kind of missile or radar warning system, it becomes impractical for Congress or for the people at large, even if they were in a position so to resolve, to insist upon a different program; for the complicated technology, costliness, and lead-time of such programs precludes the possibility of changing them in view of Congressional or popular pressure, which might in any case be only temporary. The disavowal of the government's policies in the elections—provided the import of the election results could be so clearly ascertained—could influence policy at best only in the long run and only if there were a reasonable assurance, which of course there is not, that elections to follow would not again reverse the position. As a result, the democratic corrective of elections has become at best a tenuous instrument of the popular will.

The preferences of the people and their representatives, insofar as they can be articulated at all, have in these matters hardly any relevance for the substance of the policies of the executive branch. They may, however, be highly relevant for the manner in which these policies are presented to the public and for the amount of information the executive branch is willing to make public to begin with. Thus while the executive branch acts, setting the course of policy perhaps for years to come, the people and Congress can but deliberate, investigate, and resolve; they can approve within the limits of the information accessible to them, or else, insofar as they have no knowledge to go on, they will forgo judgment altogether, assuming that since the executive branch knows more it also knows best. This advantage of the executive over the legislative branch and the people at large derives, of course, from the nature of the executive function itself and, hence, is inherent in a system of government which makes the executive branch of the government independent of the legislative branch. What is unprecedented is the qualitative shift—paralleling the shift in the means of violence—of the power of decision from the people to the government in matters of life and death, establishing the government as the absolute master of the national fate.

WE HAVE thus far dealt with one of the two paradoxes of contemporary democracy, the paradox of thwarted ma-

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jority rule: universal democratization goes hand in hand with a drastic shift of power from the people to the government. We turn now to the other paradox of contemporary democracy, the paradox of thwarted government: the drastic increase in the power of the government in relation to the people goes hand in hand with a drastic decrease in the over-all power exercised within the state by constitutional authorities. In other words, universal democratization and the increase of the power of the government at the expense of the people result in a net loss of governmental power. While more powerful vis-à-vis the people than it has been in living memory, the government governs less than it did when it was weaker vis-à-vis the people. This paradox is the result of the decomposition of governmental power from within and without: through the feudalism of semi-autonomous executive departments and through the feudalism of the concentrations of private power.

When we refer to the executive branch of the government, we are really making use of a figure of speech in order to designate a multiplicity of varied and more or less autonomous agencies which have but one thing in common: they have received their authority by delegation either from the President or from the Congress. But neither the President nor the Congress is able to control them. The reason for this inability lies in the obsolescence of the presidency and of Congress as agencies controlling the kind of executive branch that has developed in our time. The executive branch of the American government has become an enormous apparatus of the highest complexity. Its functions have been divided and subdivided and parcelled out to a plethora of agencies; most of these functions overlap or are at the very least interconnected to such an extent that any single agency needs the support of others in order to do its job. In the absence of hierarchical direction and control, one agency can act only with the consent of another, and how to secure that consent—whether through cooperation or competition—becomes a vital issue upon which the agency's usefulness depends.

THE multiple proliferation of the executive function is accompanied by an atomization of authority. For the technological complexity of many of the most important executive functions gives the agency mastering that technology an advantage in policy formation which may, in some of the most important areas, well amount to a virtual monopoly. Such specialized knowledge constitutes a unique source of power, and is typically guarded by a wall of secrecy: kept away are not only the general public and Congress but also other—and especially rival—agencies.

Upon this sprawling and unwieldy agglomeration of executive agencies, which are, legally speaking, but an arm of the executive and the legislature, the President and Congress try in vain to impose their will. The President as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief has of course the constitutional power to force his conception of policy upon the executive departments, with the exception of the independent regulatory commissions which are supposed to operate according to the statutory standards laid down by Congress. However, reality diverges sharply from the constitutional scheme. Even so strong and astute a president as Franklin D. Roosevelt was incapable of assuming full control over the State Department itself, the constitutional executor of his foreign policy. His successors have had to limit themselves, to an ever increasing degree, to laying down general principles of policy in the hope that their intent would not be too much impaired in the far-flung process of execution. On the other hand, the main weapon at the disposal of Congress, the investigating power, is clumsy; it can at best deal effectively with abuse and violation of the law, but

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it is hardly able to correct executive policy at variance with its own. For the statutory standards by which Congress must judge the executive performance are generally so vague as to leave the executive branch and, more particularly, the regulatory commissions a vast field of discretion.

Thus what was intended by the Constitution to translate the presidential and congressional will into purposeful action, as the movements of the arm reflect the impulses emanating from the brain, transforms itself into the anarchy of a war of all against all, fought among as well as within the executive departments. The objective of the war is the determination—either directly or through gaining influence over the decisions of higher authority—of at least that segment of policy which falls within the jurisdiction of the agency. Overlapping functions and, in many cases, equal status among the proliferating agencies make the interagency phase of the war almost inevitable. In such departments as State and Defense, the absence of clear lines of authority and of an organization tailored to the functions to be performed *invites* intra-agency war. To win these wars, the belligerents enter into alliances with other belligerents—with factions in Congress and in the White House, with business enterprises, and with the mass media of communications. The deliberate leak to a journalist or member of Congress becomes a standard weapon with which one agency tries to embarrass another, or force the hand of higher authority, or establish an accomplished fact.

This process of policy formation and execution resembles the feudal system of government in that the public authority is parceled out among a considerable number of agencies which, while legally subordinated to a higher authority, are in fact autonomous to a greater or lesser degree. The executive agency, competing for the determination of policy with other agencies, more and more resembles a feudal fief, which owes its existence to the delegation of powers by higher authority but becomes in active operation an autonomous center of power, defending itself against other centers of power and trying to increase its power at the expense of others. The resemblance to feudalism is heightened insofar as the fragmentation of public power carries within itself a diminution of the sum total of public power. Fragmented power is weak power, and the sum total of the fragments, each following its own impulse, is of necessity inferior to what the public power would have been had it remained in one piece, harnessed to a single purpose. The government, instead of speaking with one strong and purposeful voice, speaks in many voices, each trying to outshout the others, all weak and contradictory.

It is worthy of note that this fragmentation and consequent diminution of the public power, which characterizes the executive branch of the government, was erected by the Constitution into a fundamental principle of the American system of government in the form of the separation of powers. The separation of the public power into three departments, in good measure independent of each other, seeks to prevent one branch from imposing its will upon the whole and thereby becoming too strong for the liberty of the citizens. It seeks to weaken the government by dividing it. What the Constitution sought to achieve for the whole government by intent, the executive branch has achieved for itself through haphazard, fissiparous growth.

THE debilitating effect which the separation of powers was intended to exert upon the government was innocuous so long as the functions which the government had to perform were limited and exercised in normal circumstances. However, when a crisis required strong action by the government and, more particularly, by the executive (which alone is capable of direct action in the true sense of the word), it was the President who, through

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the authority of his office, the strength of his will, and the persuasiveness of his vision, gave the government that unity of purposeful action commensurate with the task to be performed. And the Constitution designed the presidency to be equal to such a situation of crisis by investing the President with the powers of an "uncrowned king."

What the philosophy of the Constitution could only conceive as the extreme and exceptional conditions of crisis have become the normal conditions of American existence. The revolutions of the Civil War, the Square Deal, the New Deal, and the Cold War have established permanently the dominant role of the government in the affairs of the nation. The quantitative proliferation of executive agencies implements that role. Yet the organization of the presidency is adequate only to the bygone normalcy of a weak and sporadically active federal government; it is not adequate to a federal government which has become the permanently determining factor in the vital concerns of the nation. No President can perform the functions of Head of State, Chief Executive, Commander-in-Chief, and head of his party at the same time. He cannot even plan, formulate, coordinate, and supervise the execution of policy at the same time. The President has the constitutional authority to do all these things. But he does not necessarily possess the extraordinary combination of knowledge, judgment, and character required for such a task; and most certainly he does not have the time. In the absence of an effective Cabinet system, the President is separated from the day-by-day operations of the executive branch by a gap which he can only bridge on occasion. Normally, he presides over the executive branch, but he does not govern it.

Congress, on the other hand, is kept from effective control of the executive branch by the constitutional separation of powers, especially as interpreted by the executive branch itself. This impotence, bred in good part by ignorance of what the executive branch is doing, has engendered in Congress an endemic mood of frustration and irritation which seeks relief in harassing and persecuting persons rather than in the formulating, supervising, and enforcing of policies. Lack of party discipline and archaic rules of procedure make it difficult for Congress to discover a will of its own and impose it upon the executive branch. The disintegration of the executive branch and the debilitation of the public power resulting from it must be cured by, on the one hand, infusing the executive branch with a purpose transcending the feudal interests and loyalties which rent it asunder and, on the other, by superimposing upon it a power capable of neutralizing, subduing, and fusing the fragments of feudal power which tend to be a law unto themselves. Both purpose and power can only come from the President's office. For only here are the visible authority and the fullness of implied powers necessary to make the national purpose prevail over the parochialism of feudal fiefdoms. As in 16th- and 17th-century Europe the monarchical authority and power had to be called into being in order to create a nation out of the fragments of a territorial feudalism, so in our age and place the presidential power and authority must come forward to save the unity of the national purpose from the functional fragmentation of feudal fiefdoms.

THE debility of the executive power, caused by its inner fragmentation, invites attack from the concentrations of private power, especially in the economic sphere. Factions within the state have, throughout history, frequently made common cause with a foreign enemy in order to improve their position in the domestic struggle for power and have thereby delivered the state itself into the hands of its enemies. So the feudal lords within the executive branch ally themselves with the princes of private power, each pursuing its

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particular goal. The former seek to expand their fiefdoms within the executive branch and thereby increase their share in the power of the government. The latter seek to turn the instruments of government control to their own advantage and expand their own power without regard for, and at the expense of, the public power. Thus the public power is diminished through concerted action from within and without. This concerted action results from a kind of interconnectedness between the political and economic sphere peculiar to our age. The economic sphere has lost whatever autonomy it had in the past: it is subject to political control and, in turn, it tries to control political decisions. We are in the presence of the revival of a truly political economy, and the major economic problems today are political in nature.

The interconnectedness of the political and economic spheres is not peculiar to our age. Even in the heyday of 19th-century liberalism, the strict separation of the two spheres was in the nature of a political ideal rather than an observable reality. The monetary, tax, and tariff policies of the government had then, as they have now, a direct bearing upon the economic life—and so had the outlawing of the association of working men as criminal conspiracy. Yet the ideal of strict separation served the purpose of protecting the economic forces from political control without impeding their political influence.

What is peculiar to our age is not the interconnectedness of politics and economics, then, but its positive philosophic justification and the fact that this justification is universally accepted. The state is no longer looked upon solely as the umpire who sees to it that the rules of the game are observed and who intervenes actively only if, as in the case of the railroads, the rules favor one player to excess, thereby threatening to disrupt the game itself. In our age, the state, while still acting as umpire, has also become the most powerful player, who, in order to assure the outcome, substantially rewrites the rules as he goes along. No longer does the government or society at large rely exclusively upon the mechanisms of the market to insure that the game keeps going: both—the government and society—deem it the continuing duty of the government to see that it does.

IN THE United States, the state pursues three main purposes in the economic sphere: observance of the rules of the game, maintenance of economic stability, and national defense.

The rules of the game are oriented toward the pluralistic objectives of American society. Thus they seek to prevent any sector of the economy from gaining absolute power vis-à-vis other sectors of the economy, competitors, or the individuals as such, by controlling and limiting the power of all. Regulatory commissions, legislation holding down the strong and supporting the weak, tariff and monetary policies serve this purpose.

While the state started to assume responsibility for the rules of the game in the last decades of the 19th century, it made itself responsible for economic stability in the 1930's. Economic stability, in this context, signifies the mitigation, if not the elimination in certain sectors, of the business cycle. Its main positive characteristics, as conceived by the government of the United States, are stability of employment, stability of the value of the dollar, and stability of agricultural prices. A plethora of legislative and administrative devices serve this purpose.

Since the end of the Second World War technological research and industrial production increasingly have become the backbone of military defense. The regular annual expenditure by the government of more than forty billion dollars on national defense, its decrease or increase from year to year, its shift from one sector of the economy to another, all exert a sometimes drastic influence upon the

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economic life of the nation. This has made the government the most important single customer for the products of the national economy. In addition, many tax and monetary policies and price and wage policies are determined by considerations of national defense.

With the government thus exerting an enormous controlling, limiting, and stimulating influence upon the economic life, power to influence the economic decisions of the government becomes an indispensable element in the competition for economic advantage. Economic competition manifests itself inevitably in competition for political influence. Such influence is exerted in two ways: through control of government personnel, and through pressure on government personnel.

Direct control of government personnel exerts the most effective kind of political influence. The economic organization that succeeds in having its representatives elected to the legislature or appointed to the relevant administrative and executive positions can exert a political influence equivalent to the full extent of the political influence of its representatives. Insofar as the representatives of these economic organizations cannot decide the issue by themselves, the competition for political influence and, through it, economic advantage will be fought out within the collective bodies of the government by the representatives of different economic interests. While this relationship of direct control is typical in Europe, it is by no means unknown in the United States. State legislatures have been controlled by mining companies, public utilities, and railroads, and many individual members of Congress represent specific economic interests. Independent administrative agencies have come under the sway of the economic forces which they were intended to control. The large-scale interchange of top personnel between business and the executive branch of the government cannot help but influence, however subtly and intangibly, decisions of the government relevant to the economic sphere.

However, in the United States the most important political influence is exerted through pressure groups. The decision of the government agent—legislator, independent administrator, member of the executive branch—is in the United States not a foregone conclusion automatically defined by the economic control to which he is subject. His decision rests in doubt, for he is still open to divergent economic pressures. The competition for determining the decisions of the government takes place not among the government agents themselves but between the government agent, on the one hand, and several economic pressure groups on the other. Only after this competition among several pressure groups has been settled will the government agents compete with each other, provided the issue is still in doubt.

The political struggle, ostensibly fought for victory in periodic elections by political parties, reveals itself in substantial measure as a contest of economic forces for the control of government action. In consequence, the decision of the government, and more particularly of legislatures, apparently rendered "on the merits of the case," tends to reflect the weight of economic influence and, at worst, to give political sanction to decisions taken elsewhere. Legislators and administrators tend to transform themselves into ambassadors of economic forces, defending and promoting the interests of their mandatories. The result, then, is a new feudalism which, like that of the Middle Ages, diminishes the authority of the civil government and threatens it with extinction by parceling out its several functions among economic organizations to be appropriated and used as private property. And, as in the feudalism of the Middle Ages, these new concentrations of private power tend to command the primary loyalties of the individual citizens who owe

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them their livelihood and security. In the end, the constitutionally established government tends to become, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, a "solemn mockery," glossing over the loss of political vitality with the performance of political rites.

If giant concentrations of economic power, in the form of business enterprises and labor unions, were thus to become laws unto themselves, deciding with finality the matters vital to them and using the government only for the purpose of ratifying these decisions, they would not only drain the lifeblood from the body politic but also destroy the vital energies of the economic system. For the vitality of the American economic system has resided in its ability to renew itself on new technological opportunities, unfettered by the interests identified with an obsolescent technology. Seen from the vantage point of the individual enterprise, this is what we call freedom of competition. This freedom of competition has been a function of the rules of the economic game, as formulated and enforced by the state.

Yet the new feudalism, if it is not controlled and restrained, must inevitably tend to abrogate these rules of the game in order to assure the survival of the economic giants which, in turn, tend to take over the functions of the state. The consummation of this development, possible but not inevitable, would be a state of affairs in which the rule of life would not be freedom of competition—which might jeopardize the survival of the giants—but freedom from competition in order to secure their survival. The dynamics of the American capitalist system, continually destroying and creating as does life itself, would then give way to a gigantic system of vested interests in which the established giants could use the state to make themselves secure from competitive displacement, only to die the slow death of attrition.

It is the measure of the quandary which modern society faces in this problem that the most obvious cure raises issues as grave as the disease. The cure is a state strong enough to hold its own against the concentrations of private power. Insofar as such a state acts as an independent political force, controlling, restraining, and redirecting economic activities, it is indeed the strong state, capable of keeping the concentrations of private power in check. Yet this state, by being strong enough for its task, cannot fail to be strong enough also to control, restrain, and redirect the economic activities of everybody. In other words, as the liberal tradition has correctly assumed, a strong government, whatever else it may be able to accomplish, threatens the liberties of the individual, especially in the economic sphere. Thus modern society is faced with a real dilemma: a government too weak to threaten the freedom of the individual is also too weak to hold its own against the new feudalism; and a government strong enough to keep the new feudalism in check in order to protect the freedom of the many is also strong enough to destroy the freedom of all.

THERE can be no doubt as to which horn of the dilemma the government has chosen. It is in full retreat before the onslaught of private power and a passive onlooker at its unbridled exercise. It can no more see to it that the natural monopolies in the fields of transportation, utilities, and mass communications be used in the public interest than it can protect the public interest in its dealings with the suppliers of manufactured goods. If the government has become the biggest customer of private industry, it has also become one of its most hapless customers—because it is one of its most impecunious. In the field of military supplies in particular, the government is at the mercy of its suppliers. Only within very narrow limits can it do what customers in a market economy are supposedly able to do if they dislike the terms of trade and the quality of the product: take its business elsewhere.

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This dependency of the government upon the suppliers of its military matériel evokes still another similarity with the feudal system. As the king had to buy military support from the feudal lords with parcels of his land and fragments of his power, so is the government at the mercy of its suppliers who control not only the quality of the product and the terms of trade but in good measure also the very identity of the product.

Hence, while the government is a weak contractual partner of the concentrations of private power, it is a virtually impotent bystander when it comes to controlling the exercise of private power. The government is incapable of enforcing the laws against a corrupt and tyrannical union. It cannot enforce the criminal laws against union officials, nor can it protect the members of the union against the abuse of power on the part of the union officials. The administration of the union has become in good measure an autonomous private government, making and enforcing its own laws and pursuing its own policies, in disregard of the public laws, the public policy, and the public interest.

WHAT holds true of unions applies to the legitimate business enterprise, and it applies likewise to the illegitimate business enterprise, the racket. The racket is in our society the most highly developed type of private government, not operating within the letter of the public law, as do the private governments of legitimate business. The distinctive characteristics of the racket are the institution of private criminal justice and methods of commercial competition resembling feudal warfare.

The retreat of the public power before the expansion of private governments has been particularly patent when the public power has failed to perform its most elemental function: defending the public interest—and more particularly the public peace—against the war, industrial or physical, of private governments. Both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower were helpless in preventing or settling industrial warfare between the giants of industry and labor. After President Truman's seizure of the steel industry during the strike of 1952 had been invalidated on constitutional grounds, President Eisenhower did not even attempt to intervene in the steel strike of 1959.

The issue in industrial wars of this kind is only ostensibly economic; in truth, it concerns the distribution of power between either management and labor or opposing labor unions or both. The economic settlement by which such a war is finally terminated amounts essentially to a conspiracy between management and labor to shift the economic burden of the settlement to the consumer. Whether or not such a settlement is actually supported and sanctioned by the government and whether or not its effects upon consumer prices are postponed for tactical reasons, as was done in the settlement of the steel strike of 1959, does not affect the intrinsic nature of the settlement and the government's impotence in the face of it.

The impotence of the government to assert its authority against the private governments comes nowhere more strikingly to the fore than in its dealings with the rackets. A racket is actually not only a private government but a counter-government, complete with all the characteristics of a public government (such as police and military forces, executive organs, courts, taxation), and its similarity to a feudal fiefdom (in its organization, functions, and relations to the public power, other rackets, and its outside tributaries) is indeed most impressive. The racket as an institution has proven invulnerable to the authority of the public power. The best the latter has been able to accomplish is sporadic harassment of the institution and the elimination of some of its members through criminal, contempt of court, and deportation proceedings. The very fact that the public power has found its most effective weapon in the income tax laws, whose evasion constitutes neither

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the most serious of the misdeeds of the rackets nor one peculiar to them, demonstrates the weakness of the public power's position.

Harassment by the public power, more or less good-naturedly submitted to by the private government, has become the essentially ritualistic method by which the public power asserts, and the private government submits to, its authority. This symbolic function, resembling the feudal obeisance, is performed by the arrest of known hoodlums, the indictment of labor racketeers, and the anti-trust proceedings against business enterprises. The general futility of such public measures in terms of the institutional relationship—in contrast to their effects upon certain individuals—only serves to underline the weakness of the public power and the semi-autonomy of private government. Were it not for the public power's ability to tax the private governments—which has remained effective though impaired—and for the public power's control over the most potent means of physical violence, the autonomy of the private governments would be complete and the public authority over them would have been emptied of its substance.

THE decline of the public power, revealed by disintegration from within and usurpation from without, can be traced to a paralysis of will within the public power itself. This paralysis, in turn, has been brought on by that perversion of the democratic process which reduces the government to an agent of what is thought to be public opinion. Such a government, as we have seen, cannot but be a weak government. A government which considers itself the agent rather than the molder of public opinion cannot help but set in motion that fatal mechanism through which public opinion is surrendered by default to the counter-elite of the private governments. Public opinion, which in view of its interests ought to be the ally of the public power, then becomes the instrument with which the private governments disarm the public power.

That so enfeebled a government still gives the appearance of governing and actually governs with a modicum of coherence can be attributed to three factors: the discipline of the budget, the leadership of the President, and the immanent force of the national purpose.

The budget of the federal government is, as it were, the master plan which assigns missions to all the branches of the government and determines the material resources to be expended for their achievement. However much the quality of the achievement and its faithfulness to the budgetary policy may depend upon individual performance, the budget constitutes a detailed charter of policy, joined into by the executive and legislative branches which tie all agents of the government to its choice of ends and means. It operates as the great centrifugal force tending to neutralize the feudalism from within. It delineates, as it were, the outer limits which that feudalism cannot overstep without forsaking the sanction of the law.

The degree of firmness of these budgetary ties depends not only upon the letter of the law resisting loose interpretation but also and most importantly upon the will and skill of the President and to a much lesser extent of Congress. The members of the executive branch are, legally speaking, only the agents of the President as Chief Executive, from whom they have received by way of delegation whatever authority they possess. The unity and purposefulness of action the federal government is capable of is largely determined by the degree to which the President can make his conception of policy prevail throughout the executive branch and can imbue with his will the many different steps that compose the execution of policy. That task of the President as the initiator, executor, and supervisor of policy is served by the administrative and political measures through which the presidential presence makes itself felt on all levels of the

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execution of policy. It is also served more intangibly and perhaps more importantly by the President as the articulator and living symbol of the national purpose.

THE public power is weakened and threatened with disintegration, from within and without by a new distribution of power, by new private interests, and by the widespread misunderstanding of the nature of democracy and executive decision. These threats are of a material character—and to a greater or lesser degree, a tangible one; they are social facts, subject to direct empirical observation. Yet the public power is being protected and to a certain extent immunized against disintegration by a factor which is intangible, insofar as its existence is known only directly, through certain significant words, deeds, and conditions. That factor is the all-pervasiveness of the national purpose. Both the defenders and opponents of the public power—like the partisans of the other great political controversies of the past—are parties to the purposeful consensus which sets America apart from other nations. They are Americans before they are partisans. The vitality of that consensus stands in inverse relation to the strength of the disintegrating factors in the public power which threaten the purposeful unity of the nation itself. The disintegration of the public power remains relative so long as the consensus to a common purpose outweighs, in the thoughts and deeds of the people, the commitment to parochial interests. That disintegration becomes absolute, and hence disastrous for the public power, when this commitment takes precedence over the national consensus. Either the public power will then survive only as a shadow to which autonomous feudal fiefdoms must pay ritual tribute, or else it will be destroyed in a single cataclysmic act through revolution and civil war, perhaps to be resurrected by one feudal power prevailing over the others.

In this confrontation between national consensus and parochial commitments what matters first of all is the vitality of the consensus to a common purpose. The purpose which has united America from the beginning of its history and set it apart from other nations has been to provide a home for equality in freedom within its borders and to expand the realm of that equality both inside and outside those borders. The vitality of that purpose has been restored time and time again through the experience of partial failure, calling forth a renewed awareness, a renewed consensus, and a renewed effort to achieve the purpose. If appearances are not deceptive, the nation has entered on this process of renewal by asking itself again what its purpose is in the contemporary world. What it finds, what it agrees upon, and what it resolves to achieve, will determine its future as a nation and settle the issue of the public power versus the new feudalism one way or the other.

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KENNETH KENISTON

Entangling Juvenile Delinquency

LATE in January, the Commissioner of the New York City Youth Service called an extraordinary press conference to announce a development of "tremendous significance for the juvenile delinquency prediction effort." Flanked by the Deputy Mayor, Paul T. O'Keefe (Mayor Wagner, ill, was absent), and the Harvard criminologists, Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, Commissioner Ralph Whelan praised the effectiveness of the Gluecks' "Social Factors Prediction Scale." This scale, he reported, had successfully predicted the delinquency or non-delinquency of 86.5 per cent of a group of boys in the Bronx. The Commissioner proposed that the Gluecks' scale be broadly applied to selected schools throughout the city: its extensive use, he said, would allow spotting "at an early age, those youngsters upon whom it would be necessary to concentrate the city's preventative resources."

Unfortunately, the claims made for this Youth Board study are, if not deliberately dishonest, at least as systematically misleading as the advertising that accompanies the inauguration of a new filter cigarette. More important, this kind of study in addition poses two general problems: first, the inherent limitations of *any* study which tries to predict or explain a complex personal, social, and ideological problem like delinquency by a simple correlation of bad families and bad boys; and, second, the increasing ease with which social scientists who claim too much can "over-sell" their results to an uncritical public.

A glance at the research which inspired the Youth Board's Delinquency Prediction Study gives some understanding of the latter's limitations. In Boston in 1939, Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck began a ten-year investigation which systematically compared 500 delinquent boys with 500 non-delinquents; reported ten years ago in *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency,* it is undoubtedly destined to remain the most massive research onslaught ever made on this problem. The non-delinquent boys were carefully selected so that both groups would contain the same proportions of any given national or ethnic background, the same levels of intelligence, and the same age ranges; further, both groups came from the same "unwholesome neighborhoods." The Gluecks made more than a thousand comparisons between the two groups of white, lower-class, slum-area boys. They found statistically "significant" differences between the delinquents and non-delinquents in almost every area they studied: Rorschach (inkblot) ratings, home conditions, body type, family life, school behavior, personal characteristics, etc., etc.

The way the Gluecks chose their boys made it impossible for them to study how

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social class, race, national origin, area of residence, or type of community might affect juvenile delinquency, since both delinquent and non-delinquent groups were matched to be identical in these respects. With these factors (to which other studies attribute great causal importance) matched out of consideration, the Gluecks found the most marked differences between the two groups in three areas: Rorschach test ratings; psychiatrists' judgments of personal characteristics; and—most important for the Youth Board study—five "social" factors: namely, overstrict or erratic paternal discipline, unsuitable maternal supervision, a hostile or indifferent attitude toward the boy by either parent, and an "unintegrated" family.

THE Gluecks' "Social" Factors Prediction Scale involves giving each boy a score on each of these factors. Working from their Boston findings, the Gluecks predict a high probability of delinquency for boys with high total scores. On the other hand, a boy with a firm but kindly father, "suitable" maternal supervision, warm or overprotective parents, and a cohesive family gets a low score, and is assigned a low probability of delinquency.

The Gluecks' five-factor scale in effect *post*-dicted delinquency in the Boston boys from whom it was developed: 84 per cent of the non-delinquents and 75 per cent of the delinquents were correctly identified by the scale, whereas guessing would give only 50 per cent correct. But post-diction is easier than prediction; Boston is not New York; and 1939 is not 1960. The Youth Board, with the help of the Ford Foundation (which chipped in more than $100,000) and the close cooperation of the Gluecks, decided to try out the scale as a predictive device in a New York slum.

In 1952, Youth Board workers made unannounced visits to the parents (usually only the mothers) of all the 224 boys entering the first grade in two Bronx schools. From these interviews, the five ratings involved in the Gluecks' "prediction" scale were made, and each boy was assigned a high or low probability of delinquency on the basis of the Gluecks' Boston findings. Follow-up has consisted of interviews with teachers and examination of Juvenile Aid Bureau and police files, from which the boys have been rated as currently "delinquent," "pre-delinquent," or "non-delinquent." The 223 boys still being followed are now thirteen or fourteen; that is, they were in the seventh grade during last year's follow-up.

The Delinquency Prediction Study has three more years to run before any final evaluation should be made. But since Commissioner Whelan, presumably with the approval of the onlooking Glueks, has chosen to suggest that their scale should be "applied broadly" to selected schools in the city, these incomplete returns must be examined for evidence which might support his enthusiasm.

What Commissioner Whelan's statements and press release most clearly show, when compared to the actual results of the Delinquency Prediction Study, is how easy it is to mislead with statistics, strange definitions, and omissions of key information —all without giving the impression of actually lying.

Consider, for example, his statement that 86.5 per cent of the Glueck scale predictions are correct. At first sight, this looks very impressive. But then recall that out of 223 boys, only 9 per cent (21) now satisfy the Youth Board's definition of "delinquent," with 3 per cent (6) more termed "pre-delinquent." In other words, depending on how you reckon, 88 per cent or 91 per cent of the boys are non-delinquent. Now suppose that in 1952 any one of us had predicted that *all* the boys would be non-delinquent: our prediction, either 88 or 91 per cent correct, would be even better than that claimed for the Glueck scale. The percentage correctly predicted, however imposing, in itself is a meaningless figure—something that Commissioner Whelan should know or the Gluecks should have told him.

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Or consider the verbal sleight of hand in the following two sentences, heavily underlined in the Youth Board press release. First: *"The majority of those who were rated with a low probability of becoming delinquent are currently presenting no serious community problem."* True; but hardly surprising since all but a few boys are now non-delinquent. But now the next sentence: *"The majority of those who are already showing delinquent or pre-delinquent tendencies were assigned a high probability of becoming delinquent."* We are suddenly no longer talking about what proportion of *predictions* are correct, but about the number of *currently* delinquent boys whom we assigned to the right category. If we shift back to the form of the first sentence, we get a statement with a different ring: *"Slightly more than a third of those rated with a high probability of becoming delinquent are currently delinquent."*

But even this percentage of "correct" predictions turns out to be too high, if we analyze the study's peculiar definition of "delinquent"—a definition nowhere clear in what Commissioner Whelan said or handed out. A 1957 Progress Report, however, shows that "delinquency" is taken to mean not only "adjudicated delinquency or persistent delinquency involving several police or court contacts," but "unofficial delinquency" (acts equivalent to official delinquency and delinquent-like behavior), and last but not least, "diagnosed mental illness" [*sic*]. In the 1957 report, the "adjudicated delinquent" boys constituted less than a third (4) of the thirteen boys lumped together as "delinquent."

UNTIL the Youth Board publishes its next Progress Report, we have no way of knowing for sure how many boys labeled "delinquent" fall into each of these three sub-categories. But it is clear that not *all* of the boys in the "delinquent" category are "adjudicated" delinquents; in fact, if the proportions of the 1957 report still hold, about eight of the twenty-one boys are "adjudicated," and the remainder are "unofficial" or "mentally ill."

Granted that delinquency is hard to define with precision in individual cases, including "diagnosed mental illness" under this heading is still hardly cricket—Commissioner Whelan's statement left us with the unfortunately mistaken impression that it was delinquency, not delinquency plus mental illness, which was being predicted.

But perhaps the most egregious oversight of this press release was that it failed to inform the press and the public that the *prediction scale had been changed* in the middle of the study and that the figures of this release were based on the new scale. Not until a second press release (designed to answer specific criticisms of the study) did it become generally known that the Gluecks had recently provided the Youth Board with a new scale to exclude ratings of parental affection and—when there was no visible father—of paternal discipline. The result of this change has been to reduce drastically the number of boys in the "predicted delinquent" group. Although the revised predictions (released by the Commissioner) show 35 per cent of the predictions of "delinquency" are correct, the original predictions were only 25 per cent correct. But the Youth Board's peculiar definition of delinquency makes even this figure misleading: it is probable that of the 67 boys *originally* given a high probability of delinquency *less than 10 per cent* have so far turned out to be *"adjudicated* delinquents"—hardly a noteworthy prediction.

There is, of course, no inherent reason why the Gluecks should not change their scale or their predictions any way they see fit to suit the needs of a new situation. But if the scale *is* changed after preliminary results have pointed out its errors, the study stops being a test of the scale's ability to predict, and becomes a frankly exploratory study.

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What has the Delinquency Prediction Study in fact demonstrated? Merely that 17 out of 67 boys *originally* given a high probability of delinquency have so far developed mental illness, or unofficial or official delinquency; while four more currently "delinquent" boys were originally assigned a *low* probability of delinquency. In other words, the study has shown nothing but a tenuous connection between family disintegration and gross pathology. This is hardly news to anyone; nor is it, in the field of juvenile delinquency, a development of the "tremendous significance" which Commissioner Whelan claimed; nor does it so far provide any basis for "concentrating the city's preventative resources" on "those youngsters" whom the scale, mostly incorrectly, "spots."

THE dangers of labeling some boys as "potential delinquents," especially on the basis of such inadequate predictions as those so far afforded by the Glueck scale, have been pointed out by several groups in response to Commissioner Whelan's statement. But the inherent inadequacies of this kind of "bad families make bad boys" approach to juvenile delinquency are not as obvious. Nor is it at first sight clear to what an extent the consulting social scientists in the Youth Board study have failed to live up to their responsibilities as consultants.

Studies like the Gluecks' or the Youth Board's actually focus attention away from the central issues in juvenile delinquency. By systematically excluding from study any possible relationship except that between disintegrated families and socially pathological behavior, they blind us to those forces which make juvenile delinquency a characteristic problem of American cities in the mid-20th century, but *not* of non-industrial communities, *not* of 19th-century cities, *not* of farm areas, and *not*—to the same extent—of Russian cities. To be sure, the Gluecks note in passing that they do not necessarily assume that "poverty and its correlates or the cultural forces of urban delinquency areas play no role in the causation of delinquency." But the Gluecks' decision to devote the 399 double-column pages of *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency* to a non-social, non-cultural study, or the Youth Board's expense of more than $100,000 for a ten-year project which ignores these factors, or, above all, Commissioner Whelan's suggestion that the city might concentrate its preventative resources on the boys "spotted" by such a study—all contain the implication that juvenile delinquency is essentially a personal, individual problem of the families and boys concerned, and that its therapy involves essentially individual treatment. That cultural, social, historical, or even ideological factors might help produce delinquency, or that "solving" the problem might require social and cultural changes—these thoughts receive passing attention, if any.

The complex social and ideological roots of juvenile delinquency do not, of course, rule out the treatment of individual delinquents—notoriously difficult though such treatment is. In fact, the Youth Board's *Tri-Boro Study* shows that its caseworkers can help disturbed youngsters who will accept treatment. And of even greater ultimate promise is the Youth Board's work with delinquent gangs, recently reported in another Youth Board book, *Reaching the Fighting Gang*. Here Youth Board workers made themselves useful to boys in street gangs and were often able to mediate between these working class boys and the demands (and services) of a largely middle-class world. Because of the excellent work and research being done by the Youth Board in other areas, Commissioner Whelan might have questioned the "tremendous significance" of the Delinquency Prediction Study.

A visit to the locale of the Delinquency Prediction Study makes clear some of the inadequacies of a "bad families make bad boys" approach. The boys studied began school in two elementary schools in a

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southeast Bronx industrial slum area, above and across which the now demolished "El" used to rumble. Rows of two-to-four story, front fire-escape tenements alternate with industries on the back streets and small impoverished shops on the main roads. Housing is uniformly substandard (except for a few increasingly dilapidated public units); on a warm day, the streets and tenement corridors have a heavy smell of garbage and factories. Puerto Rican and Negro children play in and among the garbage cans and run unattended in the streets. All indices of social pathology are high: not only juvenile delinquency, but crime, alcoholism, illegitimacy, and welfare assistance. When the Youth Board began its study, one third of the boys in school were classified as problems by their school authorities. Most of the working population holds unskilled jobs: restaurant workers, manual laborers, moving van men, and so on.

HISTORICALLY, this Bronx area often served as a funnel for new groups immigrating to New York: first Eastern European Jews, then Irish immigrants, then Southern Negroes, and now, in addition, Puerto Ricans. (In the eight years of the Youth Board study, the Puerto Rican school population has increased from less than a fifth to about a half of the total.) Local gangs (not fighting at the moment) are organized along ethnic lines, as is whatever sense of community may exist on the blocks. But the area gives the overwhelming impression of lack of community—of disintegration, deterioration, and marginality.

In funnel areas such as these, immigrants undergo their first years of "cultural shock," making (or often failing to make) the complex and difficult transitions from, say, a Puerto Rican village to industrial New York. Men must learn new jobs and often a new language; families usually move from a position, however unsatisfactory, within a social and cultural community which defines and limits them, to a region which offers only anomie—neither community nor the techniques and incentives for attaining any new position worthy of the name. Even more subtle changes often take place within families: fathers, already shaken by their lack of status and the demands of a new job and language, can be further threatened when their wives must take work to help support the family. It is a rare and remarkable family which does not inflict on its children the strains of its own attempt to adapt to the forbidding climate which greets the immigrant to the Bronx.

Other high delinquency areas have other, and different, social, cultural, and historical problems, but the site of the Delinquency Prediction Study illustrates another of their common characteristics. Study after study has shown that the lower-class families which inhabit such areas instil few of the restraints on aggression and emphases on personal control, planning, and intelligence which mark the "socialized" middle-class citizen. Lower-class children—who fight, do badly on tests, and "act out" their feelings toward authority—always get into the most trouble with policemen, school authorities, and especially lady schoolteachers (whose own precarious status may make them especially intolerant of aggressive, dirty little boys who hate school). When to these "natural" (in our society at present) disadvantages of lower-class status and upbringing, we add the shock of moving from one world to another, a breakdown of community ties, and disturbing changes of role within families, the development of a delinquent culture among some juveniles is almost certain. Indeed, in this setting, delinquency not only offers a chance to get back at the society which is responsible for these conditions, but—even for the unresentful—it is often the most exciting, adventurous, and vivid alternative to a future which promises neither dignity nor challenge.

In this study, the Gluecks have a major unfulfilled responsibility. To be sure, they

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should not be blamed for their emphasis on family disintegration as the key to delinquency. But as social scientists and consultants to a public agency, they have a particular responsibility to act as interpreters and guardians of the integrity of their work. And with problems like juvenile delinquency, where public pressure makes the desire for "significance," "results," and "solutions" almost overwhelming, their responsibility, if anything, increases. For here it is easiest to "over-sell" social science, promising scientific results where there are only unanswered questions. The mystique of the social sciences is always strong, and strongest among those who wish to bring the most promising "results" to bear on their problems. The informed and liberal public official is far from immune to this over-selling, for coupled with his wish to keep abreast may go insufficient time to study and evaluate the technical findings of his research staff.

UNDER such circumstances, consultants like the Gluecks should be prepared to act not only as interpreters but if necessary as dampers to premature enthusiasm. Even if Commissioner Whelan may be unable to interpret the percentages, definitions, and claims of his press release, the Gluecks are; and if they were unable to restrain his enthusiasm, they might at least have dissociated themselves from his recommendations. As the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues noted in a critical analysis of the Delinquency Prediction Study, "As these psychological approaches play an increasing role in our daily lives, it becomes more imperative that the public be protected from distorted and extravagant claims made in the name of scientific validity."

Even if one has no inherent objection to the misleading aspects of such claims, over-selling is likely to backfire in time. The public or public official, allowed to believe that commonplace findings have tremendous significance for the prevention of an urgent community problem, will sooner or later ask to have the goods produced; and when solutions are not forthcoming, the result is likely to be a complete repudiation of the social scientist and all his trappings.

Indeed, if any finding in the social sciences can be said to have "tremendous significance," it is that there are, in individual, social, and cultural life, few such findings. The individual is related to the community in subtle, complicated, and often un-apparent ways: an intangible force like the morale of the society may be as potent a determinant of an individual's delinquency as the indifference of his parents.

"Unraveling juvenile delinquency" is thus vastly more complex than Commissioner Whelan and the Gluecks would lead us to believe. If individual therapy with boys "spotted" as "potential delinquents" would solve the problem, we could rest with easier consciences. But unfortunately for our sleep, the roots of delinquency go beyond the boys and their families to our society, which permits the preconditions of delinquency—social disintegration, deterioration, and marginality —and which offers working class children few prospects as dignified, exciting, and challenging as truancy, gang warfare, vandalism, and theft. Unless these preconditions are eliminated, and until worthier prospects are offered, such efforts to predict individual delinquency are far more likely to entangle than to unravel.

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LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ

Middle-Class Judaism: A Case Study

DURING the past ten years, "Garfield Hills"—the name I have given a compact neighborhood in New York City's borough of Queens which was once closed to Jews—has turned more and more markedly into a Jewish section. As late as 1930—about twenty years after the community was founded—only 1,000 Jews out of a total population of 46,000 lived in Garfield Hills. Today the total population is over 95,000, of which nearly 30,000 are Jews (as compared with the same number of Protestants and about 37,000 Catholics). Ethnically, the neighborhood now is also varied: Anglo-Scotch-Irish, Germans, Italians, East and Central European Jews.

The growth of Garfield Hills (and of all Queens) in the past decade is easy to explain. After years of housing starvation, many young families in New York found that the great Queens building boom of 1948–1951 offered them a wide choice of apartments at monthly rentals from $75 to $140. Besides wanting a place to live at rents they could afford, these young people were fleeing from the changes in their old neighborhoods in Manhattan, the Bronx, and Brooklyn. They were looking for a reasonable facsimile of the suburbs a half hour from Times Square. Thus Queens now has about 400,000 Jews; and, according to a recent study of Jewish population trends in New York City by Henry Cohen, one-third of New York's Jews will be living there by the year 1970.

A similar process seems to be marking Jewish migration in most Northern cities. Metropolitan Jews, before they settle in the suburbs, have been moving out of the old, central parts of the city into newer, less crowded neighborhoods at the fringes of the city's limits. While the expanding Negro and Puerto Rican population has changed the character of the center city, the Jewish population has been changing the character of the outer urban ring.

Like the Gentiles there, most Jews in Garfield Hills today are white-collar workers, professionals, and businessmen. About three-fourths of the people I interviewed had at least some college training; most, in fact, are college graduates who earn between $5,000 and $7,000 per year.

There is still very little mingling of Jews and Gentiles in Garfield Hills, despite the fact that the old exclusionist policies are a thing of the past. Most of the Jews I talked to assured me they got on well with their Christian neighbors, but it turned out that relations were apt to be formal, limited to polite greetings in the elevator or on the street. The only places where Jews and Gentiles regularly see each other are at the political party meetings and the nonsectarian civic organizations like the League of Women Voters and the PTA's.

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The familiar preference about finding one's recreation among Jews came up again: "It's more comfortable," "there's less pressure," "it's one barrier less between people."

To serve the social and religious needs of its 30,000 Jews, Garfield Hills has ten local branches of national Jewish organizations (including fraternal groups like B'nai B'rith, Zionist groups like Hadassah, and defense agencies like the American Jewish Congress) and five synagogues (three Orthodox, one Conservative, and one Reform). Thus, the full ideological spectrum, right to left, ultra-Orthodox to atheist, appears to be represented. But actually, in places like Garfield Hills it is often hard to distinguish one organization from another on the basis of their activities: the truth is that the ideological outlook and ambitions of the great national Jewish organizations are seldom reflected in their local counterparts. As for religion itself, Orthodoxy, Conservatism, and Reform as practiced in this country have come to resemble each other more closely than any of them do the Halachic Judaism from which they all ultimately derive. With the middle-class identity of American Jews becoming stronger and stronger, the evolving practices and beliefs of American Judaism are converging into one pattern of nearly uniform observance.

The five synagogues in Garfield Hills have a combined membership of about 1,300 families, or about 15 per cent of the total Jewish population. Half are the kind of transients that pass through the synagogue only long enough for their children to attend its Hebrew school. A fair estimate is that about 40 per cent of all the Jewish families in Garfield Hills have belonged to some synagogue at one time or another. The two oldest and largest of the synagogues are the Jewish Center (Conservative) which grew out of a tiny *minyan* founded in 1919 by the first Jewish settlers of Garfield Hills, and orginally housed in a bungalow, and Adath Israel (Orthodox) which dates from 1927 and now has 430 members (men only—women are not counted). The other three synagogues were all established within the last decade by dissidents. The Woodbrook Hebrew Congregation—with 135 members—is composed of Orthodox German Jews who came to America in the late 30's, and were for many years housed by a congregation in a neighboring community. Young Israel, also Orthodox, was founded in 1954 and already has 175 members—a record which probably should be credited less to Young Israel's ideological or religious popularity in Garfield Hills than to its choice location in the heart of the neighborhood, its nominal annual membership fee of fifteen dollars, and its willingness to accept boys over eleven for Bar Mitzvah preparation. The Reform Temple Menorah, housed in a converted movie house whose marquee announces that every Wednesday is *Game Nite,* was established in 1947 and within three years built up a membership of 200 families. Half deserted in 1950 when the rabbi was found to have been involved in various Communist fronts, the congregation has never recovered: it is the ragtag of Jewish life in Garfield Hills.

Without giving it much thought, I had supposed that these different congregations would conform to the ordinary notions of Orthodoxy, Conservatism, and Reform: Orthodox Jews were in my mind associated with poor immigrants, Reform generally with wealthy third-generation German Jews. It turned out that in Garfield Hills many of the older and richer residents are Orthodox—the richest Jew in the community is a nationally known toy manufacturer who has long been affiliated with the Orthodox Adath Israel and his contribution of four figures to the UJA is by far the largest single gift coming from Garfield Hills. By contrast, an active leader of Temple Menorah's Reform congregation is the owner of a local dry goods store which probably yields a decent living only by dint of the hard work he and his

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wife put into it. These two instances may be regarded as constituting the not-too extensive range between the well-to-do and the not so well-to-do in a community that is predominantly middle class.

The range in religious belief is hardly any wider: at one end is a small number of ideologically committed Orthodox Jews like the leaders of Young Israel, at the other are some equally strongly committed reformers; most of the rest of the Jews in Garfield Hills, regardless of their formal affiliation, stand somewhere in the center. In such matters as Sabbath observances and *kashrut* there is very little difference among the various groups—excluding the Reform congregation, of course. A few among the Conservatives and the Orthodox are, indeed, strict observers; but most have made their less rigorous individual adjustments. Melvin Kohn,* Adath Israel's first president, told me he thought about 85 per cent of Adath's members could be classified as "Conservative" in terms of observance (of course, he meant non-observance). In fact, their deviation even from strict Sabbath observance is very conspicuous. When Rabbi Diamond, who for almost three decades has held the congregation formally within Orthodoxy, objected to the synagogue's Boy Scout troop joining weekend trips that were to start Friday afternoons, his congregation tried to talk him out of his objections. But on his insistence that the boys must wait till Saturday evening to set out, the laity finally solved the problem another way. As one member confided to me: "We began to sneak the boys out without the Rabbi's knowledge. He never knew about the weekend trips."

Even the Orthodox German Jews of the Woodbrook Hebrew Congregation are relaxing. Observance among this group, who frequently obey the letter of the Law if not its spirit, is no longer as rigid as it once was in Frankfort.

Nor do the three different seating practices in the various synagogues—total segregation in Young Israel, separation in Adath Israel and the Woodbrook Hebrew Congregation, and mixed seating in the Jewish Center—reflect individual beliefs or commitment. The convictions and practices of the Jews formally affiliated either with Conservatism or Orthodoxy—perhaps even with Reform—have closer resemblances to each other than they do to the separate movements out of which they originally developed. Solomon Schechter and Isaac Mayer Wise would scarcely approve of what passes for Conservatism or Reform in Garfield Hills. As for Garfield Hills' Orthodoxy, any resemblance it may bear to Halachic Judaism seems accidental. Customs and minor commandments have been elevated to dogmas while Pentateuchic injunctions have been abandoned. I am certain that a proposal for the men in the Jewish Center to discard their skullcaps would create a greater upheaval than if the *mehitzah* were to be removed from the Young Israel synagogue. For if the Jews in Garfield Hills—and this is true of middle-class urban Jewish communities everywhere—have put their unmistakable Jewish stamp on the community at large, they have also placed an American middle-class stamp on their own traditional religious beliefs and observances.

IT WOULD hardly be possible to get a more vivid picture of the religion of middle-class American Jews than through a study of the Conservative Jewish Center of Garfield Hills. The Center is the largest synagogue in the community, the oldest and the most stable, and has in the course of its history encompassed both Orthodoxy and Reform. Its character has been shaped to a considerable extent by the laity.

Its membership of 450 families and 150 individuals provide a yearly income of over $80,000. On this budget the Center maintains a rabbi, a cantor and a sexton, a choir and an organist; a school principal and six teachers; a librarian and youth leaders; office and building staffs. It boasts

* This like all proper names used here, is a pseudonym.

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a sisterhood, a men's club, a couples' club, a teenage club, a tallis and tefillin club, Boy Scouts, mothers' club, youth groups. Its activities include lectures and discussions; bazaars, rummage sales, baseball pools, and sweepstakes; breakfasts, luncheons, dinners, and cocktail parties; dances, theater parties, fun and games. The Center is of course affiliated with all its national correlates in the United Synagogue of America: the National Women's League, the National Federation of Jewish Men's Clubs, the Young People's League, the Commission on Jewish Education. Alvin Spiegel, the Center's young and energetic rabbi, is a member of the Rabbinical Assembly; he reports periodically on the Center's activities in the pages of the various publications of the Conservative movement. The Center's school is affiliated with the Associated United Synagogue Schools of Queens and the Jewish Education Committee. The Center itself belongs to the Jewish Community Council of Garfield Hills and the nonsectarian Garfield Hills Community Federation, a civic improvement association.

Rabbi Spiegel makes no complaint about his congregation's attendance at services. It is not unusual for the Center's synagogue, which seats about 350, to be filled to overflowing on festivals, even when these occur on weekdays. On Friday nights, on an average, about 150 worshippers are there, mostly couples seated together—the sexes seem about evenly represented. Decorum prevails, in dress and in manners. The service is marked by dignity and evokes a fairly high degree of participation during responsive readings and communal singing. Cantor, choir, and organist provide some pleasant music. The rabbi's sermon is neither long nor taxing. Abraham Joshua Heschel might have been describing just such a Friday evening when he wrote: "Our services are conducted with pomp and precision. The rendition of the liturgy is smooth. Everything is present: decorum, voice, ceremony. But one thing is missing: Life."

If by life Heschel means *kavvanah*—direction, inspiration, an awareness of the meaning of prayer—there seemed to me to be little of this even on Kol Nidre night, or during *hakafot* on Simhat Torah. Only the very elderly pleaded for forgiveness at Kol Nidre, and only the children generated excitement during *hakafot*. But at a dedication of a Torah scroll which was being presented to the junior congregation, I did, finally, it seemed to me, find *kavvanah*.

THE dedication of a Torah scroll has never been set as a fixed observance. The ceremony, which evolved in East Europe, is based on the notion that anyone who inscribes even one letter on a Sefer Torah earns a *mitzvah*—a good deed. Traditionally the scribe—the *sofer*—first outlines the letters of the opening and closing verses of the Torah; then the congregation sells these letters to individual purchasers who, on completing them, receive the *sofer's* blessing. Parents at the Jewish Center bought letters for their children.

The *sofer* was a short, ruddy-faced, white-bearded Hasid from Rivington Street. As he approached the Sefer Torah to help the children fill in their letters, he seemed indeed to become transfigured into a living testimony of the joy in serving God. He guided each child's hand, asked in his Yiddish singsong the child's name, and blessed him. When all the letters were filled in, his glowing face grew redder still, his tempo, as he sang the *Toras-Emes,* livelier and livelier. He infected the slower cantor with his own excitement, and the two men began dancing together. When all the Torah scrolls, dressed in their gold-braided satin and velvet mantles, with their silver breastplates, crowns, and *rimmonim,* were taken from the Ark for the procession, the *sofer* reached a high stage of God-intoxication. Many of the adults were visibly moved. The children seemed amused, perhaps bewildered, perhaps even embarrassed at the sight of men dancing together.

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The congregation at the Jewish Center does not believe that the Torah is Divine Revelation. They regard it as a great religious and historical document. But the *sofer* from Rivington Street, in the midst of the congregation that night, believed the Torah to be Divine Revelation of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. He blessed the children in the name of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, while most members of the Jewish Center think that this God is not different from the God of the Episcopalians, Lutherans, or Roman Catholics.

In the course of my visits, I talked to a good many Center members, some of whom even consented to a formal questionnaire interview. I asked them why they attended services and how important these services were to them. All expressed the notion that belief in God was essential to being a good Jew—but the idea that attending services was a way of being brought closer to God was expressed by exactly two persons. Almost everyone said that a good Jew must belong to a synagogue—but only one person declared his belief that attending weekly services was essential to being a good Jew. The majority of those whom I spoke to said they attended services because it made them feel better, or because they enjoyed the atmosphere of the synagogue. But only one of them was able to follow the Hebrew prayers, let alone understand them.

TODAY most of the members of the Jewish Center say they consider themselves to be Conservative, and they feel they are authentically represented by a Conservative institution. Many of those I interviewed, brought up in Orthodox homes, defined Conservatism as a moderation of Orthodoxy's "fanaticism," a loosening of its "rigidity," a "realistic accommodation to the needs of the modern Jew." A few thought of Conservatism as a brake against headlong flight into Reform—practically apostasy, in their eyes. As one woman put it, "I never liked the strict old-fashioned Orthodox and I'm a little afraid of Reform. It's too non-Jewish. Conservatism is just right for the middle class."

Not many members of the Jewish Center may realize how many deviations from tradition they have accepted. Few notice that they pray in a synagogue without a *mehitzah* and without a *bimah,* a synagogue in which the rabbi and the cantor turn their backs on the Holy Ark as they face the congregation, and where female voices join in a choir accompanied by an organ. Thirty years ago, however, the congregation was in constant upheaval over just these changes.

The founding members of the Jewish Center split into two camps: the Orthodox and the "antis"—the latter a highly diverse group whose common bond was the common foe. These "antis" included Jews who thought a Jew, even if he was not very pious, ought to belong to a synagogue; American-born Jews who had joined the synagogue for social reasons; East European Jews—Zionists and secularists—who hoped to turn the synagogue into a community center.

In 1925 the congregation hired Rabbi Hirsh Riegelman. Recently from Austria, he was attending Stephen S. Wise's newly established Jewish Institute of Religion "to get a little American polish," as a friend had advised. It was he who inspired the "antis" into the desire to make something worthwhile of the little "bungalow" synagogue. The synagogue president, Isaac Milman, had no ambition for the *shul* beyond its *minyan* and school; the secularists and socialites had more grandiose ideas.

There had not been enough room within the cramped confines of the bungalow synagogue for conflict, but the congregation's new two-story building, to which it moved in 1927, could easily hold a house divided against itself. The new restrictive immigration laws were in some sense responsible for the beginnings of the battle. One of the congregation's important donors had extracted a *quid pro quo* for his contribution to the new building: the

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synagogue was to hire his brother-in-law, a Polish rabbi, who would then be permitted to enter America as a non-quota immigrant. But when he arrived, Rabbi Greenstein turned out to have a long beard, to speak only Yiddish, and to be rigidly Orthodox.

Many in the congregation resented attending services at which he officiated. Once having turned their backs on the Lower East Side, they hated to be reminded of their immigrant origins. Besides, going to *shul* was a social event and the women insisted on equal rights: they wanted to sit with their husbands. The Orthodox Jews, naturally, strongly opposed any such thing. Finally, an arrangement satisfactory to both factions was reached. The Orthodox were to hold their services in the *bet midrash*—a small synagogue one flight down from the main floor—with women sitting in the rear and Rabbi Greenstein officiating. In the main synagogue, upstairs, where men and women sat together and the cantor faced the congregation with his back to the Ark, Rabbi Riegelman was to conduct what we would today call a "modern" or "liberal" Orthodox service. This was the classic compromise that started the transformation from Orthodoxy to Conservatism everywhere in America.

THE new arrangement, however, did not long satisfy everyone who attended services in the main synagogue. Rabbi Riegelman, fresh from the Jewish Institute of Religion, decided to convene a late Friday evening service in a meeting room on the third floor, with a string trio. Thus, in the fall of 1928, three different services were held simultaneously for the High Holy Days: the traditional Orthodox service in the *bet midrash* with Rabbi Greenstein, the modern Orthodox in the main synagogue with a rabbi hired for the occasion, and a service that today would be best described as Conservative, on the third floor with Rabbi Riegelman.

Clearly, the "third floor" had become very popular, and the annual membership meeting that was soon to be held would have to decide once and for all what manner of services should be conducted permanently. The "main synagoguers" felt themselves caught in a squeeze between the Orthodox and the "liberals," while the "liberals," for their part, worried about being forced out by a combination of the modern and traditional Orthodox. Each group sent out feelers: finally at a caucus of the "liberals" and modern Orthodox, a compromise was arrived at which the general membership subsequently adopted. Under this compromise, the old-fashioned Orthodox were to continue their Sabbath eve services in the *bet midrash,* while the main synagogue would hold a late Friday night service with music —thus accommodating the third-floor practices. But Saturday morning would revert to the modern Orthodox: a traditional Sabbath service without music. High Holy Day services, it was agreed, would be Orthodox, and without music. Once again, the congregation adopted a classic formula on the main road to Conservatism.

At first a small barrel organ replaced the string trio. But when Rabbi Greenstein's brother-in-law expressed a wish to do something for the congregation that would erase the memory of the trouble he had caused, Rabbi Riegelman suggested the gift of a pipe organ and—no sooner said than done—a $1,500 instrument was installed. That was in 1929. Rabbi Riegelman, proud of his achievement, promptly hired a concert organist for that first late Friday service.

But no organ sang out that evening. Isaac Milman, former president and *baal-tefillah* in the *bet midrash,* had, with a zeal worthy of the Maccabees, slashed the pipes. The next morning Rabbi Riegelman descended to the *bet midrash,* calling for repentance. But the congregants openly applauded Milman, for it is said "They that strive with the Lord shall be broken to pieces." Rabbi Riegelman felt he had no choice but to resign.

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During the next ten years the organ was never used, not even for weddings. With Rabbi Riegelman gone, and the stock market in collapse, the reformers' zeal flagged. They had achieved a great deal —mixed seating, the use of English in the services, dissociation from the immigrant Orthodox. Around 1930 the Jewish Center joined the United Synagogue, thus becoming officially Conservative. But the Center had little interest in its adopted parent, and little money in the bank. Each year it rejected the $250 quota the United Synagogue imposed, unanimously voting to pay only the annual $25 dues. In 1936, the sisterhood of the Center formally joined the National Woman's League.

TIME proved to be on the side of the Conservatives. The *bet midrash* congregants began to die out; and in 1937, the new leader of the congregation, Rabbi Levin, discussed with the board a plan to draft men from the main synagogue for the daily *minyan* in the *bet midrash*, so that the *minyan* could go on functioning. On High Holy Days, the *bet midrash* continued to conduct a strictly Orthodox service for those Jews in Garfield Hills of whom Rabbi Mordecai Waxman has written: "Men and women who stayed away from the synagogue throughout the year wanted the *shul* they stayed away from to be a *shul* where people *davvened*."

The dues-paying members of the Jewish Center, however, were satisfied with the Conservative service. There were even some newcomers in the late 30's who had Reform leanings. To satisfy them and himself too (for he was a "left-winger" in the Conservative movement), Rabbi Levin proposed to repair the organ which had been standing mute in the choir loft for nearly ten years. On February 2, 1939, the board, six to three, authorized $90 for repairs. The organ was first used in February in a "dramatic play," and the organist was paid five dollars. It took a little while before it was generally accepted as part of the ritual. Some members complained, a few resigned, until, on June 28, 1939, the board adopted a motion that it "favors the use of the organ at Friday evening services and authorizes the ritual committee to proceed with arrangements for such use." Now, too, a compromise had been effected, for having the organ made it more agreeable for the Reform-minded to wear their skullcaps.

The 1939 compromise was identical with the one of 1928–29. But this time there were no bolts from heaven or its representatives.

In 1943 Rabbi Levin left Garfield Hills. He was succeeded by Rabbi Philip Goldstein, a "centrist" in the Rabbinical Assembly. Rabbi Goldstein's ten years at the Jewish Center coincided with a period of intensified organizational activity on the part of all Conservative institutions to strengthen Judaism among the laity. Postwar developments encouraged rabbinic leaders to set higher standards for practicing Judaism: more Jewish education for children and adults, more synagogue attendance, more observance. People were beginning to come to the synagogue in larger numbers than ever before. Perhaps the war had had this effect, or the Catastrophe, or Israel, or the new exodus to the suburbs. Whatever the reason, it was important to do something for Jews once they were in the synagogue. The wish to do something expressed itself concretely during the years immediately following the war in a drive to give the children more Jewish education.

In 1914, Dr. Mordecai M. Kaplan, then chairman of the education committee of the United Synagogue of America, had said: "With very few exceptions, most of the congregations have to maintain a double system of schooling in order to meet the wishes of the two classes of members that are usually to be found in every congregation, namely those whose slogan is 'More Judaism,' and those who ask for 'Less Judaism.'"

It has been the practice of many Conservative synagogues to conduct both a

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Sunday school and a weekday Hebrew school; congregants could elect to send their children only to the Sunday school or, in addition, to the afternoon classes twice a week. In 1940 over two hundred children attended the Center's Sunday school, while only 75 were enrolled in the Hebrew school.

The Rabbinical Assembly continued to agitate for increased Jewish education, and its members in turn tried to influence their congregations in this direction. Finally, in 1947, Rabbi Goldstein succeeded in establishing the three-day-a-week Hebrew school in the Jewish Center. Parents could no longer choose between the Sunday school and the Hebrew school. Members with Reform leanings complained most loudly; and the conflict led to secession and the founding of the Reform Temple Menorah. This left the Center with an almost entirely homogeneous membership loyal to Conservatism.

In the ensuing years, Conservatism became so entrenched that no one even noticed the last gasp of the *kulturkampf* in the Jewish Center. One weekend in 1957, Rabbi Spiegel took twenty couples to Lakewood for a retreat. During the Saturday morning Torah reading, someone who thought to titillate the group suggested: "Why not give a woman an *aliyah?*" A woman was called up. Later she admitted she had been uncomfortable. Her attitude coincided with the views of the majority in the Rabbinical Assembly's Law Committee who felt it was "ill advised to change the *general* pattern of the traditional Torah reading procedure . . . let the ladies of the synagogue find blessing in the fact that the men take the *lead* in its rituals." This episode was mentioned in the congregational bulletin, but scarcely anybody paid attention. It was the sexton who told me about a very Orthodox old man who regularly had attended the daily morning and evening services though he paid no dues to the Center. The old man, aroused by the story of the *aliyah* in Lakewood, stopped coming to *shul*.

THE six hundred and thirteen commandments which, according to traditional belief, were transmitted by God to Moses have been widely breached, and it was hard to find any that were universally obeyed among the Center members I interviewed. Fasting on Yom Kippur, removing bread (but not other *hametz*) from the house on Passover, and lighting candles on Chanukah were the three most observed commandments. One might think the Jews in Garfield Hills were paying heed to Rabbi Judah ha-Nasi's advice: "Be as attentive to a minor commandment as to a major one, for thou knowest not what is the reward to be given for the commandments."*

Kashrut has survived in a mangled form: about two-thirds of those whom I interviewed bought kosher meat regularly, but even they did not all keep separate the meat and dairy dishes. Scarcely anyone *kashered* the meat. Again, about two-thirds of the respondents never served bacon or ham, but these were not the same two-thirds who bought only kosher meat. Some who would not serve pork at home were willing to eat it elsewhere. The general feeling was that observance of dietary laws had no real bearing on whether a person was a "good Jew."

The vestiges of Sabbath observance are even fewer than survivals of *kashrut*. (A psychoanalyst could perhaps best explain the effectiveness of the taboos against forbidden foods.) The only Sabbath observance most of the people belonging to the Center still honor is the festive Friday night meal, with its candle-lighting ceremony. But perhaps only one out of every

* Lapses in observances and changed emphases in tradition are not unique among Jews—Catholics, too, have been seduced by urban industrial America. In the *Dynamics of a City Church*, a study of an urban parish in the South, Father Joseph H. Fichter writes that the diocesan Lenten regulations "admit such a latitude of interpretation that they seem to be observed more in breach than in the practice." His comments on the unexpected popularity of Easter over Christmas and on the social function of confirmation and midnight Mass show that secularism has made drastic inroads into the Catholic church.

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two families begin the meal with the *kiddush*. On the Sabbath itself, many people work or do household chores, everyone smokes and rides. Hardly anyone is seen going to *shul*. The Garfield Hills Jews do not know and surely do not care that in 1950 the Rabbinical Assembly's Law Committee could not agree on whether to sanction riding to services on the Sabbath.

THE Conservative Rabbinate, like Gaul, is divided into three parts: right, center, and left. Though the right has the fewest practicing rabbis, its importance is enhanced by the Jewish Theological Seminary faculty, who command extraordinary prestige and whose position on questions of Halachah is pervasive in the Rabbinical Assembly. The Assembly has tried to adapt the Halachah to modern living, but it has done so slowly and with a heavy heart. Perhaps the slowness is intended to thwart the laity's unseemly haste in making changes. In 1938, twenty-five years after the United Synagogue was founded, the Assembly's Law Committee took the view that the Friday evening service was unobjectionable even when held at a late hour. It has not yet reached a formal decision on the use of the organ, even though about one-fourth of all Conservative synagogues do in fact use one at services.

The Rabbinical Assembly has modified the *ketubah* (marriage contract); its Law Committee voted to permit using electricity for illumination on the Sabbath; and a majority sanctioned riding on the Sabbath in order to get to *shul*. Yet the laity has been riding everywhere on the Sabbath—except, it seems, to *shul*. One rabbi complained at a meeting of the Rabbinical Assembly: "While we are discussing the trivialities and the minutiae, the very props of our Jewish life are disregarded, violated, and broken. Not five in a hundred of our members are Sabbath observers; not five in a hundred observe the dietary laws; not two in a hundred are *yodei sefer;* and not even one in a hundred cares about our decision, or, for that matter, the legalistic decisions of any group."

To this charge Rabbi Jacob Agus replied in the spirit that has characterized the Conservative rabbinate: "Manifestly, our central purpose is not to save the Halachah. . . . We want to save the Jews."

In a wholesome effort to save their Jews, the Rabbinical Assembly felt it important in 1950 to launch a national effort for "the revitalization of the Sabbath." They asked the lay people to pledge themselves: "1. To avoid all avoidable work on the Sabbath, specifically not to shop, not to cook, and not to do any laundry or cleaning work on the Sabbath. 2. To observe the ceremonies of kiddush, candle-lighting, the Sabbath meal, the blessing of children, and Havdallah. 3. To attend public worship at least once on Sabbath." The United Synagogue undertook to carry out this program, but without any visible results. Five years later, Rabbi Ira Eisenstein wrote that most Conservatives "honestly" declared the campaign for the revitalization of the Sabbath "a flop."

The United Synagogue has apparently stopped trying to change individual behavior. Instead, it adopted a code setting forth in detail an appropriate standard of congregational behavior on the synagogue's premises and at official functions elsewhere. Besides demanding the sanctity of the Sabbath and *kashrut* observance, the code attempts to guide congregations toward decorum and dignity in dress and behavior. The Center's Rabbi Spiegel, too, frequently addresses himself to raising the level of public taste at congregational functions. But he feels his most important role is to teach his congregation that Judaism "is a response to the most vital and immediate concerns of the Jew, what to do with his life and the days that make it up and how to face suffering, setback, and death itself."

Rabbi Spiegel's attitude toward tradition is not very different from that of older rabbis who argue that "out of the *naaseh* comes the *nishma*"—the doing precedes

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the believing. "Tradition," he says, "is the result of the Jews' encounter with the Divine. It is what has become public Jewish property after the three-thousand-year cry after God." Though he believes that preserving and changing Jewish tradition are of the deepest concern to the Conservative movement, he thinks it most important that Jewish tradition be returned to "proper perspective" and again be viewed "as the effect of Israel's dialogue with its Living God. Jewish tradition ought to be the means to help restore the religious dimension to the Jew, to expose him to the luminous throbbing world of faith." On another occasion he told me that "living as a Jew creates a sense of holiness in each person and increases his awareness of living in the sight of God."

JEWISH public life in the last few decades has been monopolized by rabbis with such singleminded dedication to nationalism and social justice that we have become unaccustomed to rabbis who place God above His people. Under thirty-five, and a postwar graduate of the Jewish Thelological Seminary, Rabbi Spiegel has been in the rabbinate ten years. His God-centeredness, like that of many of his contemporaries, has been molded by many elements: personal tragedy, the war, existentialism. His teachers have been Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Abraham Joshua Heschel. Intellectually attracted to Reconstructionism under Mordecai Kaplan's powerful influence in his student days, Rabbi Spiegel today complains that the movement offers no "compelling idea of God" which can satisfy his needs or those of his congregation.

Rabbi Spiegel hopes to teach his view of Judaism to his congregation not by sermons nor even by his enormous number of lectures, talks, discussions, reviews, and courses, but by personal example. Being a Jew, he says, is a joyous experience. He likes to think of himself as part of the Hasidic tradition and he wants to show his people that Judaism need not be morose, dogmatic, or ascetic. Has he been successful? Perhaps half the people I asked thought a rabbi should be "a source of inspiration and faith," in good times and bad, and a "counselor for guidance and advice." They look to him for facts, guidance, information. They want to find a faith or formula that will help them cope with life, death, and suffering. A sisterhood parlor discussion about the Book of Job attracted many women, seeking an answer to the question: "Why does God make suffering?"

These are the people who attend the pleasant service in the Center, the people who are looking for faith, peace, and comfort. Some hope to find understanding in a discussion about Job, as they seek to find comfort in the service. They are worlds apart from the rabbi. Yet I daresay there is more communication between him and his congregation when he teaches them the centrality of God and faith than between the congregation and the United Synagogue when the latter promoted the revitalization of the Sabbath.

As to the question of the ethical element in Judaism, practically every single person I interviewed recognized that a "good Jew" must lead an ethical and moral life. (Whether an ethical and moral life meant belonging to a synagogue or whether it meant supporting humanitarian causes, the questionnaire was not refined enough to establish.) About half my respondents thought it essential for a Jew to promote social justice by working for civic betterment, helping the underprivileged, and helping to achieve equality for Negroes. This action, it would seem, is in the mainstream of the Jewish tradition. For it is written that when man appears before the Throne of Judgment, the first question asked him is not, "Did you believe in God?" or "Did you pray and perform ritual commandments?" but—"Did you deal honorably and faithfully with your fellow man?"

Yet the modern Jew's concern with social justice does not, I think, derive from

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the ethical teachings of Judaism, which rise in turn from the religious wellsprings of belief—the belief that man was created in God's image and should imitate him in the ways of justice, truth, and mercy. The modern Jew's impulse to help the wronged and the oppressed springs, it seems to me, from the fact that he associates his own security with a democratic, liberal, and secular society. He looks upon a threat (even if not directed specifically against him) to any of these aspects of the society he lives in as an evil to be combatted. To be sure, Jewish advocates of good deeds and social welfare draw upon the teachings of the Torah and the prophets to stimulate Jewish involvement. But chapter and verse merely serve to adorn the will to self-preservation.

THE feeling of group survivalism is mainly, I think, what shapes the Jewishness of the Garfield Hills Jews I talked to. Being Jewish is as real to them as being an American or an accountant or a mother. They were born Jews and reared as Jews. But the only way they can express their identity as Jews consciously is through the synagogue, even if most of them rarely attend its services, are ignorant or skeptical of its teachings, and fail to observe its laws. They no longer live in a natural Jewish milieu and having rejected the culture of Eastern Europe and its American transplantations they have no viable Jewish culture of their own. They have spurned Yiddish, which today survives only in a few expressions and jokes. They are, at best, helf-learned in the religious literature. The specifics of the Jewish ethos are dissolving and only vague, haunting forms remain.

Fear of anti-Semitism persists, no matter how good conditions may be. Such fear is either concealed in withdrawal and hypersensitivity or exposed in assertiveness and paranoia. When we observe the middle-class Jews of Garfield Hills week in and out, the fear seems groundless enough, but in the pitiless glare of Jewish history it is not totally irrational. And this fear has its counterpoise in the wish to remain Jewish and perpetuate Jewishness, in a refusal to elude the ineluctable Jewish fate. Every person I talked to said that accepting one's Jewishness and not concealing it was essential to being a "good Jew." It was an elementary, almost biological expression of group survival.

Also, all but one of the group I interviewed thought a "good Jew" must marry within the Jewish faith. Their "explanations" were merely repetitions of their disapproval: "I'm a Jew; my boys are Jews and they should marry Jewish girls." Or: "I don't believe in ethnic exploration." Conversion is the unspoken horror of intermarriage, the symbol of a Jew's death at the hands of the Christian. In the classic story of intermarriage, Sholem Aleichem's *Tevye der Milchiker,* Tevye's antagonist is not his daughter Chave's Christian husband, but the priest who converts her. When an intermarried couple stay away from both synagogue and church and give their children an Ethical Culture Sunday school education, the Jewish loss is less poignant: the Jew who does not become a Christian remains a Jew.

Doubtless the most public and lavish expression of the desire for group survival is loyalty to Israel—all expressed warm feelings for the State. Many referred to it as the "Jewish homeland," which they uniformly defined as "a place where Jewish refugees can find a home." Everyone was eager to help Israel—though no one had considered settling there. Raising money, all agreed, was the way to help Israel, yet no one thought Israel's needs should come before those of American Jews. It was important, my respondents said, to influence American policy in behalf of Israel, but they insisted that we must protect America's interests too. Though all were very proud of Israel, none had thought to study Hebrew in order to keep up with Israel's culture. The very idea of this struck people as strange.

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What goes on inside Israel seems of less moment to them than what goes on—perilously—around its borders.

But philanthropy, too, is an index of group survivalist feeling. Garfield Hills is not a big-money neighborhood. In 1958 the UJA raised $29,000 in Garfield Hills, which would be about a dollar per Jewish head—though a good part of this money came by way of the UJA's business and industries division. But however slim the philanthropic pickings in Garfield Hills, the Jewish organizations take most of what the Jews have to give.

FINALLY, however, the most striking evidence of the desire for group survival is the stress the parents put on Jewish education for their children—most people join the Jewish Center for that very reason. With two exceptions among the group I spoke to, the parents themselves had had a meager education. Only three adults knew Hebrew well enough to understand the prayers; about half knew Yiddish, but only one person, who had attended a Workmen's Circle school for three years, knew that Yiddish was more than an immigrant's language; in many homes the *Hadassah Newsletter* was the sole form of Jewish literature. But everyone wanted his children—particularly the boys—to have some Jewish education.

I was reminded of a tale about the rabbi of Kotzk, as told by Martin Buber. A man came to Reb Menachem Mendel of Kotzk to ask how he could make his sons devote themselves to the Torah. The Kotzker replied: "If you really want them to do this, then you yourself must spend time over the Torah and they will do as you do. Otherwise, they will not devote themselves to the Torah but will tell their sons to do it, and so it will go on. For it is written: 'Only take heed to thyself . . . lest thou forget the things which thine eyes saw . . . make them known unto thy children and thy children's children.' If you yourself forget the Torah, your sons will also forget it, only urging their sons to know it, and they too will forget the Torah and tell their sons that they should know it, and no one will ever know the Torah."

What about the children in Garfield Hills? Their parents, at any rate, are very optimistic. "Don't worry about the future"—that seems to be a general motto. "Everything is getting better," a young woman assured me. "More and more young people are joining the synagogues. Maybe they're not as religious as their parents were, but they recognize they're Jews and they want to be with Jews." One mother said, "My son knows more about Jews and Judaism than I do. I know that he'll stay a Jew all his life." Many parents argued that they counted heavily on the rabbi and the Hebrew teacher, the professional transmitters of tradition and knowledge. "It's up to the rabbis and teachers to develop the young people into good Jews," said one of the Center's more active lay leaders.

The optimism about the Jewish future was ultimately grounded in optimism about America. "This is the best country in the world for Jews," one man said flatly. Another expressed his view of the bright Jewish future in these terms: "Life is getting better and easier all the time. Our children have more leisure than we did. They will have more time to rediscover Judaism's enduring values."

Here, then, we see the Jewish way of life in America, the Jewish aspect of what Will Herberg has characterized as the American Way of Life—a way of life in which religion is neither theological nor fanatical, making no demands on personal behavior. This religion, as it lends its moral sanction to mundane purposes, reflects a middle-class outlook, and it is therefore not surprising that American Jews—who belong predominantly to the middle class—should have embraced it so enthusiastically as their own.

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RICHARD LOWENTHAL

Totalitarianism Reconsidered

One of the most fateful developments of the 20th century has been the rise of the "totalitarian" regimes, both of the Communist and the nationalist-fascist types. In both cases, revolutionary movements—organized as strictly centralized "parties" under one-man leadership and inspired by an ideological sense of their historical mission—have seized power over great nations and used it dictatorially, not only to reconstruct the state and eliminate all organized opposition but also to change the direction of social development and to transform relations with the outside world. The ideological content of the two main varieties of totalitarianism, the direction of the changes imposed on society, and the nature of the impact made by the new regimes on international relations have, of course, been vastly different. But there have also been striking parallels, not only in the ruthlessness of the terror, but in the structure of the new movements and regimes, and in their apparently self-perpetuating dynamism—characteristics which early suggested an analysis in comparative terms.

The political passions unleashed by the totalitarian revolutions could not remain confined to their supporters; and it is therefore hardly surprising that in the free countries of the West prevailing approaches to totalitarianism have varied with the major political situations. Until the 30's, the experience of Italian Fascism had been too limited to inspire serious comparison with Soviet Communism, but when the rise of Hitler suggested such comparisons, it also made them distinctly unfashionable; for the gradual awakening of Western opinion to Nazism's desperate threat to the survival of free institutions and human rights was accompanied first by hopes of an alliance between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union, and then, after the interlude of the Hitler-Stalin pact, by the reality of that alliance. The first writers to defy the main intellectual current of the time and stress the common features of both kinds of totalitarianism were religious and conservative thinkers or former dissident Communists whose books reached a wider public only if they happened to come out during the pact of 1939–1941.

The intellectual climate changed radically, however, when Hitler's fall and the Russian advance to the center of Europe were followed by the forcible imposition of Communist rule on the Soviet-occupied territory. As Western opinion awoke to realization of the cold war, the Stalinist danger came to take the place of the Hitlerite one—less warlike, perhaps, but no less threatening to fundamental Western values. Now that the facts of Hitler's extermination policy were known and the

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knowledge of Stalin's pre-war blood purges and his slave camps no longer psychologically repressed, the full horrors of which such regimes are capable were for the first time absorbed into the consciousness of the democratic nations. Under the influence of George Orwell's grim vision of *1984* and the new blood purges in Eastern Europe (following Stalin's break with Tito), discussion of totalitarianism now emphasized the omnipotence of the dehumanizing terror and its capacity to prevent the growth of any forces of reform or regeneration.

IN RECENT years, the signs of yet another change in the Western approach to the problem have been unmistakable. On one side, the East German and Hungarian risings and the near-revolutionary upheaval in Poland have suggested that the human spirit's ability to resist total control may be greater than the pessimists believed—though the fact that all these countries had ready-made totalitarian regimes imported at bayonet point, and that their genuine followers were thus much less numerous than under "home-grown" regimes, has often been underestimated. On the other hand, the post-Stalin reforms in the Soviet Union itself, and above all the disappearance of mass terrorism, have destroyed the nightmare concept of totalitarianism as a system incapable of changing from within and perhaps the final blind alley of world history. Now those who would still attempt to define totalitarianism by its extreme horrors must admit the absurd conclusion that this "ultimate" regime has more or less peacefully changed into something that no longer fits their definition; while those who believe, as I do, that the essential characteristics of the totalitarian power structure and dynamism are still found in post-Stalin Russia, have had to devote far more attention than before to the role of change, intended and unintended, within such a system.

Another problem of growing topical importance concerns the conditions in which new totalitarian movements may arise and seize power. The contemporary world seems full of potential breeding grounds for either Communist or nationalist dictatorships, particularly among those newly sovereign nations which are both economically underdeveloped and politically inexperienced. Yet broadly similar situations have sometimes led to pure military dictatorships created by simple pronunciamento without the help of a mass movement; sometimes to the rise of demagogic dictators who use the 19th-century Bonapartist technique of the plebiscite to mobilize the support of unorganized masses; and sometimes to the victory of organized political movements sworn to a leader. Indeed, there seems to be an almost continuous scale of intermediate and "mixed" forms of such "revolutionary" dictatorships; it ranges from Pilsudski's Poland and Kemal's Turkey to Mussolini's Italy, from Franco's Spain and Salazar's Portugal to Peron's Argentina, from Nasser's Egypt and Kassem's Iraq to Castro's Cuba. For those who view these varied forms of modern dictatorship as mere variations of a common type, with antecedents among the Greek city tyrants, the Renaissance rulers, and the forerunners and creators of Caesarism in ancient Rome, the distinct and unique character of modern totalitarianism tends to become blurred. Yet a closer look will show at once that the difference between totalitarian and other dictatorships remains as significant as ever.

Most of the contemporary dictatorships I have listed are "revolutionary" only in the sense that, like the Greek tyrants and the Renaissance usurpers, they come to power by overthrowing the previous regime and that they have to institute a number of initial social changes in order to reward their supporters at the expense of their enemies. But this formula proves utterly inadequate if one tries to apply it either to Soviet Russia, or Chinese Communism, or the Nazi regime. None of

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these "classical" totalitarian movements has tried to consolidate its power by renouncing its dynamism and turning conservative, domestically or externally, after implementing its immediate program; each has insisted on continuously transforming society in accordance with its ideology. (In the Bolshevik case, this dynamism has proved capable so far of outlasting four decades and the deaths of two dictators, though each of the latter provoked a prolonged crisis of succession.)

Clearly, this is something quite different from the demagogic tyrannies of the past and the majority of improvised military or military-demagogic dictatorships of the present. In brief, the distinctive, unprecedented feature of the totalitarian regimes is that they are revolutionary not only in their manner of seizing power, but in their method of maintaining it by deliberately keeping up the momentum of manipulated change—they tend to produce a "permanent revolution from above."

This dynamism appears to be closely linked with the institutions of single-party rule and with the ideology of a ruling party that preceded and created the new order. In the modern totalitarian regimes, legitimate power is vested in the party, not just in the person of the dictator: indeed it can survive the latter and be transferred to a figure comparatively unknown to the public. The party, in turn, justifies its rule and demands the cooperation of the people in the name of its ideology—its program of revolutionary change. Conversely, the changes required could not be achieved through bureaucratic state power alone; they demand the combined use of the state's repressive force and of the unique engine for coercing the governed into active cooperation which is provided by the party's monopolistic control of all social organizations. The new institution of single-party rule and the new dynamism of social change manipulated from above according to a preconceived ideology are interdependent—totalitarianism may be defined by either, because it is a regime in which the revolutionary process has become institutionalized.

THE attempt to redefine totalitarianism as a revolutionary process, however, brings us back to the question of its ultimate destiny. After all, modern Western history has seen a number of revolutions, and most of them have passed through a period of revolutionary dictatorship, as England under Cromwell and France under Robespierre's *Comité du Salut Public;* yet they are now generally regarded as "democratic revolutions," not merely because their actors, including the dictators, professed democratic ideals, but because their lasting result proved to be the overthrow of absolute monarchies and the establishment of one or the other form of democratic government. How can we be sure, then, that all the contemporary revolutions we have called totalitarian are processes of an altogether different kind? How can we exclude the possibility that at least some of the revolutionary party dictatorships of our age may prove mere phases in the familiar cycle by which the great democratic revolutions of the past have developed—from moderate beginnings through dictatorial and terroristic extremes to exhaustion and reaction, yet finally arriving at a stable new social order, free both from the shackles of the ancien régime and from the horrors and suffering which accompanied the struggle for its overthrow? The question, apart from its analytic importance, has major political implications. It involves the possible plea of "historical justification" for some of these dictatorships by their final results; it also raises the most serious objection to the approach that treats Communism and nationalist-fascist dictatorships as two subgroups of one historically new phenomenon, "totalitarianism."

For obvious reasons, no one seriously applies the analogy of the West's classical democratic revolutions to the Nazi or fascist "revolution"—least of all the Nazis or fascists themselves. But the Commu-

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nists deliberately present their actual or intended revolutions in a democratic terminology based on the Marxian interpretation of the earlier democratic revolutions of the West. And while in the case of Chinese Communism the analogy is clearly farfetched and artificial, the parallels between the early stages of the Russian revolution and the great French revolution are so evident that they have long dominated the thinking of both the Bolsheviks and their opponents, and in fact of many more or less detached historians.

For more than half a century, long before anybody talked of "totalitarianism" and indeed long before the Bolshevik seizure of power, the Russian Marxists had viewed their own historical role through the prism of the French analogy: comparisons with Jacobins and Girondists, Thermidor and Bonapartism formed part of the indispensable vocabulary of the polemics between Bolsheviks and their rivals, and later between the contending Bolshevik factions themselves. But these comparisons, so seemingly convincing before 1917, and still so powerful in Trotsky's mind during the 20's and 30's, have come to sound increasingly remote and scholastic as time went on: indeed, it is because of the growing difficulty of accommodating within the democratic-revolutionary cycle the successive phases of the Bolshevik revolution and the very longevity of its party dictatorship that more and more students have been forced to recognize a new type of revolutionary process, and to speak of "totalitarianism."

YET it remains true that up to the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917, or even to the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921, the course of Russian pre-revolutionary and revolutionary development showed undeniable parallels with the democratic revolutions of the West. There was, first, the slow but gradually accelerating growth of a new "bourgeois" society in the framework of autocratic Russia—the development of capitalist industry and the progressive disruption of the remnants of pre-capitalist relations in agriculture—and the increasingly articulate discontent of the exponents of the new society with outworn political and legal institutions and their own lack of political influence. There was the gradual awakening of the main classes of society to active opposition against the autocracy; the growing uncertainty of the old regime in the face of these pressures, causing it to alternate between half-hearted attempts at reform and periods of rigid reaction. Finally, on two occasions, the widespread exasperation caused by these policies, stimulated by defeat in war, boiled up into revolutionary crises.

After the overthrow of the Czar, events at first continued to follow the classical pattern. First, the rule of the "moderates," hampered as they were not only by their own moderation but by the collapse of traditional authority and the weakening of the bureaucratic and military machine, proved incapable of dealing decisively with the problems raised by the crisis. Then, the development of a state of "dual power" in which new organs of revolutionary democracy—in this case, the soviets of workers and soldiers—opposed the "legal" provisional government and disputed its effective control of administration and armed force. Next, the overthrow of the "moderates" with the help of these new organs by the "extremist" faction, which proceeded to implement the revolutionary program in dictatorial fashion, unhampered by vested interests or traditional ideas. Finally, the revolutionary dictatorship, soon faced by civil war and foreign intervention, hurried to create a new centralized state machine and to defend itself not only by terror, but by emergency measures which far exceeded its own original program or the desires of the majority of the people, and indeed were completely out of harmony with the actual state of economic and social development. But as soon as the fighting ended and the basic revolutionary achievements appeared se-

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cure, this system of "war communism" became untenable, and a retreat had to be sounded—leading at once to bitter conflict among the leaders of the extremist party.

It is at this point that the course of the Russian revolution began to diverge sharply from the "classical" pattern. The retreat from "war communism," and the disappointment of the utopian hopes the Bolshevik rank and file had invested in it, produced confusion and conflict, but did not lead to the revolutionary regime's overthrow by a new Thermidor. On the contrary, the economic retreat was accompanied by formal establishment of the ruling party's monopoly of political activity, and—through the ban on inner-party factions—of the leaders' monopoly of organized propaganda within the party. Then, after a period of consolidation and a crisis of succession, the same ruling party undertook another revolutionary transformation—the forced industrialization and collectivization of Stalin's first five year plan, imposed on the people from above.

Again a period of consolidation followed; again there were signs of economic relaxation, of differences among the rulers about the next step, of a decline in the prestige of the party, and of pressure for the reduction of party power by the Thermidorian profiteers of the revolution—the new administrative and economic bureaucracy. But again, the classical Thermidorian solution was avoided. The ruling party's monopoly of power was preserved at the price of the blood purge of the 30's—a purge that radically changed the party's composition by incorporating the bureaucratic "new class" in place of the old revolutionary cadres, but which, at the same time, prevented the consolidation of that "new class" as an independent political force by decimating it and by submitting its surviving exponents to party discipline. Since then, the dictatorship of the Communist party in Russia has continued, surviving a world war and another succession crisis, and with it has continued the regime's ideological commitment to further manipulated changes in the social structure—in particular its commitment to ultimately obliterating the difference between collective farm property and all-national property, which is considered a precondition for reaching the "higher stage" of Communism.

At least from 1921 onward, then, the Russian revolution has developed differently from the familiar cycle of the democratic revolutions of the West—not only in its time scale, but in its direction and basic pattern; the revolution has tended to be not self-limiting, like its predecessors, but self-perpetuating. If we now turn to the Chinese Communist revolution, whose historical starting point had almost nothing in common with the situations of late 18th-century France or of early 20th-century Russia, we find a very similar pattern of "uninterrupted revolution." Finally, the Nazi revolution arose out of problems linked to a stage of economic and social development far removed from each of the cases hitherto considered; yet its dynamism, while sharply different in both its ideological justification and its actual goal from that of the Communist revolution, tended to be equally self-perpetuating. The true uniqueness of the Russian revolution, and the root of so many misunderstandings of its nature and of so many mistaken forecasts of its future, would thus appear to be that it began like one of the democratic revolutions known from Western history, but somehow turned into a revolutionary process of a new type—to become the first of the totalitarian revolutions of our time.

The distinction between a cyclical, self-limiting revolutionary process and a progressive, self-perpetuating one seems both to fit the facts and to throw the "newness" of the totalitarian revolutions into sharp relief. Yet this distinction can hardly be accepted as historically meaningful so long as the difference in revolutionary *form* is not convincingly linked to a difference in

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content—in the type of change brought about.

On this point, a famous formula of Stalin's, dating from 1926 and dealing with the alleged differences between "bourgeois" and "proletarian" revolutions, may serve as a clue:

> The bourgeois revolution usually begins when there already exist more or less finished forms of the capitalist order, forms which have grown and ripened within the womb of the feudal society prior to the open revolution; whereas the proletarian revolution begins when finished forms of the Socialist order are either absent or almost completely absent.
>
> The main task of the bourgeois revolution consists in seizing power and making it conform to the already existing bourgeois economy, whereas the main task of the proletarian revolution consists in seizing power in order to build up a new Socialist economy.
>
> The bourgeois revolution is usually *consummated* with the seizure of power, whereas in the proletarian revolution the seizure of power is only the *beginning*. The power is used as a lever for transforming the old economy and organizing the new one . . .

The revolutions described by Stalin as "bourgeois" are, of course, the democratic revolutions of the West, while the label "proletarian" was reserved by him for the revolutionary process on which the Russian Bolsheviks were even then engaged under his leadership. If the terminology is debatable, the distinction is crucial: it suggests that the achievement of the classical democratic revolutions was to set free a social order that *already existed,* by removing political and legal obstacles to its functioning; while the totalitarian revolution uses its unheard-of concentration of power in an attempt to *create* a new social order. In the former, the state was transformed in accordance with the requirements of existing society—the "superstructure," to use the Marxian term, was adapted to the "basis"; in the latter, society itself is to be transformed in accordance with the ideas of the totalitarian party—in an unavowed reversal of the Marxian concept of history, the "basis" is to follow the dictates of the "superstructure." In the former, revolutionary force had the function of a midwife—once the birth was accomplished, its role was at an end, and the evolutionary growth of the child could take over. In the latter, the role of force is considered to be literally creative, like that of a God or at least a demiurge, and such a role has no natural limits.

Stalin's definition of the difference between "bourgeois" and "proletarian" revolutions has long been accepted as a basic pillar of official Communist doctrine; but it has rarely been noticed how radical a revision of classical Marxism its "proletarian" part implies. Yet it may well be argued that, in limiting by implication the Marxian concept of the relation between "basis" and "superstructure" to the period of the growth and political victory of the "bourgeois" order, Stalin stumbled on an important historical insight. There is good reason for believing that this Marxian concept was a generalization based on the history of Western societies since the creation of the modern state, and, in particular, on the history of the great French revolution. Therefore, in that sense, it belongs among those great discoveries of the 18th and 19th centuries which stand at the cradle of our social sciences—the discovery of the economic system as an autonomous, self-balancing mechanism, and the discovery of "bourgeois society" as an autonomous network of human relations, governed by immanent "laws" that were not necessarily identical with the positive laws of the state, and that might well prove stronger.

The historical background to all these discoveries was the detachment of specialized bureaucratic and military "state machines" from the ordinary life of society in Western Europe since the Renaissance; this ended the medieval situation in which the feudal "ruling class" had been identical with the holders of public power. Henceforth, the political and socio-

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economic sphere could develop, or stagnate, in relative autonomy, so that "contradictions" could arise between them. Such contradictions became acute as the politically unrepresented society went on transforming itself and developing new needs, increasingly defined by the growing "bourgeois" middle class and its capitalist "mode of production"—until, according to the Marxian interpretation, an adjustment of the political and legal order had to be forced by violent revolution.

One need not be committed to Marxist orthodoxy nor accept every detail of this interpretation to recognize that the underlying concept of the relations between society and state—the former originating the process of change and the latter suffering inevitable adjustment—broadly fits the particular historical period considered. But Marx expected a parallel process of social-economic evolution followed by political revolution would be repeated in the advanced industrial countries, leading to a socialist economic order and the rule of the industrial proletariat; and that expectation has not been fulfilled. The industrial countries have indeed shown a growth of new, organized "relations of production" which Marx would have no doubt acclaimed as evolution toward socialism; but the industrial proletariat, while improving its economic and social status, has shown no signs of emerging as the economically leading class. In the advanced countries, in fact, both the improvement in the living conditions and political influence of the organized workers, and the rise of new "managerial" strata to positions of economic leadership, have been accommodated within the framework of "bourgeois democracy" without giving rise to revolutionary conflict.

By contrast, revolutionary dictatorships have been created in the name of "socialism" and the "proletariat" in both Russia and China, where capitalist industry was underdeveloped and the proletariat constituted only a small minority of the population. It was Lenin's awareness of this paradox which led him first to reject the applicability of the Marxian formula to the Russian revolution and to grope for the kind of distinction that Stalin later formulated so dogmatically. Speaking at the seventh congress of the Bolshevik party in March 1918, on Soviet Russia's situation on the morrow of the Brest Litovsk peace treaty, Lenin said:

> One of the fundamental differences between bourgeois revolution and socialist revolution is that for the bourgeois revolution, which arises out of feudalism, new economic organizations gradually are created in the womb of the old order. . . . Bourgeois revolution was confronted by only one task, viz., to sweep away, to destroy all the fetters of preceding society. . . .
>
> The socialist revolution is in an altogether different position. The more backward the country which, owing to the zigzags of history, had to start the socialist revolution, the more difficult it is for it to pass from the old capitalist relations to socialist relations. To the tasks of destruction new tasks are added, incredibly difficult tasks, viz. organizational tasks. . . .
>
> The difference between socialist revolution and bourgeois revolution lies precisely in the fact that the latter has ready at hand the forms of capitalist relationships, while the Soviet power—the proletarian power—does not inherit ready-made relationships, if we leave out of account the most developed forms of capitalism which strictly speaking, affected only a small stratum of industry and hardly touched agriculture. . . .

Thus Lenin in 1918 still felt that the dilemma which forced him to break with the Marxian concept was due to "the zigzags of history" which had brought him to power in backward Russia before the expected socialist revolutions in the industrially "mature" countries. But for this historical accident, he believed, the first "socialist revolution" would not have been faced with the "incredibly difficult task" of using political power to lay the groundwork of a new social order for which the material economic conditions were still

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lacking. And Lenin never wholly lost his Marxist doubts as to just how far the Bolsheviks could succeed in creating that new order within Russia alone.

It was only Stalin who, casting aside all doubt, boldly proclaimed that this apparent reversal of the Marxian relation between "basis" and "superstructure," the use of political power as a lever for *creating* the new "relations of production" (and if need be even the productive forces), was the very criterion of a true "proletarian revolution," and the ultimate reason why the socialist transformation could not be accomplished in *any* country without violent revolution and dictatorship. What Stalin defined as the difference between "bourgeois" and "proletarian" revolution was, in fact, the difference between the relations of state and society in the familiar democratic revolutions of Europe on one side, and in the new totalitarian revolutionary process on the other.

At first sight, this difference thus appears as a straight reversal of the respective roles of state and society: in contrast to the democratic revolutions and to the Marxian theories founded on them, it now seems to be the state that initiates the process of change, and the social structure which suffers passive adjustment. But while this paradoxical formula helps to bring out the radically new character of the totalitarian revolutionary process, it is too superficial to give a correct picture of either the modus operandi or the historical origin of the totalitarian regime.

In fact, it is the totalitarian movement —the ruling party—and not the state as such which maintains the initiative of social transformation in the totalitarian regime, just as it was the totalitarian movement that created the regime in the first place. Moreover, the totalitarian ruling party always makes its specific impact on the social order by combining domination of the state with its all-pervading penetration of society founded on a monopoly of organization and information. While using the state machine as an apparatus of repression, it simultaneously manipulates all legally permitted channels of information and all social organizations so as to "mobilize" the active cooperation of the "masses" in the transformation of their lives. So far from simply transferring the initiative of change from society to the state, the totalitarian revolution thus tends to obliterate the relative mutual antonomy of state and society characteristic of modern Western history: both are now made to develop in unison not according to their autonomous laws, but to the "Laws of History" laid down in the doctrine of the totalitarian party.

These considerations do not, of course, supply a ready-made answer to either of the burning questions with which we started—the conditions for the rise of new totalitarian regimes, and the ultimate destiny of the existing ones. But by restoring the sharp outlines of the phenomenon which were in danger of becoming blurred, they point the direction in which answers may eventually be found.

A totalitarian movement does not descend on a country like a *deus ex machina;* it cannot win power without a profound social crisis. Yet there seems to be no specific *type* of social crisis which precedes the victory of *all* totalitarian revolutions and precedes *only* totalitarian revolutions. The Russian Bolsheviks won power in the course of what had started as a democratic revolutionary process; the German Nazis overthrew a parliamentary democracy when its system of government was paralyzed by the effects of an economic crisis that had thrown millions out of work and had ruined large parts of the middle classes; the Chinese Communists emerged as victors from nearly forty years of anarchy and a civil war that had started with the decay of the empire in favor of regional powers and culminated in prolonged Japanese invasion. Again, China on the eve of her totalitarian revolution was an underdeveloped country with only marginal elements of modern

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industry; Russia, though also underdeveloped in comparison with Western Europe, showed a rapid growth of capitalist industry and capitalist property relations in agriculture; and Germany was one of the world's leading industrial countries.

The one obvious common element in these crises linked to such vastly different stages of economic and political development is a sense of social deadlock; this sharply distinguishes them from the crises preceding democratic revolutions. There, an increasingly dynamic and self-reliant society pressed for a reduction in the role of the strong state it had inherited. But on the eve of totalitarian revolutions, a critically divided society turns to state power for a solution to its trouble only to find that the pre-totalitarian regime is paralyzed by a political reflection of the very social conflicts it is supposed to settle: either by deadlock within its established representative organs or by an anarchic competition between independent power centers. Thus an increasingly divided and state-dependent society comes to long for a strengthening of the weak state it has itself created!

Yet this broad picture of social division and political paralysis also applies to the situations preceding many of the coups d'état by old-style tyrants or modern military and demagogic dictators, as well as to those which precede the rise of extremist dictatorship in the course of democratic revolutions. Whether in fact a totalitarian regime, or one of those more familiar and more transitory types of dictatorship, does take power seems to depend on the presence of a totalitarian movement with a developed organization and ideology and a skillful and determined leader. Of course, the formation and growth of such a movement depend in turn on certain social and historical conditions (conditions which were not fulfilled in past ages), but they are not an automatic product of these conditions. A totalitarian movement must be consciously created as an instrument of political power and social transformation.

As to the conditions for their survival, the statement that totalitarian revolutions are "self-perpetuating" and have no inherent, natural limit does not imply that they can go on forever, only that they live as long as they manage to go on transforming society in accordance with their doctrine. This raises the question of the limits of pre-vision in total manipulation —the question, in other words, how far changes imposed on society according to plan may bring, as a by-product, unforeseen changes that interfere with the continued execution of the plan. For instance, planned industrialization in the Soviet Union has led to a level of productivity and education which has required a substantial shift from compulsion to incentives in running the economic system. In itself, such a change does not affect the basic totalitarian features of the regime, which still remains motivated by its ideological sense of mission. But it creates the problem of how long the regime can go on finding enough willing supporters for imposing further changes in the name of that mission. Or alternatively, whether it could, at the present stage of development, still return to mass terrorism as a means of imposing further changes on a reluctant population.

The totalitarian party regime does not become conservative; its impulse to keep the revolution permanent has no predetermined end; yet it may find itself increasingly frustrated by unforeseen factors of its own creation, and in a moment of weakened authority at the top—such as a succession crisis—these factors may one day prove stronger than the dynamism of the regime. History does not furnish us with a pattern that guarantees the automatic "running-down" of totalitarian revolutions; but neither do the totalitarians possess guarantees of permanent success in the total manipulation of history. The ultimate limit of totalitarianism is the impossibility of total foreknowledge in human affairs.

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SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY

OSCAR GASS

(1) Value and Limitations of Democracy

I CONFESS TO having read Sidney Hook's new book* with disappointment. I admire some of Professor Hook's earlier publications and also several chapters of this book. I believe, moreover, that I share many of the practical political conclusions of his present volume and perhaps also some of the fundamental judgments in which these conclusions are rooted. I respect in Mr. Hook a clear-spoken, tireless opponent of Soviet Communism. But I do not find that his new book constitutes a substantial contribution to the analysis of contemporary politics, or a step forward in the philosophy of democracy, or a serious examination of the roots of government in the United States.

Mr. Hook's new book set me to recalling the sad career of an entirely different book, *Stanvac in Indonesia*,† one of a series entitled "United States Business Performance Abroad." The *Stanvac* volume was prepared by a considerable professional staff as part of a general effort to demonstrate to foreign, poorer countries the benefits they could derive from investments by progressive American business. But the book omitted decisive issues (profit return, the non-participation of Indonesians in management, etc.), and it was consequently regarded by Indonesians as a phony. It added up only to Americans saying to other Americans what both—speakers and listeners—already knew, or rather thought they knew. Similarly, it seems to me that in Mr. Hook's new book, and especially in "Part One: Studies in Democracy," we have an American democrat talking to other American democrats. Does this talk reach down to fundamentals? Does it deal with what is really determinative? Would what is being said carry conviction to an outsider, or appear to him to come to grips with problems *he* found difficult? Or would such an outsider feel rather that he had been tendered only a repetition of stale formulas?

Mr. Hook identifies democracy with the principle of "freely given consent." He finds two important truths at the basis of democracy: ". . . first, that men are responsible; and second, that they are sufficiently rational to know when and where the shoe pinches and when and where not." These two considerations, he says, exclude democracy in insane asylums and institutes for the feeble-minded.

BY THE CANALS of Jakarta (or the waters of Babylon), we may consider these truths and discuss their adequacy for the foundation of government. "Well," says my Indonesian (or Iraqi) friend, "what Mr.

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* *Political Power and Personal Freedom: Critical Studies in Democracy, Communism and Civil Rights* (Criterion, 462 pp., $7.50).

† National Planning Association, Washington, D. C., 1957.

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Hook says is interesting. I have read him carefully. Our people would, of course, know when a shoe pinches—when they have shoes. But that is not our problem. We have economic (and other) problems, which call for measures much more complicated than those to ease the pinching of a shoe. The consequences of alternative choices will, in some cases, not be felt for years. Our people are unable to judge such far-reaching alternatives. Talk to them, and you will see. They cannot begin to understand the terms of these problems. I have read, in your Western political science, that people who cannot judge of measures can still judge of men, but I do not feel the force of your Western epigrams. I am not confident that I have any rational ground for believing that our people can judge the qualities of the alternative political leaderships that might compete here for a popular vote. And I wonder whether most of humanity is not nearer to the position of our people than to what you say is the political capacity of the people of the United States. How can you be so confident in recommending democracy to one and all? Espousal of democracy is a conventional gospel with which you warm yourselves at home, but have you considered your responsibility for the disappointments it may bring in other countries?

"It seems to me also that your Mr. Hook wrongly minimizes the extent to which the stability of government in the United States is the result of a general social consensus, achieved in your democratic society but, to a considerable extent, outside the processes of government. When you once divided deeply, over the freeing of the Negro slaves, the mechanism of what Mr. Hook calls 'the strategic freedoms' broke down. Then you had four years of civil war. I know that democracy is a technique for achieving agreement, but it, in turn, rests on a measure of agreement. It is, of course, formally true that, if only you agree on the technique of getting decisions, you don't have to agree on the outcome. But that is merely like saying that people can ride on the same bus even if they wish to get off at different places. The places must not be *too* different —or else they have to set a value on bus riding beyond that of getting to their destinations. Now, our people have no special historic attachment to political democracy; they regard it quite instrumentally. They reject it, if it doesn't promptly yield the things they want. That may reflect immaturity, lack of long-sightedness, but I must live out my life with the people I have—though I hope they will change.

"I AM PUZZLED also as to how Mr. Hook can fail, in writing about your American government, or any other government, to emphasize the significance of the two critical factors of political leadership and administrative professionalism. What is a modern government without these? The Communists seem to have pre-empted the emphasis on the role of leadership in depth, and nobody gives proper emphasis today to administrative professionalism in government—unless it is the British. Mr. Hook says, I know, that we are making 'a claim to infallibility' if we regard ourselves as better capable than the mass of our people of choosing a general economic program. He is wrong. We make no claim of infallibility; we think ourselves only probably less in error than those who know nothing about the matter.

"You tell me there is inevitable partiality in any judgment I make of myself and, therefore, in the judgment I make that I am qualified for political leadership, or that my friends are qualified. Very well, I try to guard against partiality. I can guard myself still further, and relinquish politics altogether. I could go into education and leave politics to the less fastidious. They won't organize government on the basis of 'freely given consent.' At best, any consent will be manipulated; in part, it will be coerced. As you know, in our country, elections are not 'held'; they are 'made.' Do you suggest that I slink away? Leave the political field to others?

"I remember your John Stuart Mill saying somewhere that, at some stages in human development—and he is not talking about insane people or the feeble-minded, as Mr. Hook does—there is nothing feasible for a community except '. . . implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one.' Perhaps that is our condition. Maybe the Russians are decisively ahead of us in the capacity to choose their political leaders; their Peter the Great came two and a half centuries ago, but our

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Sukarno (or Kassem) has come only now. Even in England a hundred years ago (and more recently), did not the stability and success of government derive not only from democracy but also from the continuity of British social allegiances, which led people to choose their representatives primarily from a single traditional governing class? We have no such continuous allegiances.

"In all your talk about democratic societies, I think you overemphasize their activity, forgetting their passivity. Man is not a vegetable, but neither is he always an alert, active, creative personality. Are you not exaggerating the importance of 'freely given consent' in your total social process? Such acts of consent are, for you, the grains of salt that give savor to the whole mixture. But your people don't participate in politics actively, the way the citizens of an ancient Greek city did. In fact, I understand your political parties are little more than lifeless shells, so far as any daily participation of the ordinary citizen is concerned.

"I admire what Nehru has achieved with parliamentary government in India, but I do not know how much of his accomplishment is due to specially gifted leadership, a British-trained administrative class, or other things we don't have. The Indians have not made much progress toward real equality of opportunity. More people starve on their streets than on ours—though their wealthy people frequently call themselves socialists.

"We do not turn our backs on democracy; we favor a good deal of what we think it means. We are against the arbitrary inequalities of status, opportunity, and income which are the inheritance of centuries in our country. We wish our people were all capable of participating, freely and actively, with some understanding, in public affairs. I would like to find a way to more democracy in our country. I would like some suggestions of what we can do politically to help ourselves go forward in these next years. But Mr. Hook's formulations of the problems of government do not help me, with his men that are responsible and his pinching shoes."

MR. HOOK has not spoken to my fancied Indonesian or Iraqi (though there are passages in his book that indicate such an intention). He has not even lifted the veil of that problem. And on political democracy for more advanced societies, Mr. Hook has said almost nothing that Hans Kelsen did not write thirty years* ago or even Henry Sidgwick seventy years† ago. (I beg the translation from Kantian positivism or critical Utilitarianism into American pragmatism.) And though it is no disrespect to Mr. Hook to compare him with those great predecessors, the comparison also reflects no advance. A 20th-century theory of government that bends itself to the plough must speak to honorable and sincere men in Warsaw as well as in Washington, in Calcutta as well as in Chicago. Mr. Hook does not.

Where Mr. Hook does join with the political thought that prevails in most of the world is in calling himself a socialist. Yet, like many of our contemporaries who call themselves socialists, Mr. Hook avoids endorsement of a program of public ownership of the means of production and distribution. He explains the principles of his own socialism, thus: ". . . no man should be a spiritual valet to another, . . . irrespective of the way any man earns an honorable living he should be treated with the same dignity accorded to any other, and . . . his material conditions of life should be such as to enable him to achieve his full growth as a human being. This, *together with the specific programs necessary to realize it,* is what I mean by socialism." (My italics.)

I do not doubt that Mr. Hook's formulation of his own socialist position is generously meant. But it seems to me to have the mellifluous tone of a college commencement speech together with the unmeaningful content familiar in that kind of address. There is nothing substantive in Mr. Hook's statement that would be rejected by Harold MacMillan, Gamel Abdul Nasser, or Nelson Rockefeller. Socialism is not to be distinguished from other public positions today (if ever) by its moral ideal, but rather by its specific economic and organizational programs for the realization of that ideal. Mr. Hook espouses no such particular programs, but points out that he supports whatever programs may be found necessary. He lays stress on the present scope of public eco-

* *Uber Wesen und Wert der Demokratie,* 2nd edition, 1929.

† *Elements of Politics,* 1891.

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nomic responsibility in the United States—but surely appreciation of American realities does not constitute an espousal of socialism. Mr. Hook also expresses, in very general terms, a preference for "partial planning" and for the deliberate reservation of some areas of economic activity to private enterprise. After that, he would test every proposed step of socialization "by its probable consequences on the democratic life of the community." Except for a little different emotional color, neither Mr. MacMillan nor Mr. Rockefeller would disagree substantially with that. But, of course, emotion is something that weighs. I do not expect to see Mr. Hook stepping forward any minute as a Rockefeller Republican or, if he were qualified by nationality, as a British Conservative! It would nevertheless appear that for Mr. Hook the symbol of socialism is today litle more than a valued reminiscence and a cherished piety. Yet it remains important, and particularly so for Americans, to remember that an affirmative attitude toward the symbol of socialism is something Mr. Hook shares with most of mankind.

THOUGH MR. HOOK'S stand for "socialism" seems loose and permissive, on the question of "democracy" he shows a desire to be more severe and exclusive. I understand his impulse. I too have gritted my teeth on hearing the Communist dictatorship described as the true democracy or the people's democracy. But we must discard any idea of progress in the language of this matter. "Democracy" has now become an affirmative symbol in almost every country. The official spokesmen of nearly every government proclaim that they have eliminated some inequality or prejudice and publicly congratulate themselves on being the real democrats. It is profitless to complain. Democracy is not a word from any science. Its copyright is not the possession of any one author, still less of any society. No one has the warrant of history, of political theory—or even of plain good manners—to insist that the word be employed only as *he* finds most useful, accurate, or meaningful. This word is a weapon, and no enemy will offer it in unilateral disarmament!

Professor Palmer identified three persons who gave early modern popular use to the words "democracy" and "democrat," in a favorable sense: Thomas Paine (1791), Maximilien Robespierre (1794), and the later Pope Pius VII (1797). The three will not be claimed with equal avidity by all modern democrats! Robespierre set the dominant tradition of those Frenchmen who called themselves democrats through 1848, and it would be arguable that Lenin has as much claim to him as has Mr. Hook. For Tocqueville (1835), democracy is equality of political and social status, and he recognizes both democracy *with* political liberty and democracy *without* political liberty. The latter usage will undoubtedly seem strained to Mr. Hook; he has not hesitated to teach the language of democracy to the Stalinites, but will he teach it to Tocqueville also?

John Stuart Mill's *Representative Government* (1861) is not infrequently claimed as a classic exposition of policital democracy; Mill advocated plural voting up to the point where the plural voters have as many votes as all other persons. If we reject all these, where will we find authority for our verbal purity? Better that we should be content to recognize the many colorings of involvement, the diversities of value and intent that all go by the same word.

(2) Toward the Understanding of Socialism

WHEN G. D. H. COLE came to the end of a laborious and dedicated life, he had published six volumes of *A History of Socialist Thought** as well as some three dozen other books. With respect to information, Cole was outstandingly qualified to write this history; it is unlikely that more than a handful of other men will ever have read so widely in the literature of socialism. Moreover, Cole was notably fair-minded; no reader of these heavy volumes can fail to see that he tries constantly to give sympathetic understanding to every variety of socialism—if not always to socialism's enemies! Cole came to public questions from

* Macmillan, 1953–58, 346 pp., 482 pp., 1043 pp. (2 parts); 940 pp. (2 parts); $5.00, $6.00, $16.00, $14.50.

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philosophy; social ideas, for him, were not merely to be apprehended, with all possible empathy, but also to be analyzed, evaluated, accepted, or rejected. Many of his evaluations seem to me well considered. Yet his history will, I believe, be consulted rather than read, and it will not be the truly authoritative source for much except some episodes in the development of British socialism. The six volumes contain hundreds of pages of commonplace material. He only occasionally pressed analysis home, and, when he did, the results were rarely novel. He is almost unfailingly sensible, but he does not stimulate with the new perceptions of a truly creative historian. Nobody ever got a new pair of eyes from reading Cole.

Cole first came to public attention about 1913, as a proponent of Guild Socialism, in rebellion against what he called the "bureaucratic collectivism" of the Webbs, Shaw, and other Fabians. The Webbs, he said, supported only "a discreetly regulated freedom," and Shaw "fundamentally, did not care a button about democracy." Cole was, like them, first of all a socialist—an enemy of the prevailing regime of private property and a proponent of collective or public ownership of the means of production and distribution. In this, he never changed: though he came eventually to be profoundly repelled by the tyranny, brutality, and obscurantism of Soviet Communism, he would not join with any non-socialist in opposition to any Soviet policy or action. First things first, and no contaminating company! But Cole called himself also a social pluralist. (Not that he was one of those socialists who find the plurality of preferences usefully expressed through a market mechanism. Indeed it seemed to me—when listening to him lecture, twenty-five years ago—that he regarded "price," "market," and "competition" as three especially dirty words.) He saw a meaningful freedom only in a society based on national guilds.

His Guild Socialism begins with a rejection of mere parliamentary democracy. General representation, he holds, is a delusion; no man can be represented generally by another. But plural representations, each for a specific function, make sense. In particular, occupational representation is significant—and the closer to daily life the more significant. Men spend most of their waking lives at work. That is where democracy is important, in the individual workshop, factory, or farm. There men are either free or enslaved: whether or not they can vote once every four or five years is of much less importance. True democracy is workers' democracy, the control over the individual production establishment by its workers "with hand and brain." This is the first stage in Cole's thinking.

After the democracy of the individual establishment, comes the joinder of all workers belonging to a single industry in one national guild—one of steel workers, another of building workers, etc. All the guilds in the nation form "a partnership," operating by mutual consent, none overruling any other, none coercing another. What will prevent the guild of the steel industry from raising the price of steel? What will prevent the guild of the building workers from raising the price of construction? Cole avoided answering such questions. He deliberately sets up the classic economist's dilemma of the indeterminacy of price under oligopoly. Having created numerous Golems in the form of national guilds, he concludes that these monsters will live in peace with one another. Cole called this design industrial democracy, and it remained, apparently, his libertarian socialist creed to the end.

At the time of writing his history, Cole acknowledged that Guild Socialism was dead everywhere—except, he said (in his last volume, signed December 1957), in the Histadrut in Israel. He notes this exception twice, though entirely without particulars. The facts are, of course, quite otherwise. Neither the Israeli kibbutz nor the Histadrut factory embodies Guild Socialist principles. The kibbutz is not an occupational establishment; it is a self-contained local community. It involves just that unifying of all immediate social experience in a single community that Cole was most concerned to fragmentize into pluralistic, functional representations. On the other hand, the individual Histadrut factory is not controlled by the workers in that particular enterprise; organized in a trade union, the workers confront their particular factory management in much the same way as workers confront management in the New York subway system. The guild is nowhere.

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FOR FIFTY years Cole was an active intellectual figure in the British socialist movement. He read everything about socialism that he could lay hands on, and he gradually built up a very wide circle of acquaintances among socialists all over the world. What, after all this experience, did he come to regard as being of the essence of socialism? Three things.

First, all socialists, he said ". . . take their starting point from the recognition of the key importance of the 'social problem' and from the belief that men ought to take some sort of collective or associative action to deal with it." By this criterion, socialism differs from all doctrines whose emphasis is exclusively—or perhaps even primarily—on *individual* effort, self-cultivation, individual sobriety, individual skill, and individual abstinence (including, as in Malthus, abstaining from having children). It is perhaps only an aberration, but an intelligible one, that socialism tends to be hostile both to personalist religion and psychoanalysis: they are regarded as seeking remedies in too individual a direction. Socialism emphasizes, in contrast, that *society* must reorganize itself properly.

Second, all socialists hold that something is basically wrong in the economic organization of non-socialist societies, a wrong related to the key institutions of property and competition. This bad organization affects both the distribution of incomes and the conduct of production. Private ownership of property results in a distribution of opportunity and income that is unjust and, at the same time, deprives society of great human potentials. The competitive struggle for daily bread is harsh and strident, demeaning if not debasing. Moreover, the private competitive order is not an efficient producer. The businessman has an eye only for his own profit; many possible social benefits go unregarded because the individual entrepreneur can not count on reaping a profit from them. Again, because businessmen's profit expectations fluctuate, the whole competitive order is violently unstable. Matters could be much improved by reconstruction of the whole system of private property (Proudhon) or by more public planning (Saint-Simon).

Third, socialists tend, according to Cole, to be ". . . deeply distrustful of 'politics' and of politicians, and [to believe] . . . that the future control of social affairs should lie mainly, not with parliaments or ministers, but with 'the producers,' and that, if the economic and social sides of men's affairs could be properly organized, the traditional forms of government and political organization would soon be superseded, and a new world of international peace and collaboration would replace the old world. . . ." Here we are approaching the idea that, in a socialist society, there would be "no governing of men but only the administration of things." The same thought comes through in the doctrine of "the withering away of the state."

CLEARLY, WITH respect to Cole's first criterion, socialists performed an important service. They did not need to convince Plato and Aristotle, nor perhaps fundamentally even Adam Smith. But they did need to convince many people. When their "social" emphasis is understood as relating to economic affairs and as a matter of emphasis rather than exclusion, their point of view is now common ground. It can no longer serve as a basis of differentiation.

The contrary is true of Cole's second criterion. The roles of private property and of competition continue to be profoundly contested issues in all societies in which any political contest remains possible. Even socialists do not hold identical views about these issues in all countries; diverse circumstances make for diverse policies. But socialists can be distinguished generally by their persistent desire to minimize the role of private property as a source of income; by their negative and challenging demeanor towards private property as a source of power; by their sympathetic attitude toward public and collective ownership of productive activities; and by their conviction that the dictates of the market are not an adequate substitute for public policy and economic control. Commonly these distinctions hold; where they no longer do, socialism has become another crude symbol—not without importance, but lacking specific content in regard to public policy.

What seems most unfortunate is that any socialist—or any other reasonable person—should be identifiable by Cole's third criterion. There lies illusion. To employ Hans

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Kelsen's trenchant phrase, the state is *normativen Zwangordnung,* a normative coercive order. All three elements are unavoidable—*norms:* rules, regulations, laws; *an order:* parent and child, student and school, worker and enterprise, passenger and carrier, elector and elected—a system of social relationships existing prior to the wills of the individual parties; *coercive:* involving penalties (including denial of benefits) for non-performance. How could it be otherwise? The limited supply of material means, the limitless character of desires, partiality in self-judgment, impulses toward domination and exploitation, the need for organization in every division of labor—all these make the state, with its regulation, its prescribed order, and its coercion a permanent aspect of the life of man in society. They have a poverty-stricken, miserable conception of the varieties of human experience who believe that the relationships of consent and coercion, in the state, are everywhere the same. But we cannot live in society without coercion. This matter should not be an issue between sensible socialists and non-socialists. The state we shall have always with us.

(3) The Crisis in Western Socialisms

ÉLIE HALÉVY, WHO died in 1937, was, in my opinion, a fine-tempered and subtle historian. His two specialties were the history of England in the 19th century and the history of socialism. His few essays on the development of socialist thought are enough to suggest our great loss in his not having lived to write the connected history of socialism which he had planned. But Halévy made a major error of analysis and forecasting in his last essays, written just before his death. In them he concluded that the outbreak of another great war—which he saw coming—would result in the establishment, in all the major democratic countries, of a practical "war socialism"; that unity demanded during war would give this socialism an authoritarian character; and that this socialism of the Caesars, once erected, would, in all probability, endure.* Right in some elements, he was yet wrong in his general vision. He made an error shared by many.

All the major democratic war combatants did build up what might be called a "war socialism" or a "war corporatism." But authoritarian control of political organization and expression was not generally instituted. Opposition was not suppressed in England even during the time of greatest danger, and there was no demeaning, panicky concern over the enemy within. In the United States, we did not hold up as well. In what Professor Corwin called ". . . the most drastic invasion of the rights of citizens of the United States by their own government that has thus far occurred in the history of our nation," we carried out a frightened, forced evacuation of our Japanese-American citizens, and, to quote Professor Eugene Rostow, "One hundred thousand persons were sent to concentration camps on a record that wouldn't support a conviction for stealing a dog." Still, the Japanese-American case was not characteristic: in general, the American people had substantially as much civil and intellectual freedom during World War II as they commonly enjoy at other times. Traditional freedoms were generally sustained also in other democratic countries that did not come under enemy occupation. In this respect, Halévy was quite wrong.

WHERE HE was, however, more profoundly wrong—and, with him, a great body of enlightened opinion—was in forecasting that "war socialism" would prove durable or, at least, lay a durable base. The contrary has proven true. Socialism has had its postwar victories, as well as defeats, but the victories have nowhere grown out of the perfecting and stabilizing of the wartime administration. On the contrary, war socialism has everywhere been dismantled. The association of socialism with war controls, and with the austerities of the immediate postwar, has even been a powerful force in undermining the acceptance of peacetime socialism in most democratic countries.

Simultaneous with the demolition of the

* *L'Ère des Tyrannies.* Etudes sur le socialisme et la guerre. Paris, 1938. A cruder version of the same conclusion is to be found in J. A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,* 1942.

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wartime control apparatus has come an economic expansion, in industrially advanced countries, that partisans are already describing as one of the great, dynamic periods in the growth of capitalism. Let us disregard the years 1945–53. They benefited, first, from the ease of setting records in a period of reconstruction and, second, from the post-Korean arms boom. But, even since 1953, expansion has not abated. We, in the United States, are less sensitive to the reality of this matter because the American economy has been among the more modest beneficiaries of this expansion. In most other industrially advanced countries, the progress has been great, and its effect on the climate of political opinion drastic. In many countries, the socialist parties have lost a substantial part of their public support and are, at least for the present, floundering badly.

WHAT ARE THE large economic facts? Let us limit ourselves to the six years from mid-1953 to mid-1959 and to industrial production alone. Japan then leads the parade. Its manufacturing production rose by about 125 per cent. In Germany, Austria and France, industrial production increased by about two-thirds. Italy lagged a little, with an increase of over one-half. In Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, Australia and Canada, the increases ranged from about 30 per cent to 40 per cent. Only in Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States were the six-year increases as little as 20 per cent. The sense of poverty was nowhere eliminated—only some professors and advertising men saw their countries as "affluent"—but poverty *was* less oppressive. Simultaneously, the influence of the socialist parties declined.

In Western Germany, the Social Democrats came gradually to the conclusion that espousal of their historic socialist position would leave them permanently in the political wilderness. They took to praising where they had blamed and denying where they had affirmed. They developed a new party program, expressing esteem for private property and respect for religion, indicating lack of interest in general nationalization, trying to identify themselves only as more equalitarian, more welfare-minded, more peace-minded, than Adenauer. Socialism was soft-pedaled, if not entirely abandoned.

In Italy and France, the democratic socialist parties amounted to something on the day of Liberation. Now they have splintered, and all the splinters are compressed between a larger Communist party, with greater working class support, on the left, and various large groups to their right. Pierre Mendès-France has indeed recently declared himself a socialist and has joined the small Parti Socialiste Autonome. In his eloquent statement* of adherence to the party, one may surely find much of the traditional resonance of democratic socialism: rejection of all that is merely vested and stale; concern for justice, interpreted in the light of social equality; adherence to parliamentary government, as distinguished from all dictatorships—whether of a Caesar, a party secretary, or a president; warm interest in human personalities and their improvement —through education and opportunity and over the barriers of birth and race; withal, a sense of history, of responsibility before all time and humanity, and of freedom from mere parochial interests. These things (perhaps with less passion, more gentleness, more tolerance of the old) were, however, also true of Abraham Lincoln. No matter. Mendès-France would probably now contend that Abraham Lincoln was also a socialist—but in a generation that knew not large-scale industry, modern fiscal and monetary theory, and the potentialities of planning!

IF WE ARE to study the same developments in Great Britain, there is no better place to start than the thoughtful, comprehensive book on *The Future of Socialism,* published in 1956 by C. A. R. Crosland. An economist, a Labor member of Parliament, reportedly close in policy to the leader of the Labor Party, Mr. Crosland makes a most appealing, reasoned case. He finds that economic growth and efficiency are now secondary issues: "I no longer regard questions of growth and efficiency as being, on a long view, of primary importance to socialism. We stand, in Britain, on the threshold of mass abundance. . . ." The theme of "the affluent society" comes through as strongly in Britain as in the United States, though—insofar as international comparisons are possible—per capita

* *Les Cahiers de la République,* Paris, 1959.

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incomes in Britain today are no higher than they were in the United States in what we are in the habit of regarding as the meager 1930's.

Effective economic power is now, Crosland argues, already in the hands of the public authorities; further creation of state monopolies would be harmful: "Though," he says, "it is interesting that the British Labour Party is almost the only important social-democratic party in the world in which a strong desire for wholesale nationalization still exists." Better, he feels, that socialists should concern themselves with education and beauty: ". . . the time has come . . . for a greater emphasis on private life, on freedom and dissent, on culture, beauty, leisure, and even frivolity." Only in one sphere does a sterner note come through—in relation to underdeveloped countries, and there he says: ". . . socialism now has more application to Britain's relations with other, poorer countries, than to internal class relations within Britain." In the very wording of this last statement, one may detect an admission that what is proposed for Britain internally is being defended as wise policy, but not really as socialism.

In like spirit, we find the vivacious British *Universities and Left Review* saying, in its autumn number, just before the 1959 election, "Without CND [Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament] supporters, Anti-Ugly protesters, African demonstrators, Free Cinema and the Society For the Abolition of the Death Penalty, we would be nowhere." The literal truth. But not socialism. And, for private life, freedom and frivolity, the ordinary British voter did not look to the Labor party. On voting day, he chose the Conservatives, and the Labor party found itself indeed nowhere. In a country with a strong executive and a weak legislature, the Labor party is consigned to a role of marginal significance in national political life for the next five years. Yet the British party remains today of greater weight than the democratic socialist party of any other major European country.

Democratic socialism is, at least for the present, in the major countries of Europe, everywhere in dissolution.

IN FORTHCOMING ISSUES

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MIDGE DECTER:

STANLEY KRAMER'S "ON THE BEACH"

At some moment during the course of *On the Beach,* the movie adaptation by Stanley Kramer of Nevil Shute's novel about the end of the world, one of the characters remarks that people must have an instinct for getting indoors and into bed to die. It is this idea which becomes the film's most effective cinematic device for portraying the last days of the last men on earth—after the atomic holocaust, when huge radioactive clouds are sweeping away what the war has left behind. The year is 1964. It is not clear how long the war has been over—a few months maybe, or weeks—or quite how it took place; somewhere there is a hint that the Russians attacked and "were expunged" by an American counter-attack. To the best of anyone's knowledge, only Australia (where most of the movie takes place) and New Zealand still boast human habitation, and the scientists are predicting that radioactive dust—moving from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere—will close in on these places in five or six months and wipe out the whole population in a matter of a few days. There is only one "hope": a scientist has a theory that the Arctic region may for some reason or other have escaped; this theory is exploded in a reconnaissance trip to the Arctic made by the one remaining United States submarine. A strange, unintelligible radio signal from the vicinity of San Diego is investigated, too, and turns out to be the result of a coke bottle's knocking against a radio key. So the remnant of mankind settle down to die, which, by the end of the film, they have already begun to do—disappearing quietly from off the streets.

In fact, everything that happens in *On the Beach* happens quietly. There are countless long slow shots in which the characters go about their final bit of living: fixing the morning tea and warming baby's bottle; sailing wordlessly in a racing yacht; preparing to make love in a country retreat against a background of monotonous drunken singing; even an auto race, with only the steady roar of the cars going round and round the track, becomes a quiet occasion—a handful of unexcited onlookers stand watching, and when the cars crash and burst into flame, to whom can it matter? In the submarine sequence we see American sailors lining up at the periscope for a glimpse of San Francisco (they were in the Pacific during the war, and this is their first sight of home). There is one jittery blast of music, and then San Francisco flashes onto the screen: a ghost city, perfectly intact and totally empty. Everything stands as if it were left but a moment ago, the seamen have nothing to say. For the audience this scene is perhaps more shocking than a heap of burning rubble. Nevil Shute's vision of the end of man by radioactivity has found its most powerful possible expression in Mr. Kramer's notion that only a cowed silence will serve as a response to his scenes of annihilation.

Mr. Kramer's technique depends a great deal on his restraint, his refusal to make any explicit comment about what the movie has to show. There are, for instance, only two real "speeches"—one by Fred Astaire (playing a nuclear physicist) and one by Gregory Peck (the submarine commander)—and even these are made reluctantly, as if they were being dragged up through layers of repression. But beyond restraint there is a refusal to be concerned with the business of how people would in fact behave when faced with the prospect of their own extinction. No one either appearing on the screen or sitting before it can possibly believe from

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the evidence of Mr. Kramer's camera that something enormous (to say nothing of terrifying or awesome) is about to happen. People walk or ride through the Australian summer streets, have a party or a picnic at the beach; a wife hopes for a promotion for her husband; a lady drunk is reclaimed by love; a man whose wife and children had been left in America turns down the lady's advances on grounds of fidelity. Here and there someone mentions bravery or "being realistic" or his inability to comprehend what has happened, but the movie never really makes the point that the last men on earth must carry on "no matter what" or that they are too bewildered to do otherwise. For nowhere is there a gesture to suggest that someone, even for a moment, has been seized with the knowledge of his certain death.

RADIATION sickness, we are told, begins with vomiting and weakness, then becomes painful and utterly debilitating, and may take several days to kill. The death it brings is not pictured as particularly ghastly, at least no more ghastly than several other common forms. No one expresses fear at the prospect of suffering; and in any case, "when the time comes" the government distributes a pill to everyone that will effect a quick, painless suicide. People are seen lining up patiently in front of the hospitals, stating their names, the names of the members of their families, being checked off on some mysterious list, receiving a little box containing the proper dosages. (This is a piece of carrying-on-as-usual that strikes one not as unreal but as utterly insane. What possible inequity—hoarding, say—must such a system be set up to eliminate?) Suicide is doubly painless here because it doesn't even have to be committed. When there is no hope for anyone, getting up some morning and taking one small pill becomes a matter of convenience and esthetic taste.

And since most of mankind has died as a result not of bombing or starvation but of radioactivity, *On the Beach* is not upsetting in the way one might expect: on the contrary. Though it asks us to contemplate the end of the human race—and though to do so, as we must in this case, through the offices of a group of vital, glamorous people is rather unnerving—the movie creates a series of images that work to soothe rather than heighten our sense of personal horror. The war is barely mentioned, except as a kind of great bewildering "it" (whose fault was it? what started it?), and naturally cannot be described since by definition the only survivors are those who never even came near. The two American cities shown, San Francisco and San Diego, were not touched; they were only—and literally—cleaned out: there is not a single corpse to be seen anywhere, not even that of a dog or cat. The stark, oddly thrilling shots of "the destruction" on the West Coast lead us to suppose that everyone, even without the benefit of pills, had enough time to die decently, and arranged to do so. Nor is the life in Australia "postwar" in the usual way. There are some shortages, material and spiritual, but not enough time is left for any of them to become acute. The last community in the world will be allowed to cross over—as the camera assures us most of the already dead have done—instantly from total life to total death.

Now, there may be a certain intellectual horror in knowing that in one moment—or even within the space of a few days—all life on earth will cease. It is, however, not this aspect of a hydrogen war that lies at the base of our deepest anxiety: what we all really fear is the pain, terror, and suffering that would undoubtedly attend such a war, and perhaps even the possibility that we ourselves would be left after it was over, sick and maimed, to pick up the pieces of a contaminated world. A man, moreover, would have to be deeply, even madly religious to suffer *personally* from the idea that in future there will be no men on earth.

Yet this is precisely the idea that *On the Beach* expresses and would presumably stir us into action about. At one point in the film we are shown a Salvation Army meeting: a huge banner hangs in the public square announcing THERE IS STILL TIME . . . BROTHER. Later we see the scene again. This time the square is virtually empty, the preacher's box deserted; the banner which had earlier summoned the Australians to salvation is flapping in the breeze, and now its message is for us. But what is there "still time" for? When Fred Astaire, the nuclear physicist, is called upon to explain why there was a war, he tells his companions it

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was the result of the existence of weapons that man had learned to manufacture but not to manage. By 1964, then, there are no such things as policies, decisions, responsibilities—only the atom and its inevitabilities. Perhaps for anyone who actually came out on the other side of an atomic war, this view would be right. What would it matter then if the war had been caused by "justified" actions or tragic mistakes? But as for us, is the movie saying there is "still time" to turn back or divert the uses of atomic power—and in favor of what, peace at any price, or conventional armaments?

The answer to this question makes no difference. Whatever meaning Mr. Kramer intended the message on the Salvation Army banner to have, the real effect of his movie is not to stir one's fears about anything, least of all about the bomb. If *On the Beach* avoids imagining what the world would really look like after an atomic war and if it never makes an attempt to portray how the last men on earth would behave while waiting for death, this is because Mr. Kramer has fallen victim to the most insidious seduction of our time—the seduction of the apocalypse. What he has given us is a fantasy in which all problems are solved by a single explosion. His Australians have achieved that perfect peace in which there is nothing more to do and nothing more to worry about; our life in the cold war seems full of strife and death by comparison. The world they leave behind is portrayed in the sweetly sad images of San Francisco and San Diego and the elegaic last days of Australia rather than in a picture of what must have become of New York or Moscow. There are scientists who say that a *real* atomic war would kill 55,000,000 Americans and leave another 10,000,000 sick or injured. In such a prospect lies the true horror; to imagine that 180,000,000 Americans will be killed is like reading a fairy tale, and has much the same effect on our feelings.

Watching *On the Beach* stirs a momentary longing to achieve what Mr. Kramer claims to be warning us against: a small world from which has been obliterated not only a life of responsibility but even death itself. It is doubtful that anyone leaves the theater thinking about how to prevent an atomic war.

TED DIENSTFREY:

A CONFERENCE ON THE SIT-INS

It is with a desire to do *something* that many Northern white college students look at the sit-in movement of their Southern Negro counterparts. (Some of us, seeing newspaper pictures of rioting Mexican and Japanese students, have envied them and their activity.) That the Northern response has been almost unanimously favorable is no surprise: of all the current social and political issues—the cold war, disarmament, the draft, planned obsolescence, the double standard—integration is the only one which does not have to be discussed. We all agree that segregation must end; we only disagree on when it will end, on what will end it, and who is responsible for ending it.

I am a Northerner, and I attend the University of Chicago—where equality is preached in the classroom, though the University itself practices segregation in administering its real estate—and I live in an almost completely Negro neighborhood which is relatively unsafe at night if one is alone. Those of us at the University who feel that ending segregation is in part our responsibility probably use methods very similar to the methods of comparable groups in other Northern schools.

We have had our student government pass resolutions decrying the present situation, and we have sent many telegrams stating our position. Several times we have tried unsuccessfully to pressure the University into enforcing desegregation on its off-campus real estate holdings. We have circulated and signed petitions addressed to city,

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state, and national legislatures and executives asking them to pass and *enforce* various anti-segregation ordinances and laws. We even attempted to elect an anti-Dawson slate to the city NAACP.* And we have repeatedly tried to get the National Student Association to endorse strong and enforceable legislative measures, but, as in the United States Senate, Northern indifference joined with Southern passion to out-maneuver us. (Now that the present NSA officers have given support to the sit-ins, we expect the Southern white students to protest strongly at this summer's convention.)

Most of our activity accomplishes little. We achieve none of the small victories which might encourage us to believe that we are not wasting our time. Some of us become disillusioned; others just look for something else to try. Through all such shifts, though, we seldom discuss the causes of segregation. We also have a much clearer idea of what we mean when we say we are anti-segregationists than what we mean when we say we are pro-integrationists—even though we use the words interchangeably. Nor do we discuss why we are against segregation.

In April 1959, we participated enthusiastically along with 25,000 other students in the Youth March for Integration. (Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., in the May *Progressive,* claims that there were 40,000 in the march; 25,000 was the figure the police reported.) With the backing of the NAACP, labor unions, Reverend King, and various other notables, the students of the country were to demonstrate in Washington—to Congress, to the people, and to ourselves—that the youth wanted segregation to end *now*. But when we went to Washington, we found ourselves walking down four back streets to the rear of the Washington Monument, and listening there to an endless number of self-righteous speeches by labor leaders and Congressmen who told us what we already knew—that integration was better than segregation. The newspapers gave us only minimal coverage, and many of us—the white Northerners, I mean—felt very little enthusiasm over attending another such event, and giving our energy and support to what seemed a kind of betrayal.

YET in February 1960 we began hearing about the Southern sit-in demonstrations, and by March we had set up sympathetic picket lines in front of Chicago's Woolworth stores. Our reasons for picketing were, as usual, mixed. We were picketing to demonstrate sympathetic support, to arouse Northern interest, to pressure Woolworth, to be part of the movement. Few of us thought we would go to jail. (One of my friends brought his schoolbooks to the picket line just in case.) But mixed as they were, our feelings must have been duplicated throughout the North. The spread of similar picket lines to other cities was in no way coordinated, and they seem to have been as spontaneous as the sit-ins themselves.

In the South, meanwhile, students *were* going to jail and others were being expelled from school. A few of these students began traveling to Northern colleges to ask for moral support and, if possible, financial support as well. (I do not know who underwrites these trips.) Two such emissaries came to Chicago, and they told us of a conference that was to be held on the 16th of April in Raleigh, North Carolina, for the purpose of trying to coordinate the goals and the tactics of the Southern sit-ins. One of the Southern Negro students suggested that we send observers, and so the day before the conference began, four of us decided to drive the thousand miles from Chicago to Raleigh to see for ourselves the students who had started something which had moved us all.

The conference—which was organized, so far as I know, by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference†—was held at Shaw University, a small Negro Baptist school in Raleigh. When we reached Shaw on Saturday afternoon—the conference had started the night before—we found that a hundred students had already arrived from the eleven Southern states in delegations ranging from Mississippi's single Negro representative to the inter-racial coed group of

* Congressman William Dawson is the leading Negro politician in Chicago. If Reverend Adam Clayton Powell is at one end of a continuum of "verbal militancy," William Dawson is at the other.

† The SCLU, whose president is Martin Luther King, Jr., was founded to work toward extending the franchise among Negro voters.

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twenty from Tennessee (this was the only inter-racial group from the South). There were, in addition, about sixty students from Northern schools and the majority of them were white. When the housing director saw us, she said in a tired voice that she just hadn't expected so many people.

Yet no one, least of all ourselves, thought it strange that we had not given advance notice of our coming. We had brought sleeping bags with us and were prepared to use them. But, though most of the delegates were housed in the University's dormitories, for the four of us, the housing director found rooms in three private Negro homes.

The keynote of the conference had been given the night before by Reverend James Lawson, who, because he had led the sit-ins in Nashville, had been expelled from the Vanderbilt School of Theology. His speech was referred to several times during the day and a half we stayed in Raleigh. Apparently he had attacked middle-class complacency, concerned lest the students' middle-class attitudes would prevent them from going to jail or getting expelled from school or doing anything else that was necessary. He had also urged the students to develop their own philosophy and ideology.

In the meetings that I attended, Lawson kept insisting that the form and structure of the movement should follow the beliefs of the members. Though students chaired these meetings, Lawson sat on the stage and was consulted whenever a problem arose. I assumed that he was responsible for the main orientation of the conference: an attempt to decide whether non-violence was basic to the movement as a principle or as a tactic. Lawson himself indicated that he wanted the group to endorse non-violence as a *principle* and to work out the implications of such an endorsement. But as far as I could tell, the majority of the Southern students had merely absorbed the rhetoric of non-violence and had considered only its strategic importance. Few, for example, seem to have considered becoming conscientious objectors. For most, non-violence was the most effective tool to end segregation.

At the first session of the conference that afternoon, we broke up into small groups for discussion. Committee One, "Non-violence Speaks as a Movement," was to be attended by the heads of the various delegations. The other delegates were assigned more or less at random to seven remaining groups: "Non-violence and the College Administration," "Techniques of Non-violence," "Inter-racial Trust," "Non-violence and Financial Problems," "Preparations for Non-violence," "Jail vs. Bail," and "Strategy of Non-violence." Lawson, who did the assigning and probably chose the topics, explained that the areas overlapped and that therefore we should go to the committee to which we were assigned.

Each group met with a student leader and an adult advisor. Lawson was advisor to the first committee, the one I attended. Its chairman announced that we must decide on the "goals, philosophy, future, and structure of the movement." Lawson suggested—and justified—a reversal of the first two terms of the list: "*philosophy, goals,* future, and structure." That is, we were told once more to discuss first the "philosophy" of non-violence and then the "goal" of integration.

After preliminary attempts to define "non-violence," one student claimed that since non-violence was based on our common Christian beliefs, we all understood what it meant. I pointed out that most of the advocates of non-violence I knew in Chicago were agnostics or atheists.

Gandhi and Thoreau were invoked, and the discussion continued. But the group still could not come up with an acceptable definition. The chairman, who wanted to "get something done," kept trying to force an agreement. Several times she asked "Jim" to give us his ideas. He replied that we had to solve the problem ourselves. In desperation, the chairman finally appointed a subcommittee which, with Reverend Lawson, was to work out a definition.

The discussion then turned to "goals." To the surprise of most of the students, definition here was just as difficult. It is, after all, hard to explain the relation between a hot dog at Woolworth's and human dignity. Perhaps such an explanation is unimportant, but a major point of the entire conference, and the point of our particular committee, was to try and arrive at one.

But more than one student said that the talk was "getting us nowhere." Deeds were what they wanted, not words. And in fact,

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some of the students were so unconcerned with the talk of the conference that they left the meetings to picket.

When, sometime later, I asked a Shaw student how the sit-in movement started, he could name dates and individuals but could give no reason as to why this year and not last. I asked him how he had spent all his time last year—the time, I explained, he now spends in the movement. Again he had no answer; my questions, in fact, seemed strange to him. I asked him what he thought about non-violence. He was for it. For South African Negroes too? I asked. He had thought about that, he said, but could not come to any decisions, for it didn't seem natural not to fight back when people were shooting at you.

In the late afternoon all the delegates held a general meeting with Reverend King. He said that he had nothing special to say to us now, but as practice for his appearance on *Meet the Press* the next day, he would prefer to answer questions. The students asked for and received reassurance that their movement was a good one. At another point, King praised the movement's spontaneity, but he went on to say that by now it had become so large that it needed to define itself, it needed an organization.

King spoke at a mass meeting later in the evening. It was held in an auditorium large enough for 3,000 people, and was approximately two-thirds full. The only white members of the audience were the Northern student delegates and about a half-dozen reporters. On the stage sat the potentates of the Southern Negro community: ministers, morticians, teachers, and businessmen. There were no union men.

The program was long and interwoven with badly sung spirituals. Someone made a short impassioned speech about getting out to register and vote. A Negro teacher who had filed for Congress said a few words: for him there was only one issue, racial representation in Congress. We were asked for an "offering," and in an attempt to imitate South Africans coming forward to burn their pass books, we were asked to walk forward to give our contributions instead of dropping them into a plate. Needless to say, there was great confusion.

The long-awaited King speech finally came. As I listened, I kept comparing the King of today, attempting to retain leadership of spontaneous youth demonstrations, with the King I had heard in Chicago in the spring of 1958—the King who was the acknowledged leader of the Montgomery bus boycott. He had been more impressive in Chicago. Perhaps he was tired now, perhaps the audience did not respond adequately. In Chicago the audience had been half Negro, half white; and as King's speech moved swiftly from quoting the Greek classics to a chanting Baptist crescendo, the Negroes in the audience rhythmically interjected "amens," while the whites sedately interjected applause. At Raleigh the almost all-Negro audience mainly applauded.

King did not deliver a factual speech—either about the sit-ins or about the Alabama state government's current suit against him. In some sense, he gave an apologetic talk which defended Negro rights and encouraged the attempts to secure them. "We no longer want to eat pigs' ears and pigs' feet," he said. The audience responded to this simple statement in a manner which clearly indicated that not so long ago pigs' ears and pigs' feet had been a major part of their normal diet.* But most of the audience was now dressed in a way that pointed to the affluence of at least sometime beef eaters.

King kept using the same phrases he had used two years before in Chicago: "We have no hate for the white man," "We must love our enemy," "We are doing this for all America." If I had heard them twice, how many times must King have heard himself repeat them? And without the emotion of the Chicago speech, their meaning seemed to me unclear.

King had trouble with his hands throughout the speech. He buttoned his three-button suit, put his hands in his front pockets, moved them to his jacket pockets, unbuttoned the jacket, put his hands behind his back, almost raised them to make a point dramatic, but half-way up he let them fall.

* The only joke I heard in Raleigh was told to me by a Negro following King's speech. A Negro goes into a restaurant and asks for "pigs' feet." "Don't serve them," the counterman answers. "Chitterlings then." "Don't serve them." "Pigs' necks?" "Don't serve them." "Pigs' ears?" "Don't serve them." "White man," the Negro says, "you just ain't ready for integration."

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When he finished there seemed to be neither extreme approval nor disapproval. Everyone left the auditorium satisfied.

I got the impression that King needed rest, but simply did not have the time for it. Perhaps his remark to the students in the afternoon—about the need for organization—was his way of commenting on the enormous amount of work he had done and was continuing to do. This interpretation seemed to me more reasonable than assuming that King had in the back of his mind definite and clear objectives that were to be gained through such an organization.

The only heated discussion of the entire meeting came on Sunday: were Northerners to be represented on the temporary planning committee of the not yet established organization? Lawson and the other leaders felt that whatever ideology and/or momentum the group now had would be dissipated by Northern intervention. But to the Northerners and to many Southern participants, such "second class membership" was unacceptable. A compromise set up a de facto all-Southern planning committee which Northerners could *earn* the right to join by participating in non-violent demonstrations against segregation in the North. Sympathetic Woolworth picketing did not count as such a demonstration. The compromise seemed satisfactory to almost everyone; a few Boston students thought they might have been gypped, but they were not sure.

The various delegations began leaving after lunch; those which remained met once again to close the conference formally. One Negro from Virginia said that he felt the conference had not accomplished anything, and that he was extremely disappointed. But a majority of the group disagreed; they felt that a spirit had been created. An elderly Quaker woman told us that we had done more than most of the very many conferences she had attended. One of the original sit-in students from North Carolina said that he was satisfied.

Before we left Raleigh, the families with which we had stayed provided us with an embarrassingly large amount of food for our drive back to Chicago. Their hospitality was much beyond our expectation, and only after a while could we think of a possible explanation. Southern Negroes probably give their friends such large amounts of food for traveling because most of them would not be served at Southern restaurants.

What did the weekend mean? That with or without the help of Northern students, the South is changing. Soon Negroes will be able to eat at most restaurants, and their friends will not have to pack big lunches for traveling. And schools will be integrated, and the Negro will vote. All this will change, but—and this is what no one at the Southern conference wanted to discuss—very much in American society will not change.

As for non-violence, what can it accomplish? Gandhi is often called the spiritual leader of this movement, so it is well to look at Gandhi's accomplishments. India is no longer under British rule, and it achieved its freedom through non-violence. But Gandhi was incapable of stopping the Hindu-Moslem massacres. Nor was he able to have much effect on India's variety of the race problem, the untouchables.

The young Southern Negro today is understandably having one of the best times of his life in the process of fighting for his rights. For once he is participating in a meaningful action. King had told us how glad he was to be alive at this moment in history. He also told us that he doesn't need Khrushchev to inform him that he has an iron heel on his neck. He knows this by himself, as do all the Southern Negroes who have created and sustained their movement of non-violent direct action. But I am not so sure they know that as the movement progresses and achieves its goal, they are trading the localized and identifiable pressure of that heel on the neck for all those more general and more amorphous conflicts we all face.

MIDGE DECTER, a veteran contributor to COMMENTARY, has also written for *Partisan Review* and *Midstream*. TED DIENSTFREY, who will be graduating from the University of Chicago this year, here makes his first appearance in print.

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YOUTH IN AMERICA

The Demonology of the Superego

IN PAUL GOODMAN'S roughly 25,000-word essay, what we have is a long, anguished, soul-rending cry of pain for the crucified adolescent. The society (not the parents) has eaten sour grapes, and the children, *die arme Kinder,* their teeth are on edge. In the first section Mr. Goodman tells us that in his seminal talk with the youths on the beach of Hamilton, Canada, he turned away with burning tears in his eyes and a pain in his breast. These tears have continued to blind him so that he is to be excused from the demands of logical categories, coherent discourse, objective analysis, or rational argument. Instead he presents himself as an Old Testament prophet intoning woe unto Nineveh, repent Babylon, cleanse thyself Jerusalem, cast out the devils, the false gods. We are so moved by his deeply felt pity and identification that it matters little that he speaks from the heart, not from the head.

Let us then pass over his errors of fact (the false picture of the 19th-century farm as not oriented to a market, the fallacy of current teen-age poverty); his contradictions (more progressive education, but resurrect shame as a prime child-rearing technique); the use of jargon (Marxist, Freudian, Hip); the use of loaded terms ("front-politicians," "boondoggling production," "tribes of middlemen," "wise opinion swamped," "enterprise sabotaged"); false dichotomies ("Either one drifts . . . or one dissents totally," "either society is a benevolently frivolous racket . . . or society is serious"); oversimplifications and generalizations ("A missed revolution makes irrelevant the community that persists," "With the increase in population and crowding the number and variety of human services increase geometrically"); global parentheses ["(Let me make an analogy from psychotherapy: When a patient is schizoid, you give reassurance, protect the weak ego; when he is neurotic and can take care of himself, you attack the character-resistances.)"]; irrelevant quotations (such as from the National Recreation Congress); distorted interpretations (the aim of the Civil War was not to win "social justice and factual democracy" but to preserve the union; Pacifism appears to have some vitality as witnessed by Southern Negro youth's CORE program); slapdash categorizations (Honesty, No Child Labor, Permissiveness); and even inaccurate language ("inherited prejudice," use of "small" when he means "young"). Mr. Goodman is a polemicist not a scholar; a journalist, not a social critic, an *ecstast,* not an analyst. . . .

LET us then listen to Mr. Goodman's cry of pain and attempt to translate it so that we can assess it more accurately. What issues have been overstressed, what issues distorted, what issues omitted in his description of "youth in the *organized* society" (as opposed to the *unorganized* society, the *non-organized* society?).

Let us first note some omissions. The words *home, family, parents, father, mother, marriage, wife, girl, woman* occur seldom if at all. From my own point of view, the place to begin an analysis of youth or its culture in relation to society is within the family, that prime representative of society, noting the changes that have been wrought in the family as we have been traditionally accustomed to view it. At the same time, we would be led to a consideration of the most striking difference in the modern family, the

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emancipation of women. Certainly this has some consequence for the mother-son relationship, and certainly it has some consequences for the job market, competition, adult roles, masculinity, etc. (Who knows, it might even be the twenty-third uncompleted revolution of modern times.) At no time are we offered any of the specific anxieties that girls or women face today. Are we then to assume that with the increased marriage rate, the younger age at marriage, the increase in the birth rate, that marriage and the family are sound institutions today, that girls are excused from adolescent crisis, and are not subject to modern pressures, that young men suffer only in terms of the job market and marriage represents a conflict-free area?

I think not. Instead, let us assume that in any society the adolescent of *either* sex is faced with a crisis, and that the *rites de passage* of primitive groups serve to symbolize the struggle. What is unique for both sexes in industrial society is that for the first time immensely large numbers of adolescents are permitted the luxury that only an affluent society can afford, to prolong the stage at which an individual assumes his adult, social, occupational, familial role. Previously only the nobility, the aristocratic, or the upper-middle-class youth were free to experiment with adolescent adjustments. There is no lack of documentation of these solutions available from folk tales or novels. The playboy, the wastrel, the prodigal, the remittance man, the perpetual student, the revolutionary student, the nihilist-anarchists, the *Luftmenschen,* the *nebbish,* the cynic, the sophisticate, the drugstore cowboy, the sheik, the young buck, the young Turk, the smoothie, the dandy, the decadent; Alcibiades, Werther, the Artful Dodger, Studs, Huck, Penrod, Pollyanna, Holden Caulfield: we recognize the guises of adolescent rebellion and its resolutions. Aside from illegal devices (the Artful Dodger), all of these characterizations belong to members of the middle class. The middle-class adolescent with his traditional problems is today joined for the first time by his lower-middle-class brethren who with their less-advantaged social conditions are that much further behind in making their particular adult choices. Mr. Goodman entirely fails to deal with the class differentiation in their problem of adolescent adjustment. (The Angry Young Man is not a Teddy Boy, the Existentialist is not a *blouson noire,* the *Stilyagi* is not a hooligan.)

At the same time, *all* adolescents in industrial societies face certain other circumstances which Mr. Goodman fails to appreciate. Modern science and discovery have changed the nature of society and our characteristic means of viewing it. Change itself has become institutionalized so that the stability of traditional values has been disrupted. No one is guilty unless one follows a fundamentalist Amish point of view. Simultaneously man's position in the universe has been drastically altered: he no longer is the center of it, and in viewing his own nature he now finds that he cannot control even himself. Man has become more insignificant as his technology has become more overwhelming. Durkheim's concept of *anomie* might well have been discussed here.

In addition, youth and the middle-aged as well, have become disenchanted with the concept of Progress. It is not a question of x or y numbers of uncompleted revolutions but that the flaming banner of revolt has turned to ashes as each enactment brought with it unanticipated consequences and as some of the nature of the positive character of what had been destroyed reached awareness. Mr. Goodman notes that faith and honor are lacking. Their primary source from earlier periods was derived as a communicant in a church and as an adherent to a code that was bound up with notions of class. Today both religion and class have lost much of their vitality as appeals for integrating behavior; the knights of gang wars are not appealing figures for identification, but they exist more concretely than the religious-aristocratic Knights Templar. Democracy with its parallel strands of egalitarianism and secularism make it difficult to keep these values alive, whether in Athens or America.

WHAT I am suggesting is that there may be a basic dynamic between the factors of the division of labor, democracy, secularism, and egalitarianism and that one need not have recourse to prophetic denunciation in order to understand problems. We need the demonology of the superego only if we want to condemn, not to understand. Perhaps a

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more adequate statement of the problems that confront youth would be to recognize that there are legitimate, conflicting interests within a society, that the degree of social integration possible is in part limited by the structural features of the society, that industrial society is not wilfully evil and at the mercy of dark forces.

As for the tender emotions, love is defined by Mr. Goodman as a "temporary psychosis," and he does not mention it again except in passing reference as part of the "rat race." Courtship and marriage are not mentioned at all. So much for the poet *manqué*. The clinician *manqué* then takes over and we are treated to a scattered series of comments on sex, advice for both children and youth. Among these, sex per se, without any particular content, not heterosexual, homosexual, or even auto-erotic, appears as a liberating force in the personality. In contrast, Freud had a great deal to say about fixation and anxiety as possible resultants of the overstimulation connected with precocious sexuality. Nowhere is there any mention of civilization and its discontents necessarily resulting in the repression of infantile sexuality, nowhere is there any mention of the concept of sublimation as offering some kind of gratification, nowhere is there any discussion of the concept of fusion and neutralization of sexual instincts. Whether or not one agrees with Freud, as I take it Mr. Goodman and Mr. Reich do not, what forms of social organization does he propose for his youth-growing-up-with-a-need-for-sex-without-love? With love reduced to a temporary psychotic reaction and sex a kind of nonspecific genital irrigation, Huxley's anticipation of drugs (soma) as a substitute for both offers new insight into today's young pushers. Drugs are more effective as a stimulant (do-it-yourself-club) than sex without love. No, love is not an important emotion for Mr. Goodman, and I suspect from his articles he would substitute anger and disgust in its place. *Ira* not *Eros* makes his world go around.

Adolescence is generally noted as a time when young people seek one another and form friendships: another manifestation of *Eros*. Yet Mr. Goodman makes no mention of friendship as an important concept (though in all honesty he does mention "peer-group" and "peers" once). His adolescents stand alone, crushed by the brutal adult world or else band together in asocial gangs. Once more some kind of personal association seems lacking in his picture. Similarly the asceticism, idealism, and theorizing of adolescents that Anna Freud discusses are omitted by Mr. Goodman. Their transformation into athlete worship, YMCA piety, Graham quackery, bobby-soxing, and science-fiction are similarly omitted.

Freud once commented that we might well measure the attainments of a man by noting his ability to work, to love, and to play. As I indicated, Mr. Goodman doesn't think much of love, and he has some strange ideas about play. He calls it leisure, but with a difference. For him it must be "serious leisure," with "community necessity," to "avoid shame and achieve grandeur." General de Gaulle might very well approve of this, but poor Einstein or Sherlock Holmes, fiddling away for relaxation, would have to go to the foot of the class. The concept of play as a temporary regression to a nonserious occupation from which one emerges refreshed is not to be permitted.

THE core of Mr. Goodman's article appears to be, if I read him correctly, and I am not at all sure that I do, that our society is poisoned by the profit motive and that this infects the whole area of *work* (which, incidentally, is not distinguished from *labor*, despite Hannah Arendt's efforts) and politics. Yet isn't it clear by now that it is the problem of mass society, whether capitalist or socialist, that is the major source of difficulty? Mr. Goodman's nostalgic references to the Greeks reminds us that an aristocratic, slave-owning democracy was possible because they had only a few thousand free citizens, a small geographic area, and a high degree of homogeneity of population. I would like to see socialist China, minus our whole tainted apparatus of popular culture and profit, duplicate this with its 700-million population and its millions of square miles. Can either India or China move from a village economy to an industrialized society without mass culture, centralized planning, and the disruption of traditional institutions such as the family, the church, and the community? To ask if the benefits of science and industrialization are worthwhile would be more radical, even though the

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issue may already have been decided. To wail instead for a futuristic Disneyland which never was intended and never will be may drain off whatever non-sexual energies remain, but it won't solve the problem.

It is good to find a person of Mr. Goodman's passionate nature concerned with youth and its relation to society. After he has done his homework, some of his vagueness will pass and he should have some worthwhile things to say.

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Mr. Goodman Replies

SINCE happily I do not know Mr. Rosenblatt, I have no idea what is eating him. The latter parts of his little essay seem to spring from desire to make a speech of his own, which is fine by me; but include me out. He certainly cannot read very well.

Nevertheless, in the main burden of his complaint, that I "omit" the problems of family and love, although he is 100 per cent wrong, he is not unjustified; for there is an unavoidable misunderstanding. The COMMENTARY chapters were culled from a book, *Growing Up Absurd,* that has thirteen chapters, of which two are devoted entirely to family, parenthood, sex, and love. But these were specifically *not* chosen for the COMMENTARY series, because they might be too rough for too many readers. When Mr. Rosenblatt says that modern marriage is unsound and causes trouble, I could not agree more; also I don't know any ready solution. (By the way, I am not such an amateur in psychology as he and some of my other critics seem to think; I have for many years been a teacher of psychologists, psychiatrists, and pastors in the East and the Middle West, and am the author of a well-known text.) The strategy of my new book is first to deal with specific topics, isolated as far as possible, and then to construct a few *whole* models; and the chapters objected to happen to come from the first part. I am pleased that Dr. Popenoe, of the American Institute of Family Relations, was not put off, and praised what he did read; I hope he will like the rest as well. The topics I deal with are Jobs, Public Speech, Class Structure, Aptitude, Patriotism and Community, Marriage and Sex, and Faith. It will be seen that I proceed to what I think is *more central.*

My low estimation of love seems to be inferred entirely from the alleged sentence that "love is a temporary psychosis." Luckily I said no such monstrous thing. The actual words are, "If a young man falls *in* love, a temporary psychosis. . . ." and for this newsy epigram I could call to witness Socrates, Shakespeare, Freud (I shall provide texts on request), as well as my own and my friends' experience. I am indignant, however, as to what passages in anything I have ever written could lead to the rhetorical question, "What forms of social organization does he propose for his youth-growing-up-with-a-need-for-sex-without-love?" I am afraid that this reading comes from Mr. Rosenblatt's own fantasies. Although I am not a Reichian, I should agree with Dr. Reich that without love there *is* no sexual satisfaction. The only possible form of "social organization" would be providing therapy. Concerning the various erotic aberrations, there is considerable discussion in *Growing Up;* how could there not be? But did not the often reiterated theme of "proving" ring any bells for this perceptive critic? What does he think I mean when I say, "It is a poor kind of community they have; friendship, affection, personal helpfulness are remarkably lacking in it; they are 'cool,' afraid to display feeling"?

The problems of the boys and girls are not identical nor similar; Mr. Rosenblatt is mistaken. An average woman always *has* a worthwhile, capacity-using, and unquestionably justified career to aim at—the children —and *with that background,* to work just for money is not necessarily virulent. Her present problem, and it is a desperate one, is that there are not enough manly, independent fathers; and one of the strongest indictments against our Organized System is how it cynically invades and undermines the home and creates an *ersatz* suburban home life. A further complication for women, to which teachers at the great colleges for women will testify, is the common need to go through the song and dance of pre-

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paring for a "career" without really meaning it; this comes, for instance, to getting jobs at publishers which they sensibly quit at the first offer of marriage. (Mind, I am speaking of the average.) Delinquency, of course, has a corresponding pattern. "Incorrigibility" and sexual offenses are big items for girls (for obvious reasons); they are hardly considered delinquent for boys.

I AM told I pay no heed to class differentiation (as I pay no heed to rites of passage, though I call delinquency a religious crisis!). It happens that my book is structured on class differences, four chapters on the underprivileged, four on the middle class; but if Mr. Rosenblatt had read even what was printed, instead of blindly misreading, he must have seen many contrasting sentences, to underscore the differentiation. Indeed, given the fact that the analysis of the rat race in the second printed article is explicitly *organized* on this class principle ("Like the rat race, the class struggle had a dominant and an underprivileged group, etc."), to show how youth of various backgrounds are variously disaffected, I can only conclude that at this point in his fury, Mr. Rosenblatt is lying. If I made no use of class difference, what would be the point of my *repeated* insistence on the peculiar new *likeness* of Organization Man and Underprivileged Delinquent, to denigrate earnest lads either poor or rich? Mr. Rosenblatt's own list of kinds of middle-class rebellion is interesting; I think that on a closer look he will find that my own, "Beat, Angry, Wino, Existentialist, etc." will match fairly well as the present-day developments; and the item that he singles out as exceptional, the Artful Dodger, blossoms into what I mean by Role-playing or "Hip."

It is frustrating to be an author. Since the purpose of the chapter on Religion (plus the one on Patriotism) is to spell out *anomie* as a reaction to loss of human scale, it is onerous to be lectured on this very subject by a man who has not gone through the labors I had to write *Communitas*. The use of exploring the missed revolutions is to find something to *do* about it, to find a program. As the author of a vastly praised work in regional planning, used in every school in the country that has such a department, I could *hardly* think that the industrial system is a "wilful evil" and not beautiful and serviceable; but it *is* damned well time that we start to pick and choose in our production and distribution; and I *do* think that the forces of money and control often *deliberately* ride roughshod and exploit, are vulgar and cynical, make the rules and then give out that there is no other possible game.

Mr. Rosenblatt's best wisdom is his sentence, "A more adequate statement of the problems that confront youth would be that there are legitimate, conflicting interests within a society, that the degree of social integration possible is limited by the structural features of the society." In the conclusion of my first article I expressed the same thought by saying, "Our society has evolved a social plan, a city plan, an economy and physical plan, in which this delinquent youth is an organic part. The problem is not to get them to belong to society, for they belong *a priori* by being the next generation. The burden of proof and performance . . . [is] for the system of society to accommodate itself to all its constituent members." I don't see that his statement is more adequate, but it is always useful to have a good thing said twice.

LET me quickly run through my particular errors alleged in his beginning. I say the "Jeffersonian *ideal* . . . energized settling the West"; Agrarianism *was* a Myth, but an efficacious one (this is the whole point of Henry Nash Smith's work). Teenagers indeed spent $11 billion annually on their junk (figure of *Life* and cf. Eugene Gilbert), but the underprivileged youth in the big cities are not *these* teen-agers. There is no contradiction between using shame and progressive education; I make the very point the critic does and show it is a poor one. "Marxist" and "Freudian" are not jargon when they are used accurately—I use them accurately; "Hip" I define and use technically as a key concept. I do not use "loaded terms," I mean to riddle these people with contempt; does the critic think I am writing detached sociology? The dichotomy "either one drifts . . . or dissents totally" is explicitly and *several* times called by me an exaggeration, that, however, is *believed* by the Beat boys, with consequences. The missed revolution and the geometrical increase of human relations can be

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observed as *causality operating* in our society; I use them as middle terms, not as "generalizations." How can an analogy *not* be "global," since its purpose is to illustrate by a quick whole picture? In a discussion of religious beliefs, what is irrelevant about citing a speech by a distinguished academic calling for a "new ethics"? The aim of the Civil War was indeed to preserve the Union, but from 1863 the Civil War *won* formal rights for Negroes, which is what I say. As a long-time pacifist, pacifist editor, and kind of pacifist counselor, let me tell Mr. Rosenblatt that my friends and I would say that the pacifist revolution has been entirely missed, though we rejoice when nonviolent tactics prove their vitality, and we hope that some day we can use them to stop war. (The bother throughout here is that Mr. Rosenblatt is a man of no life experience in these matters and doesn't know what he's talking about.) As for the slapdash "categorizations" (*sic*) of the revolutions, I should like to see this critic try to give as much information in as little space without resorting to this kind of shorthand. Does he think that *any* reader mistook my "inherited prejudices" to mean genetically inherited? (What *is* eating him?)

I suppose I ought to say something about the closing buffet, that I don't do my homework, since other profound scholars, e.g. Dwight Macdonald, have accused me of the same. (Indeed, I seem to some people to be a village idiot.) Now Aristotle points out that it is the sign of an ignorant man to be more precise than the subject warrants. In books like *Growing Up, Gestalt Therapy,* and *Communitas* I am trying to say something about the whole man in an indefinitely complicated organism/environment field. My experience in reading in this interesting subject is that those authors say the best things who keep their visions central and concrete, insisting on the glaring big features, who draw on what they know intimately, and are not afraid to risk being passionately involved. Their strong errors, as St. Thomas says, are better than weak truths.

MY CHIEF difference with Frances Jordan [April "Letters"] seems to be about standards. She thinks that forty is a permissible size for a class; to me it is impossible for good teaching. I think the grammar school optimum is twenty. She asks how one handles "emotional release." By the calisthenic techniques of character analysis and by dramatics, creative dramatics, and eurythmics. "Mis-educating" is failing to woo forth the child's nature and actualize it by providing opportunities in the culture.

Hilton Kramer is correct in that my wording is elliptical: I mean, "great—so *he* thinks." I thought this would be clear from the following sentence, "he knows by the evidence of his senses that nothing could be better."

I agree with everything that Mrs. Slawson says about the need for social work. I am carelessly prone to underestimate the molecular work which, with vision, is the most important thing of all. Without vision, and simply carrying out administrative holding-the-line programs, it can fairly be called "gimmicks or social work."

FINALLY, a word for Ellen B. Hill [May "Letters"]. There has gotten to be, in the behavioral sciences, too strong an emphasis on background conditions. A good gestalt requires *both* a clear background and an adequate foreground figure which, in the present discussion, would be an objective opportunity. (Certainly the success of the Higher Horizons experiment in P.S. 43 is evidence for this.) The emphasis on the background makes perfect sense when dealing, like Freud, with neurotics; but the craze to treat social problems so, without regard for political change, institutional change, real jobs, real sex, real art, true religion, must be viewed suspiciously as trying to get people to "belong," to no matter what. My guess is that her "qualified" investigators with their "specialized" training and "grants" will discover nothing, because they are not scientists. They do not make the relevant experiments. The relevant experiments, taking seriously the whole human being, are "open" experiments in real life situations aiming at real values that can energize *high grade* behavior. They are, I submit, precisely risks at political, moral, and institutional change. I would urge her to study the Peckham experiment as a model.

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LETTERS FROM READERS

Macdonald and the Vote

To the Editor of Commentary:

After reading Dwight Macdonald's discussion of *Candidates: 1960* and the current campaign [April] I found myself wondering if one who writes like a political Jack Kerouac is making a contribution that is worth anything. . . .

Macdonald's article is not so terribly unique. During the years of covering politics I have often noticed the same fatal flaw among some literate people who are engaged in a daily retreat from life. They feel compelled to "lecture" others, including the average voter who does not like to be lectured to, or at. On the other hand, it is the Macdonalds who really do want to be lectured to, to be "told" what to think. They would be happy to follow a leader. . . .

Robert G. Spivack
Washington Correspondent
New York *Post*
Washington, D. C.

To the Editor of Commentary:

For a European-bred American, old enough to look back on some thirty years of political developments, Dwight Macdonald's "The Candidates and I" represents a curious piece of unreasoning. Taking for granted that a parliamentary democracy, especially one with a two-party system, is or has become a highly questionable blessing, we still have to admit that the alternative is a tyrannis. . . . Even though Mr. Macdonald "does not like" any of the current candidates (and who does?) he cannot overlook the fact that the President not only makes enormously important decisions that *do reach* into every private existence, but—and this is the key question—appoints a cabinet which makes policy. . . .

In the final decision an active choice has to be made because diplomacy, education, and welfare taxation, defense, housing, agriculture, market prices, etc., etc., will be decided by that slight difference in the skeletons of, say, Nixon and Kennedy. None who witnessed the effect of that first slight infringement of the German constitution, made by Bruening in 1931, will ever believe that withdrawal from one provision of free citizenship will not mean the collapse of all.

Sibyl Moholy-Nagy
Professor of Architecture
Pratt Institute
Brooklyn, New York

To the Editor of Commentary:

Mr. Macdonald says that "no major candidate is on record against civil liberties" and that "civil liberties are definitely chic." If civil liberties are "chic" then why is Dr. Willard Uphaus still languishing in a New Hampshire jail because he won't name the guests who attended his World Fellowship Camp? . . . Why were teachers in California recently fired for refusing to cooperate with a Congressional committee, or why was a professor in Illinois recently fired for advocating free love? It is true that today no major candidate is on record against civil liberties, as such. But has Mr. Macdonald forgotten that Mr. Nixon has one of the worst records on civil liberties of any contemporary American politician? . . .

Mr. Macdonald says that the "race question" is an issue only in the South, that both parties are for desegregation, and that, if anything, the Republicans are more reliable "for obvious reasons." . . . Yet, even though the Democrats are divided nationally and in Congress, their record in the North is as good if not better than the Republican record. On the other hand, the current Republican administration (which includes the Republican presidential candidate in 1960) has done the barest minimum it could get away with to either back up the Supreme Court's desegregation decisions or to help the Negroes' cause generally. . . .

Mr. Macdonald says that he assumes almost everyone is worried about the effects of radiation and he also assumes that therefore almost everyone will want to avoid

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atomic war. . . . Does he see no difference between the approach to military policy between such Democrats as candidate Symington and candidate Kennedy?

If issues do not mean much to most people, then the answer is not to ignore the issues, to leave-them-to-the-politicians-routines, but to, yes, educate people: not only through schools, etc., but through politics, through greater, not less, respect for politics nationally as well as locally. Politics is not something stuck up in the atmosphere to be controlled by a few wily politicians, ad nauseam; it is (or ought to be) an intimate part of life—not all of life, but a real part of it. . . .

To swallow whole the orthodox sociological notion that role alone determines action—i.e., that any man in the same job will do the same thing—is to buy a determinist theory that is simply not justified.

ROBERT LEE TRIPP

New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . Dwight Macdonald is one of the last rebels among contemporary writers whose delightful nastiness never fails to shock the well-adjusted "liberal mind." His refusal to vote this year may be denounced by many as a highly "un-American" activity, especially by those who believe that the "Best Man" is always the one who gets elected. But thousands of spectators are applauding, night after night, the "amusing" cynicism of Gore Vidal's campaign comedy where the struggle between two candidates only seems to indicate that the "bad" man is extremely clever, as far as politics are concerned, and the "good" one extremely inefficient and by no means fit for the office of presidency in a time of cold war. After having seen this play, written by a potential candidate of tomorrow, one can only conclude that we need more Macdonalds to clean the political atmosphere. . . .

HANS SAHL

New York City

MR. MACDONALD *writes:*

Let me first deal briefly with some specific points—

Tripp: Of course politics should be everyone's concern, not left to the pros. My point was that on a national scale the choices offered us are meaningless and that only locally do we have the knowledge and the ability to decide issues.

Moholy-Nagy: According to your last sentence, American democracy should have long since given way to totalitarianism, since for generations almost half our electorate have conscientiously (or unconscientiously) passed up one of their "provisions of free citizenship," namely voting. That we have still staggered on untotalitarianized may indicate (a) a healthy skepticism about presidential candidates, and (b) an even healthier skepticism about government.

Spivack: How even a newspaperman could deduce from my article a desire to be told what to think is puzzling. I might add that "fatal flaw" is a cliché as is "retreat from life," and since "unique" means "of which there is but one," it is incorrect to call my article "not so terribly unique."

The spy plane crisis has in some ways confirmed and in other ways shaken my resolution not to vote in the fall elections.

CONFIRMED: No Democratic candidate criticized the Eisenhower administration on the main point which is that while espionage is OK Given The Way Things Are—like licensed prostitution—espionage by plane is quite another thing, since it might mean the end of everything. Suppose some nervous or psychotic Soviet major-general had decided that U-2 "Weather Plane" was a bomber and that he had pushed a button, and that etc., etc. Or suppose a Soviet weather plane is discovered over Chicago; we have nervous and psychotic military men too. Taking such chances is irresponsible, yet no prominent Democrat made this point.

SHAKEN: The administration's handling of the episode disturbed me. Not the lies—who expects a government not to lie?—but the original insistence that espionage-by-plane would be continued and then a week later the sudden announcement that it would *not* be continued. Either the government should have recognized its error once the U-2 plane was shot down and promised no more such flights, or else it should have kept on insisting that, as Secretary of State Herter put it on May 9th: "The government of the United States would be derelict in its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet co-

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operation [in giving military information to the government of the United States—D. M.] take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and overcome the danger of surprise attack." But a week later Mr. Herter's chief announced, as he arrived in Paris for the Summit Conference, that the U. S. government had decided, everything considered, to shirk its responsibility to free peoples everywhere. I applaud the decision, though it might have been given in a more conciliatory way—Eisenhower and Khrushchev were like two kids spoiling for a fight.

I can't refrain from pointing out to my critical friends that Christian Herter is just the kind of man, intelligent and high-minded, they think it is important to get into office; yet in this crisis he has proved to be as much of a hypocrite as that liberal *bête noire,* Vice President Nixon, who was unhappily trapped, on "Open End," into a full-throated defense of his chief's non-responsibility-shirking-plane-espionage policy the very night before it was abandoned. I don't mean by all this to impugn the sincerity of Mr. Herter, or even of Mr. Nixon, but merely to suggest how difficult it is for persons in high office, or persons aspiring to the same, to make sense.

The reason I'm shaken in my resolution not to vote for anyone this fall is that the present administration's handling of the whole U-2 business seems to me even more inept than I should have expected, and that this ineptness may get us all hydrogenized, and that perhaps the Democrats may be more astute or more human. Adlai Stevenson's May 12 speech in Chicago was the moral and intellectual high point of the campaign to date. It might be worth voting for a Democrat just to get him for Secretary of State. If only he had been enough of an unpatriot and unpolitician to speak out against espionage by plane!

The Guggenheim Museum

To the Editor of Commentary:

It was more with dismay than anger that I read William Barrett's "Frank Lloyd Wright's Pictorama" [March]. . . .

Mr. Barrett is simply mistaken when he asserts what he takes to be "the key to the whole structure. He [Wright] imagined a great crown continuously and slowly flowing past the pictures." In reality, of course, Mr. Wright planned the museum for 350 persons and the occupancy requirements were only subsequently enlarged.

Mention is made of the artificial light within the museum. . . . Mr. Wright in fact provided an ingenious lighting scheme, relying upon sunlight, which (rightly or wrongly) was abandoned in favor of artificial light by the director of the museum.

Basic confusion between what Mr. Wright designed and what Mr. Sweeney (the director) altered has resulted in criticism of the lack of seating, or the lack of smaller spaces where "individual works of art could be isolated and looked at." Even a cursory investigation of Mr. Wright's presentation drawings would reveal the flexible partition system he designed for this purpose. . . .

But the most disappointing feature about the article is its lack of sympathy [and of the] respect and tolerance for the "spiritual and individual personality of the modern artist" which Mr. Barrett eloquently supports, unless, apparently, that artist happens to be an architect.

Phillip I. Danzig

New York City

The Oberammergau Passion

To the Editor of Commentary:

A reader's letter in the May issue states flatly that the story of the passion of Christ is historical and implies that criticism of the Oberammergau play is unjustified and anti-Catholic. . . .

While no serious authority doubts that Jesus existed and was crucified, there are many good reasons to doubt the improbably presented Gospel contentions that God-fearing Pharisees were power-mad hypocrites, that they forced the ruthless Pilate to execute Jesus against his will for a violation of law, and that thereafter the Romans were really always trying to protect Christians from Jewish attack. A massive work by Robert Eisler entitled *The Messiah Jesus and John the Baptist* presents clear evidence that the crucifixion was initiated by the Romans over Jewish opposition and not vice versa. . . .

Christine Miles

Akron, Ohio

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The Brownsville Syndrome*

THEODORE SOLOTAROFF

THIS is a very good first novel—noisy and anecdotal, to be sure, but at the same time written under the spell of the truth it is telling. *The Time of the Peaches* takes place in Brownsville at the bottom of the 30's—the "lost and forsaken world" that Mr. Granit first surveyed in a group of stories, several of which appeared in COMMENTARY. Stories of boyhood, written in much the same antic vein as the novel, each of them also had its indirect but bitter point to make, and the wild adventures of the narrator, his friend Usher, and their five-man gang were meant to illustrate the general ills of the life around them. The same characters and method are carried over into *The Time of the Peaches,* but the scope has now widened to focus more squarely upon the adults of the block. Taken together, the stories and the novel comprise a thick, concrete commentary on the sights, smells, sounds, humors, and miseries of the Brownsville enclave, and also, I think, a chapter in the natural history of Jewish ghetto life: for Mr. Granit shows Brownsville during the depression reverting back to its East European ancestor—a community emprisoned in its poverty, isolation, and hysteria.

What makes the novel remarkable is that the dreary analysis is carried out in so high-spirited a way. Like other American Jewish writers—Bernard Malamud, Saul Bellow, Philip Roth, Herbert Gold, Grace Paley, for example—Mr. Granit deals with his victims and sufferers by means of a comic invention that evokes and verifies suffering and loss by their half-ludicrous stances and wacky fantasies. His treatment may seem at first excessively wild—a compulsive clowning that can get on your nerves. But I suspect it is supposed to do so (like Holden Caulfield's obscenity), and it does function as part of a precise method to capture the hectic rhythms and grotesque contours of a little world that is breaking up and going mad. It is part of Brownsville's and Mr. Granit's joke that the destruction should be accompanied mainly by the comic shrug, the omnipresent "Ha, ha, nice weather we're having." However, the reader who listens closely will hear the hysteria behind the laughter.

It is also part of Mr. Granit's method that nothing very dramatic or sustained should happen in the novel. Until you catch on, it seems to be a strident and rather incoherent chronicle of small beer. There is an epic rainstorm, a five-day blizzard (nature answering the human conditions of the ghetto), a peach from the local tree that turns up with a thumbtack for a pit; but generally the episodes are scaled down to catch the block's routine mania and each day's dead end. Not even the depression is made much of: there is only one eviction (and that a special case), only one street-corner speech, and on the whole, the conventional pictures and symbols of the 30's are left out. However, if the depression is not clearly visible in the foreground of the novel, it is very much there at the back—like a slipped disc that cripples and punishes the whole body without being particularly detectable.

"Up until the depression," as Mr. Granit writes, "Brownsville had every right to exist." And as one finds it in Alfred Kazin's *A Walker in the City,* the Pitkin Avenue section, dreary and hectic to be sure, had its "healing quiet" of the Sabbath, its periods of relative abundance, its fierce aspirations: a cramped, high-strung way of life but on the whole a sane and hopeful one. The cen-

* A review of *The Time of the Peaches,* by Arthur Granit (Abelard-Schuman, 254 pp., $3.95).

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ter of Mr. Kazin's Brownsville is his mother's warm, busy kitchen and its communal life is defined by the Friday night family ritual, with its lavish dinner, the good talk around the samovar, and the records of Caruso. The ghetto of Mr. Granit, however, is that of a decade later and "assailed on all sides" by the depression. And the center of *The Time of the Peaches* is a cellar, half-filled with ashes, where first live the childless Podolskys with their seven Yiddish cats, and then a deserted wife with her five children. That the sad *nebbishe* Podolsky is the owner of the building, that the wife is the beautiful and tender Miriam, the "bloom" of the block, and that two of her children are intellectual prodigies—all of this is again part of the grim joke. So too are the illustrations of the new communal life: the card games in the cellar, for example, where famous killers play poker with neighborhood shopkeepers, amid the banging steam pipes, the kibbitzing children, and the ashes.

Mr. Granit handles the Brownsville dementia with a tender as well as comic touch, his registration of it is subtle and varied; but the cumulative effect is only the more shattering. Among the children in the novel, for example, there is the idiot son of the madwoman who refuses to vacate her flat to the Podolskys (who have themselves been evicted), and there is Bibi, one of the gang members, whose fate is to go through childhood "permanently surprised." At the other extreme are the child geniuses—particularly the five-year-old Duhvid, who spends his time working on trigonometry, or reading Kropotkin's *Methods in Incendiary Radicalism,* and in worrying if his brother, Jakie, will be able to go to City College. Both he and the eleven-year-old Jakie are also already experts in the history of Jewish persecution. Between the demented and the grotesquely brilliant are the normal boys—Usher and the all-but homeless narrator—but they are both chronically prey to fits, deliriums, and obsessions. The most moving scene in *The Time of the Peaches,* when Usher's mother takes the boys out late at night to solicit a bag of food for Miriam from the neighborhood shopkeepers, is told in spasms of nonsense language by the young narrator, who wonders if he is going crazy. However, the children but lightly reflect the permanent desperation of the persecuted and persecuting adults:

> Picture our Jews coming down the street outlined as grotesque images against the houses, noses made longer by the shadows, fluttering hands reaching to the roofs. Now they are turning against each other in anger, screaming in pain, becoming mad in their agony; and laugh, how they laugh. Then someone passes by and says, "Ha, ha, nice weather we're having."

Most of *The Time of the Peaches* is a subtly sustained development of this early description of the mad block—lifted up and defined by an imagination of the first order. What is particularly impressive about Mr. Granit is his power to be at once subtle and concrete, witty as well as bitter. Frequently, too, he produces images that have a real resonance and specification of meaning and help to connect up the setting or action with the theme. Thus a brief account of the subway train running directly overhead at once evokes the brainwashing noise of the block and develops a central, ramifying image that suggests the point of the frantic happenings that will follow:

> There were moments. The huge black ugly thing would come hurtling across our street with a loud scream, sounding for all the world like a lot of rusty chains grinding against one another. And as it came over the darkness of our drab and ugly street, there would flash a ball of fire, a streak of light, a jag of lightning, and windows would begin to dance and grimace, on toes and off toes, with smiles and without smiles, showing teeth or no teeth. . . . One had to wait but a few more minutes for the excitement above our heads to begin all over again while down below on the street, everything seemed darker and drearier than ever.

By the vigor and resourcefulness of his imagination, Mr. Granit is thus able to make a kind of poetry out of Jewish poverty, without falsifying his subject—the pathology. Similarly, he develops the second major characteristic of the ghetto (suggested above by the image of rusty chains) by various images of confinement, which reinforce his method of keeping the action either indoors or on the one block itself. The Podolskys' cellar with its bad light, noise, and ashes is a fertile source of these images; so too is the boys' hut in the back yard—barely large

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enough for the five of them to squeeze in and lie on their mattresses in the dark; so too are the crowded flats in the tenements, the small stores with their "unshielded electric bulbs . . . that only served to add to the dismal gloom." Again, one notices the contrast with Mr. Kazin's earlier Brownsville where the ghetto is made to open out in all directions and the structure of his book is controlled by a series of walks. *The Time of the Peaches* is a story of economic, cultural, and personal imprisonment, and the structure carries it merely from cell to cell within the larger cell of the block itself. It is worth noting that for all the bizarre behavior in its pages, the usual action of its characters is that of sitting—sitting in darkness.

In *A Walker in the City,* Mr. Kazin uses the relatively stable, if tense, center of his home and immediate neighborhood and the emphasized openness of the city-scapes to suggest and reinforce his main subject: the development of a strong, if again tense, young mind, freely exploring and expanding outward from the confinements of his Jewish culture, trying to make contact with the Gentile and American world. Mr. Granit inverts this method. He pulls his ghetto in upon itself and throws up walls which seem to keep out even the knowledge of a life outside, except for that of Jewish suffering in Europe. The emprisoned block, hectic and strident, becomes the perfect correlative for the individual mind of each character, shut in, darkened and agitated by troubles and obsessions. Thus while the young Kazin passionately reads and meditates and grows, the equally alert young Granit—equipped with the Jewish talent for moral inquiry—broods upon a single, compulsive fantasy of goodness somehow springing out of all this evil.

Out of the cement, the ashes, seemingly the dirt between the cracks, a peach tree has miraculously grown up, with its own strange rhythms of blooming and bearing. But during the course of the story, the tree is poisoned by the mad woman whom the Podolskys have finally evicted; shortly after, the barren Mrs. Podolsky (only slightly less mad) throws a box of thumbtacks into the yard because she is infuriated by her husband's attempt to make their flat livable. "Can thumbtacks bloom?" the boy keeps wondering. And each instance of moral beauty that he sees in Usher's mother or, particularly, in Miriam (the human embodiment of the miraculous tree—done in a complex and beautifully suggested set of parallels), the boy takes to be a sign of the possibility. Eventually, the tree does bloom and bear again, and one of the peaches is discovered to have a thumbtack for a pit. But the other boys quickly lose faith, the adults and the rabbi laugh it off, and the boy realizes finally that blooming thumbtacks and rare acts of goodness make no difference, change nothing. In a final apocalyptic vision he sees that the misery of each life on the block is irreparable and unending. And with this vision the book comes full circle, for the boy has reached precisely the understanding with which as a mature novelist he begins his account of his "lost and forsaken world."

A remarkable evocation and interpretation of Jewish life during the depression, and beneath its apparent chaos a remarkably constructed novel, *The Time of the Peaches* is also a disturbing document. The Jewish reader need not have lived in Brownsville in the 30's to test its accuracy. He need only invoke his own memories of Jewish community life, and the hypertensions of Mr. Granit's book can be verified by his listening, as it were, to his own pulse. I merely wish to suggest here, though Mr. Granit does not, that the peculiar hysteria of his book did not begin with the depression nor has it ended with it. Mr. Granit demonstrates the pure form in which it existed then and there, but in so doing recalls us to the awareness of the Jews' special intimacy with "that black, ugly thing" symbolized by the subway train. Though the Kasrilevkes and the Brownsvilles are destroyed, the ghetto endures as a state of mind, a condition of the nerves, a tendency to be pushed to the extreme, to live on edge. Thus much of the behavior in *The Time of the Peaches* seems painfully familiar and contemporary—conventional Jewish responses to adversity. Note, for example, how much of the suffering here comes simply from group- and self-punishment. Also I would suggest, that just as there is a tendency today to idealize the *shtetl* (for example, *The Little World of Sholem Aleichem*)

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as some sort of lost world of Jewish innocence and togetherness, so too is there a tendency to dote upon the virtues of Jewish survival rather than to face the price. Mendele and Sholem Aleichem knew the price and the early Peretz appears to have been haunted by it in much the same way that Mr. Granit appears to be on the record of what he has written so far. Even in Mr. Kazin's Brownsville, one also early learned that "to be a Jew meant that one's very right to existence was always being brought into question," and the account of Mr. Kazin's over-zealous, straining efforts to "make sure" by his schoolwork is an index of the price. Which is to say that the habits of response to the ghetto cannot only exceed the immediate reasons but can also survive the ghetto itself: the *tsores* of the Hester Street refuge of sixty years ago lives on in the "aggravations" today of his grandson in Los Angeles. It is not surprising, then, to find that contemporary American Jewish fiction is largely the comedy of individual moral crisis, of characters hurried to the brink by their own demons of aspiration and self-punishment, usually working hand-in-hand. Isaac Rosenfeld's Joe Feigenbaum, or Malamud's Frank Alpine, Bellow's Tommy Wilhelm, Roth's Neil Klugman, Gold's Bud the "carnie"—all of them madly asserting in one way or another their "right to existence," though it is only they themselves who seriously question or curtail it. This, of course, is only part of the recurrent pattern in these writers but it is also part of Arthur Granit's rather different joke and it is finally what makes *The Time of the Peaches* another in the series of postwar fictions which, written against the grain of Jewish self-assurances, disturb us into seeing a truth.

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

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An American "Centrist"

THE END OF IDEOLOGY. By DANIEL BELL. The Free Press. 416 pp. $7.50.

Reviewed by DENNIS H. WRONG

FOR nearly two decades now articles and reviews by Daniel Bell have been appearing in our better journals of ideas and opinion. He has been so ubiquitous a figure, expressing himself on so many subjects, that readers must have occasionally wondered if there were more than one person writing under the name. Bell has in fact had several different careers: youthful radical journalist in the early 40's, teacher of social science, labor editor of *Fortune,* globe-trotter for international committees of intellectuals. Now that he has returned to academic life as associate professor of sociology at Columbia, the publication of this collection of his more ambitious essays suggests an effort to indicate his intellectual resting places.

Range, variety, and versatility are the talents with which Daniel Bell is commonly credited. Yet the grouping together of his essays in *The End of Ideology* reveals his intellectual concerns to be rather more consistent and narrowly focused than regular readers of his magazine pieces might have anticipated. Two main themes predominate. One is what used to be called "American exceptionalism": the view that political and sociological concepts derived from the study of European societies seriously distort our vision if applied to the American scene. The other is the "end of ideology" of the title: the abating in our prosperous post-bourgeois era of the ideological conflicts between left and right which have for so long dominated Western politics. Marx and Dewey, especially as interpreted by Sidney Hook, to whom the book is dedicated, are Bell's chief intellectual mentors in developing, exploring, and illustrating these themes in their bearing on a range of topics including the bureaucratization of American capitalism, the decline in the militancy of the labor movement, the inadequacies of Mills's theory of an American "power elite," the rapid swings of the intellectual *zeitgeist* since the 30's, and the continuing boredom and emptiness of industrial work and what might be done to alleviate it.

It is possible to discern a certain formal inconsistency between the two themes. If the end of ideology applies to the Western world as a whole and reflects the stability of mature, increasingly egalitarian industrial societies, then the American immunity from divisive ideological passions which Bell consistently emphasizes as the unique virtue of our political system is no longer exceptional. There is, in fact, a dialectic between European and American experience that Bell misses—the much advertised postwar "Americanization" of Europe and the belated American adoption of reforms long advocated and in some cases long instituted by European socialist parties both helped dampen the fervors of the 30's, the decade whose epitaph Bell is writing once more in so many of these essays. In an often penetrating discussion of the "New Left" here and abroad—*Dissent,* the British "angries," the post-Hungary defectors from Communism on the continent—Bell fails to note the paradox that American radicals denounce mass culture in accents echoing European elitist or "Establishment" values, while young British leftists manifest immense sympathy and curiosity about American culture and are envious of the fluidity of status and the absence of stuffy, gilded institutions like the monarchy on this side of the Atlantic. Each group seems to wish that its own country resembled more closely its image of the other.

Except for this discussion of contemporary radicalism abroad, a review of theories of Soviet society, and some reflections on the thought of the early Marx, the essays in *The End of Ideology* deal with American life. Bell is perhaps our most conscientious and reliable historian of the return from the 30's, of the assimilation of once-radical intellectuals and trade unionists into a society which they succeeded in modifying without transforming. But by now we know this story so well in so many of its ramifications that several of these essays have inevitably lost the flavor of originality they had when they first appeared. One is struck, nevertheless, with how good the best of them are, a category in which I would place those dealing with the U.S. economy. Probing the point at which economic problems of wage determination, national mobilization policy, technological rationalization, and

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shifts in business leadership and the sources of investment funds become or touch on political conflicts, Bell refuses to be frightened by the formidable abstractions or the arrogant professionalism of the economists and determinedly locates what they have to say in its larger social and historical context.

I have more reservations about his treatment of political and cultural issues. Dwight Macdonald recently described Bell as a congenital centrist. If so, and Bell good-naturedly accepted the designation, we are here confronted with the spectacle of a centrist engaged in finding his own image reflected in the society around him, a society founded, he argues, on the politics of moderation and the culture of the middle class, yet strong and vital enough to blunt the critical assaults of both the cultural aristocrat and the utopian radical. Bell is aware of the intensity with which many intellectuals "ache for the lost Arcadia" of the 30's; he recognizes the widespread hunger for heroism, passion, a transfiguring cause. Nor is he lacking in sympathy for such an outlook, observing that the young intellectual unavoidably feels that "the middle way is for the middle-aged, not for him." And he is careful to note that "a repudiation of ideology, to be meaningful, must mean not only a criticism of the utopian order but of existing society as well."

Yet there is an irritating cageyness about all this. For Bell will not finally concede the reality of anything out there in the world to justify rebellion and rejection. His tone becomes avuncular: ah yes, young intellectuals naturally want to be fired with romantic passions—that is a *rite de passage* of their vocation. But unhappily history is unable to accommodate them, for the Age of Ideology has ended and anyway we have learned that "the tendency to convert concrete issues into ideological problems, to invest them with moral color and high emotional charge, is to invite conflicts which can only damage a society."

Now if one equates "ideology" with secular messianism few will want to deny the essential rightness of this judgment after all that has happened in this century. The trouble is that it is almost impossible to believe Bell's claim that, for himself at least, it represents a bitter, hard-won wisdom, that in giving up the delights of ideology he is really surrendering something for which he has a strong appetite. His references to the pessimism, disenchantment, *et al.* of his "generation" (he is a great player of the generations game) therefore ring hollow, and he simply sounds smug when urging the young to renounce this evil fruit. It is all very well to affirm with Machiavelli that "men commit the error of not knowing when to limit their hopes" (this quotation heads the final and title chapter of *The End of Ideology*), but the reality and indestructibility of their hopes need to be insisted on with equal force. Especially if one sees history as tragic.

But these are essentially matters of sensibility and are perhaps of secondary importance in what is not, after all, a personal testament but a series of uncommonly knowledgeable political and sociological interpretations. I find, however, that on at least two occasions Bell's centrism and "moderationism" lead him rather seriously astray on substantive questions.

In an essay which has already acquired justified celebrity as one of the very few available critiques of the fashionable notion of "mass society," Bell ably traces the origin of the idea to European reactionary and aristocratic-elitist thought. He catches Jaspers, Ortega, and other mass theorists in a number of extreme and romantic overstatements before turning to a defense of American society against the charges of social atomization, cultural mediocrity, and compulsive conformism leveled by these thinkers and their epigoni. So the American habit of establishing and joining a multitude of voluntary associations serving all conceivable purposes is invoked to refute the view that we are a rootless, alienated mass, although the very disposition to create such "artificial" social groups might as readily be considered evidence *for* as against our rootlessness. And then we are told for the umpteenth time how many good books are sold and how many symphony orchestras flourish in the United States, as if these conceivable indications of the *average* cultural level were in any way relevant to the arguments of Ortega and T. S. Eliot which bear solely on the opportunities for *high* culture. While Bell, finally, is right to chide leftist critics of mass culture for ignoring

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the possible conflict between the claims of cultural excellence and social justice, he himself then suppresses the issue by descending to the sorriest level of apologetics in defense of American culture.

Bell argues that socialism failed as a movement in the United States because American socialists of all breeds never resolved the contradiction between ethical idealism and the requirements of effective political action. Perhaps by stressing this somewhat esoteric consideration he is simply trying to avoid another rundown of the usual causes cited to explain the failure of American socialism: the lack of a feudal past, the influx of immigrants, the high standard of living, and so on. But he manages seriously to distort and oversimplify the thought of Max Weber, from whom he borrows the notion of an inevitable tension between ethics and politics. In his famous essay "Politics as a Vocation," Weber contrasted an "ethic of responsibility" with an "ethic of absolute ends." By the former he meant the recognition that to make changes in the world one must take into account its imperfection and be prepared to use ethically questionable means, i.e. force, for *all* politics involves the use of force at some level. The proponent of absolute ends, on the other hand, refuses to separate means and ends: he may simply recommend exemplary conduct or he may argue that "from good comes only good, but from evil only evil follows." Arthur Koestler's dichotomy of the Yogi and the Commissar refers to the extreme versions of each ethic.

Bell quite illegitimately identifies the Communist, the fanatic, the totalitarian extremist with the ethic of absolute ends. In fact the Communist does not, like the saint, "live his end," but is at the very opposite pole, completely dissociating means from ends, and ultimately, in his worship of the "organizational weapon" of the party, collapsing the latter into the former. Bell wants to reserve rational, expedient, "responsible" conduct for the politics of compromise and moderation which he favors, so he stands Weber's distinction on its head and obscures the fundamental dilemma of means and ends in politics which Weber grasped more profoundly than anyone else, the dilemma, in Weber's words, that "if one makes any concessions at all to the principle that the end justifies the means, it is not possible to bring an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility under one roof or to decree ethically which end should justify which means." Koestler's pseudo-tragic polarity is also a false one because though a man acts by following an ethic of responsibility somewhere, unless he is a totalitarian, "he reaches the point where he says: 'Here I stand; I can do no other.' "

Perhaps it is a measure of the ultimate limitations of centrism as a political philosophy that it so obscures the central, utterly irresolvable dilemma of politics. But this is not to deny the illumination it casts on particular issues and these essays amply attest to that.

Some Academics on Affluence

THE NATION'S CHILDREN. Edited by ELI GINZBERG. Volume I: The Family and Social Change, 252 pp. Volume II: Development and Education, 242 pp. Volume III: Problems and Prospects, 242 pp. Columbia University Press. Each volume, $4.50.

Reviewed by NATHAN GLAZER

THESE thirty-one papers were prepared as background reading for the decennial White House Conference on Children and Youth held late in March in Washington, with a vast attendance from all over the country. Clearly, a good deal of care was taken in assigning the papers, and in grouping them in volumes around some single, large theme; most of them, too, were carefully prepared and edited. There are a number of distinguished names here, and some of the less well-known contributors were clearly selected because of their special competence and knowledge.

At one time, when conferences were infrequent, it must have appeared an exciting enterprise to collect and print the papers specially prepared for them and by so doing sum up the knowledge in some wide field. As conferences became more common, and the papers read at them seemed less exciting—perhaps because those presenting them were too busy getting them ready—a greater effort was made to circulate the papers in advance as a basis for discussion at the con-

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ference; this is the nature of the present volumes.

But one of the faults of academic life today is that academicians are too confident that their disciplines have something to say about any question put before them. Every contributor to this volume knew that his paper would be read by a vast number of lay participants gathered to confer on problems of American children. Yet how leisurely so many of them summarize the approaches of their special field, or their individual researches, seeming to feel no pressure to think about the main subject of the conference—American children in the 1960's. Granting that a man who has devoted his life to a discipline may well be convinced of its importance, one still expects more humility—in the form, at least, of questioning, on page one, and not on page fifteen, the relevance of his discipline and these researches to the problem at hand.

Nor do many of the contributors feel any pressure to be at all original; one thinks of teachers with the course that has served them for years. But the academicians, now facing increased numbers of students, and more and more conferences, might do well to remember vaudeville: when it died, the performer could not repeat his successful old act, but had to develop fresh material for his larger mass audience. Of course, there is no point in being original at the cost of being wrong. Yet if the writers in this volume had felt impelled simply to say something new, that in itself, I think, might have led them to think something new. Interestingly, it is a journalist, Eric Larabee (among others we will mention later), who here seems to feel such pressure; but since he himself has no large new revelation to make, he does the next best thing: reports on two studies which, though not new, do tell us something about American children in the past. Too many contributors to these volumes seem quite content to say (and at length!) that we live in changing times—a fact we all know too well.

The volumes present other familiar faults: the exhortatory articles (the preachers so busy urging religion or scientific education or the need to learn about distant lands, that we wonder what has happened to the children); and the special disciplinary quirks (the sociologists' cheerful insistence, for ex-

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

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ample,that the family is here to stay, even though it may become something quite unrecognizeable—our interest after all is in the family we know, not the abstract form that the sociologist is convinced we will always have).

But aside from the things we don't care about knowing, and those we have already heard, what are the interesting pieces in this book? Nelson Foote points out that each of the decennial White House Conferences on Children and Youth since 1909 has been oriented to quite different problems, and he tries to consider what the special issue of the 60's might be. He tentatively suggests that—given some kind of change in our relations with Russia—it might be the full impact of American affluence. Mr. Foote interprets the new emphasis on personal realization (and he puts this in the same continuum with the search for pleasure, "fun-morality") as the proper individual reaction to a society in which certain harsh problems of survival can be eliminated; it is not, he argues, an attempt to evade these problems. Nor does he think that this new national mood necessarily means the dissolution of all disciplines: ". . . the traditional discipline of work was not really the discipline of work but of a society which imposed unpleasant toil on the majority as a condition of consumption. . . . 'Just a job' was the typical way of speaking of it, but that is not how one describes a profession. A profession offers not just a job but a career, and its morality springs from the assumption that it was entered by voluntary commitment."

In other words, work as we know it is no real discipline, nor is it much aid in personal realization, for it is hard to demand positive commitment and discipline and morality when nothing presented calls forth these responses. It is especially difficult when most of today's youth know that there are better things and know that the worst things to which others expect them to be committed often exist out of inertia and stupidity. Occupations which have the color of voluntarism and escape the wheel of necessity, which demand interest, involvement, and skill—this is one way in which the demand for personal realization may be met. These are the "jobs" a rich society can provide—indeed, Mr. Foote seems to be saying, it will inevitably provide them.

Papers by Moses Abramowitz and Seymour Wolfbein on changes in occupations and the educational requirements for occupations do indicate that the jobs we call professional and which Mr. Foote thinks produce their own morality are rapidly rising in number. From this viewpoint, one of the unexpectedly interesting articles is Harold Wool's "The Armed Services as a Training Institution"; his detailed breakdown of occupational specializations in the armed forces indicates that those in electronic equipment and maintenance (7 per cent) outnumber all those in the infantry (6.9 per cent). One may also find some support for Mr. Foote's optimistic outlook in the interesting article by Henry David on the huge increase in the number of working women and working mothers. Although this rise represents continuing poverty and misery, the fact that it also parallels a growing prosperity suggests that women are making a positive selection of occupation and profession—thus escaping from their own form of unskilled labor, the home.

Paul Goodman, in a recent series of articles in Commentary, has argued the centrality of work for understanding the problems of youth. Though his judgment as to the meaningfulness of the work provided in America contrasts sharply with Mr. Foote's, both men have seized upon a radically important theme, and there are a number of articles in this collection which afford some of the material we need to advance the discussion. Of course, statistics on occupational change settle no basic disputes, but I think it is helpful to know just what shifts are taking place in our society in the different kinds of jobs, and what increase can be detected in those jobs that may potentially be classified as challenging.

In addition, I myself found new things in Hyman Lewis's frank discussion of the Negro family and Horace Mann Bond's discussion of the distribution of talent among Negroes. There are some other interesting articles in these volumes—enough to start the discussion on American children and youth in the 60's. One only wonders if there is any way to get the specialists to contribute, more directly and more economically, to that discussion.

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

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The Victims of Caste

THE NEGRO PERSONALITY. By BERTRAM P. KARON. Springer Publishing Co. 184 pp. $4.50.

Reviewed by MELVIN TUMIN

Many of us have known in our own lives what it feels like to be socially depreciated: considered unworthy of ordinary social rewards, excluded from places where others have unquestioned access. But most of us have *not* known what it feels like to be on the wrong side of a caste line. Dr. Karon's excellent book tells us that there are important differences. An individual who has grown up inside the pale is likely to feel that people go out of their way to make trouble for him; he will fail—or refuse—to recognize real anger; he will tend to deny the existence of his own aggression, even when it is unmistakably present, and will deliberately suppress his own strong anger. His emotions become deadened and are quickly converted to their opposites without apparent cause. He is confused about his work motivations—usually he works only when prompted and not out of any inner desire—and he fears close contacts with other men. These are wounds, Dr. Karon argues, that the Southern caste system inflicts on Southern Negroes.

Dr. Karon, moreover, is to be congratulated for a remarkable job of imaginative thinking, as well as for his meticulous scientific procedure, careful statement of findings, and painstaking concern with minimizing bias. The book's entire design is connected systematically to general problems and propositions in both sociology and psychology, and its questions and findings are put into clear relation to significant social problems. At the same time, Dr. Karon makes explicit the inadequacies in his design, the gaps in his sample, the variability in the weight of his findings, and the biases which might have prejudiced the outcome.

What we learn from Dr. Karon's study more completely than ever before, is how the internal lives of those on the "wrong" side of the caste line are structured: their readinesses and resistances; where they will play touch and go with their environments and where they will relate themselves meaningfully; what they dare and what they fear. The villain of the piece, for Dr. Karon, is the caste system—not age, nor education, nor industrialization, nor rural-urban residence, nor population density, nor any single factor which by itself might help to explain differences in social behavior. Dr. Karon shows the limited relevance of such typical variables.

Unfortunately, however, he does not go on to suggest the specific factors within the caste system which are responsible for the psychological injury upon Southern Negroes. We can only speculate as to what they might be—a congeries of threats, degradations, forced emotional withholdings, insults, inculcated sense of inferiority, daily confrontation of unfavorable self-images, lack of motivational support by the regular environment, and perhaps others. Dr. Karon leaves us in some ways, with regard to the personality damage suffered by the Southern Negro, about where Durkheim left us with regard to suicide. The caste system is to Karon what *representations collectifs* were to Durkheim: the nexus of relevant factors, but with the components unexamined. Thus it might be suggested that *The Negro Personality* ends just where it should begin: at the very point where, once the ordinary sociological sources of variation have been assigned their proper place, the cultural pattern and the personality structure begin to interact. Why, for instance, should Negroes' emotions be deadened, or why should they deny their own aggression? If we ask how such dif-

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ferences might be accounted for—what is it about the varying ways Negroes and Whites are exposed to the educational system—we would be led, it seems to me, to some version of a social-psychological set of variables: self-images, ego threats, motivational supports, and the like. I cite this list as a kind of schedule of future research.

DR. KARON diagnoses the damages to Negro personality by a projective test (devised by Tomkins and Horn and known as the Picture Arrangement Test) which is, in almost every way, objectively self-scoring. If his test is indeed a reliable measure, Dr. Karon's findings must shock us, both in what they imply about the inner life of Southern Negroes, and in what they suggest generally about man's emotional life under conditions of severe repression. But how shall we satisfy ourselves on this? How does one know when he has truly detected fear of one's own anger?

The peculiar characteristic of most of the traits which distinguish Negro from White is that they result in non-behavior, in disguised action, subverted emotions, and calculated withdrawals. The crucial evidence would thus be that Negroes did not perform the decisive actions which others, less wounded, did perform. But to go one step further: when we are dealing with disguises and pretenses, so clever that they deceive even the pretender, where then is the evidence that at bottom there is so much more than meets the eye? Projective tests are, it seems to me, insufficient for getting at such information. Some day, some Negroes will have to tell some Whites, in ways more decisive and clear than projective tests now show, and in ways so shocking that they are recognized by Negro informants as well as by their White listeners as unmistakable truth, what it is they really feel. But this can probably be done only by the most alienated, atypical, "non-Negro" Negroes; and the message can probably be heard only by those Whites whom most other Whites won't believe. Perhaps, hopefully, such drastic circumstances of truth-saying and truth-hearing may not be required.

Yet Dr. Karon's work, as it stands, is precisely the kind of closely reasoned scientific investigation which may help open frontiers in constitutional interpretation. It took the various courts a total of more than fifty years to absorb the evidence that separate schools are not equal schools. Perhaps it will not take subsequent courts as long to absorb the evidence that nominally desegregated schools within a functionally segregated community hardly meet the spirit of the 14th Amendment, much less its letter. Perhaps, in other words, the Court in the future will take more direct account than it has in the past of the substantial evidence afforded by such social scientific studies as *The Negro Personality.*

In another way, this work speaks eloquently to all of us concerned with the raising of children in today's society. We steer, or try to steer, precarious and uncharted courses between teaching what is conducive to social success and what is needed for the free and generous emotional expression which most of us recognize as important to the health and integrity of the psyches of our children. Yet somehow a frightening

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number of these children seem to be ending up as organization men, mannered and success-minded, but incapable of crying and raging when they need to.

Have we not made them afraid of their own emotions? Have we not demanded that they defer their emotions in the interest of social reception, their educational careers, their community relations? Dr. Karon's work warns us, sympathetically yet strongly, that "if you cannot control your anger in a world where you are constantly being provoked, and where the direct expression of anger brings inevitable disasters, you are lost." He is here speaking of the Southern Negro under caste repressions. But the corollary implication is equally undeniable: that if you cannot express your anger when you are provoked, then you are lost, for systematic repression of anger brings disorder and death to the capacity to feel.

Religion and Theology

ANATOMY OF FAITH. By MILTON STEINBERG. Edited, with an introduction by ARTHUR A. COHEN. Harcourt, Brace. 304 pp. $4.75.

Reviewed by BEN HALPERN

IF HISTORY is what remains memorable over a span of generations, then history finds itself consistently distorted as the generations pass, owing to the original sin of the invention of writing. The men who are made memorable by their writings are not always the men whom their contemporaries and disciples found most memorable. Many a leader of his time, far outshining, in the estimation of those in the best position to know, the pen-wielders who dominate the historic record, is forgotten as soon as time passes the bounds of living memory. It is not uncommon, therefore, for those who have felt the charm and force of an eminent personality to seek to communicate its power to posterity by publishing a collection of writings.

This collection of the theological writings of the late Milton Steinberg—who at the time of his early death in 1950 had perhaps the deepest personal influence of any rabbi in America—aims at establishing a specific role for Steinberg in the intellectual history of contemporary American Jewry. The editor, Arthur A. Cohen, has contributed a long introduction in which he defines this role in the following terms:

> In every generation there are those who do more than move with the tide of culture, who succeed in transcending its conditions and thereby altering them. Such individuals may anticipate the culture, breaking with it, in order to chart new directions for its unfolding. They may also summarize in themselves so much that was best in their environment that they may anticipate and instruct the future without consciously shaping it. . . . Theirs is not yet to know the truth, but to know the incompletion of what is; not to know the future, but to know the limitations of holding with the past; to be possessors, as Bergson observed, not of the creating intuition, but of the denying intuition—an awareness of what cannot be, but an uncertainty of what is.

This, then, is a commemorative volume, but also a volume with a thesis. Mr. Cohen bases his case for the high historical importance of his old friend and teacher on the fact that, having overcome naturalism and attained religion in his youth, the mature

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

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Steinberg remained sufficiently alive to contemporary theological influences to experience and express the shortcomings of the liberal, theistic pragmatism which was fundamentally his own metaphysical belief. In support of his argument, Mr. Cohen reprints, along with earlier writings, two essays or lecture cycles by Steinberg which are devoted to an examination of contemporary theological and semi-theological theories. They deal (repetitiously) with such themes as Existentialism, both theistic and atheistic (Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre); Pragmatism, its critical doctrine and religious varieties (James, Dewey, Mordecai M. Kaplan); "Neo-Reformationism," both Continental (Barth, Brunner) and American (Tillich, the Niebuhrs); and with a number of individual thinkers—Bergson, Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, and Charles Sanders Peirce—who impressed Steinberg as contributing valuable insights to religious discussion.

To have been aware of the challenge of these thinkers and to have settled one's own account with that challenge certainly bespeaks a mind that was able to summarize in itself the best in its theological environment. But what is the nature of Steinberg's discussion of contemporary theology and philosophy? Was he really a practitioner of the "denying intuition"? Was it indeed his role, as he himself saw it, to terminate an era and clear the way for the constructive genius of a new epoch?

I do not think that his published works bear out this view of him at all. Not only cannot the material presented in *Anatomy of Faith* sustain the claim that Steinberg was a theological pathbreaker; to make such a claim obscures another and, in my opinion, far superior quality which these writings unquestionably do possess. They are superb examples of religious teaching, clear and penetrating in expression, humane in their sympathy for spiritual travails, and serene in their integrity of attained belief. If Milton Steinberg was a significantly original thinker, then the record of his true thought exists not in the sketchy surveys and simple critiques collected in *Anatomy of Faith* but in the memories of men like Arthur Cohen, Will Herberg, and Albert Salomon who found in him an emotional as

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well as intellectual support in crises of belief.

IN HIS twenties Steinberg had arrived—as he himself put it—"at a satisfactory intellectual attitude toward Judaism both actively and passively—actively in that one reads, one wrestles with the problems, passively, in that one's attitude and position gradually clarify themselves, almost of themselves, like a precipitate dissolving in the presence of some unknown, unseen reagent." One recognizes the state of attained faith, said Steinberg:

> 1. When one knows what one's own position is very definitely—and one has definite arguments that are convincing (to oneself at least) for holding that position.
> 2. When one ceases to be afraid of people who disagree and to dread the reading of hostile books.
> 3. When the restlessness departs—and peace sets in.
> 4. When everything one reads seems either false or else confirmatory of one's attitude.

Everything printed in *Anatomy of Faith* confirms the accuracy of this intellectual self-portrait. In one for whom theological issues are still critical, the passion of demonstration is concentrated on specific, technical points, and there is the feeling that until these are correctly dealt with, salvation—if not belief—must hang in the balance. Perhaps when he was studying under Morris R. Cohen at CCNY, Steinberg had this kind of theological concern. In the mature writings published here, however, no trace of it can be found. His discussions of philosophy are extremely general and the grounds on which he approves or disapproves of theological doctrines are very slight. All Steinberg is impelled to do when he confronts any disturbing idea in Kierkegaard, Barth, or Niebuhr is to show that it derives from the specific Christian background of these thinkers; having done that much, he feels free to dispose of the idea. In talking about younger Jewish writers like Jacob Taubes and Emil Fackenheim who seek Jewish analogues to doctrines that Steinberg feels able to dismiss simply because they have Christian roots, he merely makes the cursory comment that they should label their products as breaches with Judaism rather than interpretations of it.

If this is a true estimate, why should Mr. Cohen and Will Herberg (who has praised *Anatomy of Faith* in the highest terms) feel constrained to make claims for Steinberg as a theologian? The answer seems to be that for Mr. Cohen the critical need of American Jewry today is a renewed concern with theology, and therefore he is forced to frame his case for Steinberg's importance in theological terms. But the notion that this or any other age need look to theology for its regeneration is entirely unfounded. I have noted in praise of Steinberg that he was a religious man rather than a theologian; yet he, too, like so many "religionists" insists that without "true" beliefs there can be neither morale nor morality in human society. But we have had proofs of a kind that no one would wish to see repeated that *any* blind belief, no matter how perverted, is enough to instil morale. And as for morality—that is, love of the good, not the mechanical observance of taboos—it derives not from sophistication but from innocence. Theology, whether old or new, has nothing to do with it. Religion may of course produce it, but so does any form of wisdom that follows a rule of purity.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

THEODORE SOLOTAROFF, a young critic who specializes in American Jewish writing, will be teaching English next year at the University of Washington.

DENNIS H. WRONG, a veteran contributor to COMMENTARY, is in the department of sociology at Brown.

MELVIN TUMIN is professor of sociology at Princeton and the author of *Caste in a Peasant Society.*

NATHAN GLAZER is currently engaged on a study of ethnic groups in New York City.

BEN HALPERN, author of *The American Jew,* is now at Harvard's Center for Middle Eastern Studies, where he is completing work on a two-volume history of Zionism.

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